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Harry F. Sunn illc, Jr., PRO SK
#17265

FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

OCT 0 2 2009

c/o Utah Stale Prison
P.O. Box 250
Draper, UT 84020
IN THE UTAH STATE COURT OF APPEALS

Ham F. Sunhille, Jr.
Defendant Appellant

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
Appeal from the 3 District Civil Court
Case # 080903840

\s.

Judge Kate A. loomey
Jordan Credit Union
Plaintiff/Appellee

Appellate Case No. 20090398 CA

Comes now the Defendant and Appellant in the above-notated case, Harry F. Suniville,
Jr., PRO SE« to respectfully submit to this honorable Utah State Court of Appeals, this following
BRIEF OF APFF LI ANT

in my Appeal 1 am appealing the final decision of the Honoiablc Judge

Kate A. Foomev in the above-entitled action, the MhMOR \NDUM DhClMON >\M) ORDKR, entered
in this matter on April 6. 200c), but not actually recehed b> mc until c\cning mail call on
4 ; 10 '00. M\ No i ICL Of

APPEAL

in this case was mailed to all respective parties on Ma\ 3, '09.

Now. regarding this Court's jurisdiction. I have just recently recehed a letter from the Supreme
Court oi Utah, dated May 13. "09. and it tells me that this Appeals case of mine will be
transferred back to this Utah State Court of Appeals for disposition within twenty daj s

which

transfer I am not opposed to.

Mj appeal is taken from the entire judgment 1 believe that error is apparent upon the
fact of the iccord, and that the crror(s) are a matte i of substance. Specified!}, I belies e that the
\erdict is not responsive to the issues in this case as are established b\ the contested facts and
evidence that I pie\iousl\ submitted to the lower couit. 1 also believe that when one takes a hard

and honest look at the evidence previously submitted by me

and that the lower court has

apparently chosen to ignore - that surel} this higher Court will see that this evidence casts
serious doubt of credibility upon Plaintiffs disingenuous and suspect allegations that are
genuine!}, and material!}. contradicted by this evidence of mine.
Moreo"\ ei\ 1 further contend that it is I, not the Plaintiff, Jordan Credit Union, that has
been the greath more injured and grievously harmed of the two of us. and that the facts and
circumstances of this case will support the same conclusion on appeal: that I was egregiously
\ictimized h\ the Plaintiffs breaching the spirit of (and yes, even also the letter of,) the Contract
in question here, which actions of theirs, (most of it self-described,) can, at every step along the
way, only be characterized as arbitrary, capricious, hasty and recklessly negligent, not to mention
purely incompetent, and that the resultant collateral asset deficiency damages the} claim are
consequently self-inflicted damages and mistakes that 1, their much-abused loan customer,
should not be asked to pay for.
Kirthenriorc. I belic\e that the lower court erred in its failure to consider my contrary
e\ idence. and I also believe that it is an issue of appeal, the fact that despite my several requests
for a fair, and "level playingfield1"- that is, for legal assistance and'or & postponement of these
proceeding? until such time as. outside of these very much handicapping conditions of zero legal
resources while I remain in prison, and b} which I might otherwise help myself, (that is, until
March, 2010. when I could then seek out real, authentic legal representation, the better to defend
m} self) - the lowei court has additionally failed to consider these realities, too.

NATURE OF POST-JUDGMENT MOTIONS

Previously I filed with the Utah Court of Appeals a PETITION
MEMORANDI M IN SUPPORT,

and this Motion, the same as my

FOR R F VIEW, AND

NOTICE OF APPEAL,

was put into

an outgoing mailbox on May 3 rd , '09. In fact, all of these iollowing Post-Judgment Motions that
I have listed here were mailed out on Ma} 3 ld . with courtesy copies sent to 3rd District Court, and
to the opposing attorneys, as well as to this honorable Utah State Court of Appeals - except for
m} Motion and Supporting Affida\its for Waiver of Court Pecs, and these (owing to the extreme
difficulties that I face getting any kind of Xerox copies made on a timely basis,) were mailed to
the honorable Judge Kate A. Toomey. alone, on May 11th, '09.

Accordingly. 1 ask lor a supersedeas (if that is the correct term for me to use here.) to
ensure that the issuance oi an Execution ol Judgment be stayed . . . for an ARREST OF
JUDGMENT,

staging the issuance of such an execution of judgment.

Finally, please direct the Third District Court to send up a complete record of the
proceedings in the cause so that these certain alleged errors may be reviewed - particularly and
especial I) the Original documents, such as the Sheriff-prepared Impound Tow Receipt, and
other ielated evidence attached to the pleadings which went to Judge Toomey* in order that their
authenticity could be more easily determined. M\ pre\ iouslj-filed

REQUEST FOR TRANSCRIPT

asked only for a transcript ol the testimony at the Court Hearing held before Judge Toomey on

March 2 n V09.
Having already filed with Third District Court the May l5t, prison-prepared
AFFIDA\ IT FOR W A I \ ER OF COURT FEES,

and

AFFIDAVIT OF iMPECUNiosm

MOTION AND

by Inmate Funds

Accounting staff, I pray for this Court of Appeals to permit myself, as the Petitioner and
Appellant, and because I remain indigent, to PLEASE allow me to proceed without prepayment
of costs, fees, or other assessments (including transcripts of records of proceedings which are
relevant to this cause of action.) until such time as these issues have been fully adjudicated on
appeal Thank Yon!

INTRODUCTION

A concise suiopsis of my main Issues for Review that I bring before \ou with this
appeal are these:
A.) The lower Court erred in failing to consider, as "untimely" my Defendant's
R E F L \ MEMORANDUM;

[This Opposing Response and Reply Memorandum of mine was

actually mailed to the lower Court on December 4th, *08 not on January 5lh. *09, and as Judge
Toomey as mistakenly declared.]
B.) Inadequate legal resources and assistance of counsel for defense: Forced to
defend mj self PRO SE while incarcerated, I was held to impossible, unrealistic, and
unreasonable standards when holding this case in suspension until my release from prison
would have been more fair;

C.) Pivotal and key Evidence has apparently been ignored, (including signed and
notarized affidavits, and two poJice-geiienilfd doismieuK* r./..*ardin»i *he w-Ur. 'l •:-"-.
condition of my car at issue;
D.} Plaintiff victimized me, their customer, by breaching the "spirit" of our
Contract, as well as the letter of this car loan Contract at issue; My car never should have
been repossessed in the first place;
and.!:.» After repossession, Plaintiff failed So mitigate their alleged damages when
they sold my MUMJO.OO Keih Blue Kouk valued car to e sahajiv yard for onh ^JJUlXC
The factual circumstances of my ease will nn\\ follow. suaed in the; terms and eonteM of
these primary Appeal issues.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff jne! i entered into a Loan contract for purcnuse >i a ~eewe :via^uoi^ii; t.cupse in
which $12,829.°° was the total amount financed, (zero down payment.) and the car itself serving
as collateral asset security. Then for over two years, I made all of my car loan payments on time,
like clockwork, while simultaneously living up to all other of my obligations implicit to this
Contract. For example, when once Plaintiff requested, that I re-write my auto insurance policy to
beuer prolcct 'hem with*' lesw deducirk, > promptly complied in changing my insurance
policy 10 the higher-priced premiums in order to also meet these lender expectations.
Then, I was arrested on December 3, '07, and my car was impounded by the arresting
S.L. County Sheriff deputy who had pulled me over while driving my car; Notice of this was
sent to Jordan Credit Union, (the Plaintiff,) natural!} enough, because the} were the iien holder
in this automobile registered iu me. Ana, it p: unclear vdi\ the} (Plaintiff) reacted as ihe} T.d in
the sequence of choices that followed. It would appear that the\ panicked. Kit their stated
reasoning (which appear to be more like :iftcr-the-facl excuses and pretext to me.) n- that by this
fact alone - my car's temporary storage at an inipounci lot - they had the right, "on the good faith
belief" that suddenly I would be unable to meet my obligations to them, to repossess my car,
which they hastily did, 7 days later, reporting this fact, (it: a siimk uneertiivcL plain envelope
letter v^>u:k f^-

rv^neeMx ma;ie f t - nh mother^ h >use where: a went unread. \\< reason i >

suspect dire urgency needing prompt action,) as a "done deaf5 and an accomplished fact, with the

entire balance of the loan now7 suddenly accelerated and due immediately. Incredibly, this one
feeble attempt at communication with me, and which I never even saw until, out of jail in
January, (roughly six. weeks later, and please consider I might just as well, as easily, have been
out of town on. extended holiday vacation,) "was their only attempt.,, ever, at any kind of notice at
all regarding an impending sale of my car

and even though the State's Notice of Impound itself

suggested I was in jail They might easily enough done much more to ensure that such a
momentous letter was actually received by the party to whom it was intended. For example, they
certainly could have contacted my mother's bank: for over 2 years every single one of my ontime, like clockwork, monthly car loan payment.1-- pmi to .-nrdan Credit Union had been paid
direct from the bank to them. Neither did they ever pick up the telephone to call either of the
two 'Suniville' listings found in the Salt Lake City directory.
The end result was that upon my release from jail in January - and myself fully prepared
to retrieve my car from die impound lot where it was being safely stored, fully prepared to v^y
out-of-pocket the towing and storage fees incurred at the tow/impound UA

x

vac ^••J-

dismayed and shocked to learn, that not only had this Plaintiff repossessed in) car KV
unwarranted, and specious reasons, then they had, with cavalier and capricious, completely
improvident and reckless incompetence, sold this $9,000.°° Kelly Blue Book-valued, (and very
much prized) sports car of mine for only $200.00 to a salvage yard! Up until then, ray car's true
and actual resell value had been keeping pace "very nearly with the outstanding car loan balance
(approximately $8800.°° owed to them at: this time.) This lawsuit that I am herein appealing is
their subsequent attempt to paint this ludicrous transaction as a fair, responsible and reasonable
one, with myself left, liable to continue paying for a car I no longer have since they took it away
from me for no good or justifiable reason, and then proceeded to flush all. but $200.°° of the
$9,000.u0 collateral asset value down the drain.

Harry K S e v i l l e . Jr. PROS!:
5/30/09

STATEMENT OF FACTS

All of my Issues for Review and presented by this Appeal can readily be discerned from
the record of briefs and pleadings previously filed in this case. My appeal basically seeks a
simple review of all that went before - but with thorough and conscientious, fair and unbiased,
consideration of this record's evidence.
What follows here is a statement of facts material to the consideration of the questions I
have presented by my 5 separate, primary Appeal Issues. Specifically, I believe

1. The lower Court erred in failing to consider as "untimely" my Defendant's
REPLY MEMORANDUM.

Judge Toomcy's

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER,

dated April 6,2009, (received

by me at evening mail call 4/10/09,) and that I am appealing states, UURCP requires Opposition
to a motion to be filed within ten days of service of the motion. Mr. Suniville filed his objection
on January 5, 2009, over six weeks from the date JCU filed its motion. Mr. Suniville's
opposition is untimely/5
However, Judge Toomey is clearly wrong in this assessment because my Motion that she
is referring to, MEMORANDUM

AND REPLY (SUBMITTED IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS,

AND DEFENDANT'S ANSWER TO PLAINTIFF'S [ORIGINAL] COMPLAINT,) AND, As AN OPPOSING
RESPONSE I O PLAINTIFF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendant

MEMORANDUM AND REPLY;

, . . henceforth referred to as my

was mailed to her Court on December 4th. 2008 - not

January 5,2009. as she states. My Defendant

MEMORANDUM AND REPLY

Response and Reply to PLAINTIFF MOTION FOR SUMMARY

was an Opposing

JUDGMENT, AND PLAINTIFF

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AND IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S RENEWED MOTION TO DISMISS

included an additional
MARTINEZ."

"AFFIDAVIT OF MICHELLE ROGERS,"

(which two filings also

and "DECLARATION

OF KEN

[ received all of these documents at my evening mail call on Tuesday night,

November 25th.
f very well know that my Defendant

MEMORANDUM AND REPLY

was timely filed

because this required me to work on my Opposing Response and Reply all through the

"ihanksghing Holiday until ] was finally able to put in into the prison's outgoing mail box on the
Thursday night of December 4th, breathing a sigh of relief at the time that J was thereby safely
within the parameters of an accelerated 10-day window of response time prescribed for me to file
mv reply to a MOTION I OR SUMM \RY JUDGMENT, and which had also required me to seek out
special fa\ors and accommodations from prison staff when I stretched and scrambled to meet
this hard deadline from the very difficult circumstances of a prison incarceration.
Proof of these facts can readily be seen from elsewhere m the lecord, if not from
elsewhere within Judge Foomcy's own records in the matter. Please note that Plaintiffs
REQUEST IOSUBMII K>R DECISION: PLAINTIFFS MOIIONM>R SUMMARY JUDGMPNI,

and which

was dated December 18th, acknowledged my Memorandum in Opposition as having already been
filed (mistakenly they credited mine as 11/25/08, not 12/4'085 and they also filed with the trial
court a Plaintiff REPLY AND OBJECTION, along with a 2nd Affidavit from Michelle Rogers, on
December 16. 2009. In Michelle Rogers* 2nd Affidavit she recants her testimony from the first
such "affidavit" of hers with regards to the date alleged to be the actual sale date in which she
sold m} $9,000.°° Kelly Blue Book-valued cai for only S200.00 to a salvage yard - and this
"Oops. Sorry" correction of hets was obviously made to address particular and specific questions
that my own Defendant MtMORANDUM ANDREPL^ had raised in the very same Brief that Judge
Toomey mistakenly asserts was not filed until January 5th- 2009. Moreo\ei\ these same Plaintiff
REFL^ \ \ D OBJLCI ION filings that are dated December 16th, 20(R urge the original 3rd District
trial court to please disregard all but 5 pages of my arguments (for lack of brevity,) that Judge
Toomey has claimed was not recen ed until January 5th into the next year, and hence "untimely"
filed.
As a more careful scrutiny of the records in this case will clearly show. 1 expressed strong
objection to this Plaintiff REPLY AND OBJECTION - which urged the Judge not to read oi consider
any but 5 pages of im arguments and Jwidence, for lack of brevity - and for good reasons, too.
which I explained to the Court in a supplementary rebuttal argument J titled DEFENDANT
OBJLCIs

io PLAIN ni r \ OBILCIION, (and which, interestingly >iat filed on January 5, 2009.)

\ careful reading of these pleadings, back and forth between Plaintiff and I in
chronological order of their filing, should be all that is required for die honorable Utah State
Court of Appeals to see the rightness of my claims and issues upon appeal and also that Judge
loomcy *s lower trial court has obviously failed to consider all of the evidence in this case of

mine and that will upon your close examination of these records and evidence in the matter,
probahh lead you to an opposite conclusion. Given the lower court's error just described,
evidently a careful reading in the matter has yet to occur in this case,

2. Inadequate legal resources and assistance of counsel for my defense: Forced to
defend myself PRO SE while incarcerated, I was held to impossible, unrealistic, and
unreasonable standards, when holding this case in suspension until my release from prison
would have been more fair.
Judge Toomey's ruling that I bring to you on Appeal stales, among still other errors, that
my arguments in defense 'lack proper titles, form and content, both procedural and substantive";
and that they are '"hearsay, unsubstantiated opinions and irrelevancies"; or '"not in proper form,
not adequately supported." Yet, please consider: several times throughout the course of these
proceedings 1 have complained of my lack of legal assistance or adequate legal resources needed
to guide me in my own defense. The prison has done away with a law library, and all other legal
research resources, in lieu of assistance by ''Contract'* attorneys, but their contract covers onh
criminal law and this translates into a hard reality that they will not so much as answer a simple
question when it comes to a lawsuit such as this one brought against me. Twice I asked the
lower court to address the lack, but her subsequent ruling states that I was not entitled to Courtappointed legal representation, nor pro bono assistance referral, either. When I asked her at the
March 2nd Hearing about a postponement of these proceedings until such time - after m\ March
23. 2010. release from prison, which release would then allow me to seek out the legal advice,
resources, and representation I so sorely need. Judge Toomcy answered that m\ request to hold
the Court proceedings in suspension, pending my release from prison, "came too late; was not
requested until sometime after the scheduling of the Court Hearing I was then attending."
However, here again she was in error, because my previously-filed MOTION FOR COURTAPPOINTED COUNSEL, AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT

REQUEST FOR RULING

suggests "hold

these proceedings in suspension," written in big, bold ink for emphasis on the last page; and,
because it was mailed to the Court on December 28th, it pre-dates by more that a week the

Court's NoncbOh

COURT-SCHEDULED HEARING.

I assure this higher Court that no one is more acutely aware than 1 am of my awkward
and stumbling pro se ignorance of the law, and its protocols and language. The old adage that

* anybody choosing to act as his own attorney has a fool for a client* could not be more true as it
applies to mc, 1 know. And yet, I have not deliberately chosen to defend myself in this lawsuit.
Rather, it has been thrust upon me, incredibh' enough while I find myself in prison and otherwise
unable to mount a defense oi'any kind, (except by the light of my own ignorance,) against these
bogus and unwarranted claims brought against me on this \ery uneven playing field. Hence, at
the Healing of March 2nd itself, I found myself shackled hand and foot, unable even to refer to
my notes that were wrapped up in a plastic bag beside me from where they had been placed by
the two unsympathetic armed prison guards transporting me to the hearing, and where they
remained, for all practical purposes, inaccessible to my hands that were bound behind m> back.
Naturally enough, I was hesitant to argue too vehemently under those conditions the issue
which came first: my request for a suspension, or Judge Toomey's scheduling of the Hearing that
she claimed made suspension, postponement problematic - did not wish to make the Judge mad
at me because common sense seemed to suggest my interests would be better sen ed b> a
deferential attitude, no matter the seeming rush to judgment at the hands of a greedy Plaintiff and
their high-priced.'fancy pants' lawyers on this very unfair, and uneven playing field. Given the
trial Court's stated objections to "proper titles, form and content, and other procedural errors";
4

*not in proper form/* and "not adequately supported/* it would appear ] ha\e been held to

unreasonable standards, and unrealistic expectations, given my very handicapped conditions of
confinement and total lack of access to legal resources of any kind, including adequate legal
ad\ ice and representation.

3. Pivotal and key Evidence has apparently been ignored, (including signed and
notarized affidavits, and two police-generated documents,) regarding the actual, true
condition of my car at issue:
Consequently, 1 now ask this honorable Utah Court of Appeals to review this case in light
of all the contrary evidence on my side of these issues and that seem to ha\c been up until now
ignored. At the March 2nd Hearing I heard Judge Toomey assure the Plaintiffs attorney that she
would not be considering the evidence I presented to her which was a signed and notarized
affidavit from the wife, business partner'owner, and office manager of Mirror Image Auto Body
and Paint: which is an automotive body shop personally familiar with my car's real, true and
actual condition of repair - and an Affidavit that clearly contradicted Plaintiffs assessment of

same. When I asked Judge Toomey at Hearing why this would be so, she said my Affidavit "had
problems" (unspecified,) and I did not dare then press her on the issue because, here again, I was
afraid to make her mad at me at that critical juncture in my case.
And yet. given this judge's characterizations in this MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
that is here brought to you on appeal, that I haven't '^demonstrated a genuine issue of material
fact," but only "hearsay, unsubstantiated opinions and irrelevanciesr then Evidence overlooked
because "untimely" (when it really wasn't "untimely", at all) or otherwise ignored, is surely
critical to this case at issue. In fact, this is the nuts and bolts, and the very heart itself, of my
appeal.,.
§ Rule 402 regarding Rules of Evidence - Utah Code Annotated*, as you no doubt know,
says "All relevant evidence is admissible" and "relevant" means evidence having any tendency
to make the decision of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence" .. . and appreciable probative
value would be anything rationally tending to persuade people of the probability or possibility of
some alleged fact... (* Please see Determinative Law, attached)
The real, true and actual condition and state of repair of my car is key and pivotal to this
case. Ever since this case began, I have contended that Plaintiff utterly failed to mitigate these
collateral asset deficiency damages that they allege. Plaintiff, on the other hand, would have you
believe that my car was in terrible condition when they so arbitrarily and capriciously decided
(for no justifiable reason whatsoever, none that stands up to scrutiny,) to repossess this car of
mine while 1 was in jail, and the car temporarily stored at the impound lot that it had been towed
to at the time of my arrest. They have alleged egregiously exaggerated damages, and then
further allege that the car would not start in order for them to advance their ridiculous notion
(and after-the-fact excuses, more like,) that it was an entirely reasonable and prudent business
decision for them to sell my $9,000.00 Kelly Blue Book-valued car - a car that was deemed
sufficient security collateral for a 'zero down payment" car loan that started out at $12,829.°°
total amount financed (after fees and sales tax were added on) - and a car loan, I might hasten to
add, that was for the next 25 months paid down by 25 monthly auto loan payments, each and
every one of them made reliably on time, like clockwork, by my mother's bank. In other words,
my car's resell value was keeping pace with the loan's outstanding balance, and if Plaintiff
Jordan Credit Union had only treated my much-prized sports car with the respect it deserved, had

they only not squandered my/their collateral asset value after it was back in their hands (owing
to their needless and hasty decision to repossess.) then there would be no collateral asset
deficienc} damages for us to argue about today.
Sadly. however, they not only chose to repossess my car for bogus and unwarranted
reasons, saying that the) suddenly had "good faith belief that he [I] would be unable to make the
required payments on the loan, and to mitigate the damage and protect its interest in the
Collateral" -then, incredibly they chose to sell m> $9,000°° Kelly Blue Book-valued 2003
Mitsubishi Eclipse to a salvage yard for only $200.001
So. since obviously the true and actual condition of my car is of such critical importance
to this case, I pray that this Court will take into serious consideration the fact that Plaintiffhaving chosen to repossess my car by tow truck from off the impound lot where it was at that
time being held for me never had a working computer-chip coded ignition key that would have
been necessarily required to start my car that they now are claiming was "not operable*' and
"wouldn't start," In fact, these keys cost in excess of $125.00 to be duplicated by a locksmith
because these kc} codes must come direct from Mitsubishi Motors, and the only such key that 1
had went to jail in my pocket with me. Neither this Plaintiff nor am one else connected to them,
has yet declared the cost of key duplication expense. Additionally, please consider that though
an uo-coded key will open the doors of my car. only the coded-ignition keys will start the car and
keep it running; without such a key, the engine turns over and then quickly sputters off But,
regardless what one ultimately comes to believe regarding whether or not Plaintiff ever
possessed a working key. it is curious, also, that Plaintiffs "mechanic" reports the odometer
mileage ol my car when he had it as 40 miles more than the odometer mileage reported by the
S.L. Count) Sheriff deputy when he put it on the tow truck. This begs the question: was my
''inoperable" and "'would not start" cai driven 40 miles aftci Plaintiff repossessed it from off the
impound lot or is this discrepancy just another typically characteristic and sloppy. "Oops,
Sorry,'" mistake by a "mechanic" pricing auto body replacement parts which are not e\cn
missing, and when he can't e\ en correctly name the model year of the car for which his repairs
are being estimated?
Moreover, as soon as I was out of jail and trying to re-negotiate, buy back my car from
the salvage yard owner who purchased it for the bargain-basement, 'fire sale' price of 200.00,
(also trying to locate all of my valuable property from inside the car: clothing, CDs, tools, etc..

all of it by then lost or stolen,) he understandabl) enough refused to reverse his lucky-buy
windfall with a re-sell back to me for anything less that its actual Kellj Blue Book value... but
he M>as asking me for a working, coded-ignition key - which he said he did not have!
Additionally, another '"factual contention likely to have evidentiary support after a
reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery" (Please see Determinative Law,
attached.) is the fact that m> car had just barely passed all the required safety and emissions
certifications required by the Utah State Depl. of Motor Vehicles in order for them to have just
barely renewed this car's licensing and registration at end of October - only one month prior to
the ear's impound on Dec. 3, "07. This, loo. is another fact easily confirmed and verified by
outside sources - in this case by State DMV. records.
Plaintiff, on the other hand, relies upon a signed "Declaration^ from a so-called
'"mechanic.'" Ken Martinez, (whose "estimate" for mostl} imaginary repairs doesn't even start
out with the car's model year right.) to advance their bogus and disingenuous allegations
regarding my car's condition, but a close examination of this fcdeclaration' will show it to be
riddled with holes, and conflicted with itself as well as with the plain truth in the matter of my
car's condition. (Please read my Defendant

MEMORANDUM AND REPLY

for a more detailed

analysis of this ludicrous 'declaration*, particularly (a) § #4, #6, #79 #85 #9, #13).
But also, perhaps most important!} of all Please note that his greatly exaggerated claims
regarding my car's condition are directh contradicted by the police report document which
clearly proves the car to be running just fine when the arresting officer pulled me over for
allegedly "driving erratically'* on the c\cning of December 3 rd , '07. Then, when he decided to
impound my car. this same Salt Lake County Sheriff deputy assisted in preparing a tow receipt
record that itemized all pre-existing damages to my car as it was put on the tow track to be
driven to the impound lot. This towing receipt and itemization clearl) shows Ken Martinez, the
Plaintiff'"mechanic" to be lying about "extensive body damage," the same as the "would not
start or run" part of his testimony.
Moreover, now please note that the Mirror Image Auto Body and Paint Affidavit which
Judge Toome) v cozies up to' Plaintiffs Attorney about, assuring them in open Court at the
March 2nd Court Hearing that she's intending to ignore this evidence of mine," shows more of
the same thing: that is - bearing in mind that apparently, when deciding the merits of a motion
for summary judgment, the "Court shall draw all reasonable inferences in a light most favorable

to the non~mo\ing party/4 fie. me,) - 3 f three) critical pieces to this puzzle, all of them evidence
that plainly shows Plaintiff to be lying about the true and actual condition of my car, fthc signed
and notarized copy of the Mirror Image Auto Body and Paint Affida\it, the Adult Probation and
Parole Post-Sentence ln\ estigative report prepared by them for the Utah State Board of Pardons,
and taken from the arresting Sheriffs deputy police report, and then, finally, the subsequent
itemization of pre-existing damages to my car as it was put onto the tow truck,) have all \ery
clearly been ignored in order to arrh e at the fault}7 conclusion characterized as "Mr. Simiville
has not demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact.*' My Affida\ it from Mirror Image Auto
Body and Paint is an affidavit of automobile expertise from people personally familiar with my
car's real and actual condition of repair, providing signature foundation to the formal estimate
for repair of the pending, minor body shop work needed to restore my car to an impeccable,
"show room' -quality condition of maintenance and repair. Their affidavit substantiates the
Exhibit C formal estimate of repairs, ($51 L°°, only, required to fix my car, which Estimate,
obtained in October, was just prior to my car's December 3 ld Impound,) that was first submitted
to the lower Court m my MOTION TO DISMISS on November 4th. *08; and, given its significance
to disputed material and substantive facts at the heart of this case in dispute, this Affidavit should
not has e been casually dismissed by the lower Court.

4* Plaintiff victimized me, their customer, by breaching the "spirit" of our
Contract, and express lender obligations by the 'letter of this auto loan Contract at issue,
also; My car never should have been repossessed in the first place*
I always took good care ol my car, and complete service records, (unavailable to me here,
in prison,) would further pio\c this to be so Accordingly. I believe that I was entitled to
expectations of reasonable and responsible courtesy, and respect for my inherent and legitimate,
vested property rights: to be treated in harmony with customary, accepted and established
standaids of normal business lender bcha\ior. and in accordance with this Lender's own implicit
obligations to our '2-way street5 Contract.
Instead, these facts alone, (most of them self-described by Plaintiff themselves.) tell a tale
of shabb}' mistreatment, and arrogant victimization of their up-until-then completely trouble-free
and faultless, reliably on time with every single auto loan payment -kind of customer. Plaintiff
has self-characterized their own hasty, and improvidently reckless decisions the 'less

burdensome" route; like their after-the-fact excuses and pretext couched in terms Q[U good faith
belief" theii \emaeular speaks more eloquently of an evident attitude more like "'we can do
an} thing wc want to do." including run rough-shod over my legitimate rights, and reasonable
expectations, with arrogant and cavalier disregard for ail of my interests in the matter. On closet
examination, "good faith belief* and "not in possession" can be seen for what they are: specious,
and hugely presumptive, reasoning and pretext.
Sadly for me. I last sav\ my car atop the tow truck engaged to take it to the impound yard.
This is standaicl practice when one is placed under arrest because of liability issues incurred by
leaving a vehicle parked on private property, or on a public street Yet, never in my experience
before had this circumstance been a problem to me: it never had, for one thing, prompted
repossession; lathei. I simply had to paj for the tow and daily storage fees accrued to the tow
truck impound yard. And. of course, in all the previous times this car had been impounded, they
- meaning the arresting officer alongside the tow truck driver - make a careful inventory of all
pre-existing damages to the vehicle, lest the owner be able to come back at them dishonestly
blaming liability for damages already there before the low. I'm guessing Plaintiff didn't expect
me to be able to produce such a significant evidentiary proof of their disingenuous exaggerations
from my handicapped conditions of incarceration when they submitted their "Declaration of Ken
Martinez" into the record. Nowhere on this tow receipt prepared by Salt Count) Sheriff Deputy
is there any mention of broken headlights. (Ken Martinez* testimony stated two. ^$265.00 each
for replacement costs.) broken tai[lights, broken windows, flat tires, missing gas lids. etc.. all of
which "auto mechanic" Ken Martinez has fraudulently declared in Plaintiffs subsequent
arguments. And. while it's surprising foi the lower Court to have seemingly ignored this critical
and highly significant evidence of mine, we should here remember that the ORIGINAL cop\ of
this tow receipt and suhstanti\ e, material document was my Exhibit A attached to Defendant's
MEMORANDA n\i AIND REPLY

the \ ery same as Judge Toomey mistakenly characterized

"untimely filed/* Additional!}7, please consider that were my "non-starting inoperable" car really
being driven with broken headlights and broken tail lights, then most likely these would ha\e
appeared on the Sheriff deputy's citation (the same one as started out with "driving enatically^
allegations to prompt me being pulled o\ er in the first place,) as equipment/safety violations (in
the same manner as he did write me up for "failuic to install an ignition interlock device on my
\ ehicle," and which, for the record. 1 never ha\ e been required to have installed on any vehicle

of mine,) I would urge this honorable Court to additionally please consider the 'Big Picture'
here at stake, and the precedent being set if a Lender like this Plaintiff were encouraged to just
'iess burdcnsomely" run rough-shod over the rights and vested property interests of other
customers who might choose to finance their purchase of a car. Personal I), 1 feci like m> car
was "stolen'" from mc. and [ feci like this is understandable when it's your own prized sports car
and investment property taken away from you for no justifiable reason, and without even the
barest, minimal courtesy of communication. Please consider how you would feel, personally, to
be so shabbily mistreated b) a consumer credit lender!
I previously posed the rhetorical question, "were they acting like prudent and responsible
business people when they made their decisions relevant to this case at hand." Plaintiff argued
back, k*lt didn't matter; they don't have to'* which seems to me like implicit admission they were
not, on the seeming assumption that 1 could be made to pay under the terms of the contract no
matter how7 irresponsible and hasty, arbitrary, capricious and incompetent their own actions in
regards to it. Right up until the day Plaintiff decided to repossess my car I had been a good
completel} trouble-free kind of customer who had always and reliably made his car payments
exactly on time. Then, without so much as a courtesy phone call this Plaintiff suddenly wants to
willy-nilly declare the loan Contract null and void, car already repossessed when their one feeble
and ineffectual letter goes out advising me of this, all because they suddenly had a "good faith
belief* that I would be unable to continue meeting my obligations to them? That being the case,
evidently "good faith belief with them is an oxymoron with a meaning closer to something like
4

\\c can do anything wc want to do, regardless how disrespectful or arbitrary, malicious e\cn"

and if 1 ever hear these words from Plaintiff again. Ill immediately be holding on to my wallet!
And that, in mv humble opinion, surely constitutes the more egregious "Breach of Contract" by
Plaintiff, to be herein considered.
Judge Toomey \s ruling states that Plaintiffs inadequate notice to me regarding the sale
of my car was "harmless" error

but so was the precedent fact of the car's impound, and

temporary storage at a tow lot, a similarly "harmless" circumstance initially ? even though the
hasty, (malicious, even) over-reaction by Plaintiff set into motion this whole fiasco that followed
in the wake of that initially harmless circumstance.
It is my contention here that 'what is good for the goose is. or should be. good for the
ganclei/ and if being temporarily and harmlessly "not in possession" can become grounds for

Plaintiff to arbitrarily repossess my car and accelerate the entire outstanding loan balance to due
immediately, all at once... if they can capriciously and arbitrarily ignore the well-understood,
common sense reality thai car maintenance is by its very nature an ongoing "work in progress*
proposition . . . if they can wilh-nill\ declare "not in possession'* to be a cause for repossession
despite the fact that many cars financed may, at one time or another, be driven out of state,
driven by insured dri\ ers other than the debtor to the auto loan contract, or left in the possession
of auto repair businesses for the purposes of that car's ongoing, and continually evolving,
maintenance and upkeep, .. then surely, at their instigation of this entire fiasco, and their
subsequent utter and miserable failure to 'mitigate their own, self-inflicted collateral asset
deficiency damages \ then surely they, themselves, must be held to the same standards with this
one. only, misaddressed and feeble attempt at communication with me. As I have pointed out
previously: even a car loan customer delinquent in his auto loan payments would have received
more diligent Plaintiff communication, more 'Notice' than was sent to me. Moreover, this very
same Utah Court of Appeals has previously held the requirement of an adequate notice [to me]
before disposing of my'our security collateral at sale to be absolutely vital, (prescribed by law,)
and Plaintiffs Notice failed even to meet the standards of time frame window prescribed by the
Loan Contract itself. Given all that has followed, their inadequate notice was very far removed
from ''merely" harmless, particularly so since nit-picky and willy-nill) application of small print
provisions from this \ er> same Contract have been used against me as a pretext to tr\ and justify
the impetuous repossession that set into motion all that followed. Doesn't it seem the paramount
importance of such a letter as this one in question might have merited an envelope marked
"Urgent - Reply at Once 1 and/or for the mailing of it. (and for only a couple dollars more
expense,) that it come to me "Certified Mail - Return Receipt Requested " ? so that the lender
could better ensure that his obligations of communication not go unnoticed, and also so that,
should the required recipient of it. perchance, be temporarily unavailable to receive such an
important Notice, then sender would know of it? I think that "Notice" in mv case fell far short of
its mark, and c\ en fell short the provisions of Contract, as well as Law, itself.., For that matter.
I believe I might even ha\e been entitled to the simple courtesv of a phone call before they
initiated repossession (or. at least, a courtesy call to the bank that had reliahh made each and
every one of some 26 monthly car payments up until that time!)... Too, I believe it is a pretty
telling and illustrative fact of their incompetence generally, and at every subsequent step along

the way, that their only attempt at communication also advised me that my property from inside
the car was in jeopardy by 12/02, instead of 12/20/07.

And finally,
5- Plaintiff failed to mitigate their alleged damages when they sold my $9,G00.00
Kelly Blue Book-valued car at a salvage yard for only $200.°°.
At this point a very critical and material fact in deciding this issue pivots upon your
assessment of my car's condition at the time of repossession. Even if one were inclined to accept
those preceding and obvious exaggerations ad^ anced by this Plaintiff regarding the true and
actual condition of my car - exaggerations placed into genuine and material dispute by the
contradictory Evidence I submitted - still, the arithmetic advanced by Plaintiff when they
Motioned for Summary Judgment is transparently false because it just doesn't add up.
Their stated and inflated, exaggerated, cost of repair, ("well in excess of $3,000.°° to
fix,") are further misrepresented when it is applied to dated and after-the-fact automobile
valuations that are more than a year or two newer - hence a year or two lesser valued- than the
"blue book" valuations that were in place when my car was actually sold! Of course, they chose
the newer book valuations for illustrative arithmetic to better make it superficially appear the
sale of my S9.000.00 Kelly Blue Book-valued car for a mere $200.00 seem speciously
"reasonable" and responsible. (Please see # 2 5 , # 2 6 @ my Defendant

MEMORANDUM AND

REPLY,)

CONCLUSION

M\ car was not sold for a fair price, and all notice, all attempts to communicate with me
(there was one, onh) were weak, feeble and ineffectual. An auto loan customer delinquent in his
loan payments would have received far more honest attempts at Notice and communication than
did I with this one, single, mis-addressed letter reporting, after-the-fact, the unwarranted
repossession of my car as an accomplished fact, already done.
Then the fact it was clearly sold for a pittance of its real true and actual value has further
exacerbated the injury that "less burdcnsomely" victimized me when this highly-prized sports car
of mine was repossessed for no justifiable reason whatsoever, (only "good faith" presumptions

and pretext,) after over 2 years of timely car payments that represented an investment of time and
money - hence vested property rights and interests, also. All of these were run over with roughshod arrogance by an impetuous, recklessly improvident and incompetent auto loan lender, and
for them to now pursue me for additional monies after having flushed all of mine/our collateral
asset \alue down a drain is outrageous.
When it is said that upon their receiving no bids at auction, they then "had no choice but
to cut their losses by selling to a salvage yard " (for $200.°°.) isn't this just a little contrived an
answer, not to mention a rash, hast) and improvident decision, beside the fact that not even then
did they attempt (for what would have been only a second attempt,) to contact me to explore the
possibility that it could be sold back to me for multiple monthly auto loan payments of $226.°°
each??? Moreover, selling my car at auction not only subjugates its inherent resell value to
wholesale, the auction markets needn't necessarily be relegated to a once-only, one-time, then
give up -kind of attempt. Of course, this might have been slightly more rather than "less
burdensome" an alternative - but it seems obvious to me. at least, that this Plaintiff ought to at
least have tried, for merely a second time, to contact me and inform me what was going on with
my car and before these reckless and hasty, rush-to-desperation decisions had progressed past the
point of no return and rectification; it would certainly have sa\ ed us all a whole lot of trouble
afterwards. Too. I also think that it is a very telling fact beside these questions, to also consider
that by the time Plaintiff had actually sold my $9,000.°" car for only $200.°", they had by then
continued to recehe. and pocketed, two of my $226.°° month!) car loan payments! These
payments (for Dec. '07, and Jan. *Q8) continued to be paid to them automatically by my mother's
bank - because the bank, same as k remained in the dark all this time owing to this Plaintiffs
inadequate notice.)
So. finally, I would here and last of all ask that you please consider the bad precedent
being set were I really to remain Court-ordered to continue paying for a car I no longer have
when the circumstances of this individual case suggest such an egregious scale of incompetent
and improvident lender mistake side~by~side with a cavalier disregard of their own obligations in
the matter - mistakes I certainly should not be asked to pay for. Plaintiffs after-the-fact excuses
notwithstanding, to attempt to paint these things as reasonable practices among dealers, either in
consumer credit or automobiles, is purely ridiculous. Police-generated reports and documents,
and other credible evidence surely casts substantial doubt upon Plaintiffs version of these events

and ought persuade one towards a dismissal of this Plaintiffs suspect, and evidently bogus,
disingenuous and hugely exaggerated claims brought against inc. Too, it might also cast some
light upon why the Original Complaint's 2-only 'cause of action' allegations, (subsequently
switched up after proven to be false,) didn't start out with alleged collateral asset deficiency
damages at all...
My 25-plus genuinely disputed, and key material facts - when not ignored, but instead
considered in the light of supporting and credible evidence - would certainly seem to me, at
least, to permanently retire from any further or serious consideration, their newest, revised,
allegations, also. As [ said, a careful and thorough attention to all of the Court pleadings already
filed in this case will likely persuade you to the same conclusion - even if all these intrinsic
truths, and important pieces of the puzzle, have not been told by me in a fashion completely
acceptable to this Court. At least my story has the shining virtue of being the truth - plain, and
unvarnished truth, consistently told - and much of it easily corroborated by credible, and
verifiable, sources upon further discovery. In one of her earlier rulings this lower trial Court
denied my MOTION TO DISMISS for "having failed to provide a legal basis for relief" but my
grounds for relief are pure and simple Equitable grounds, and based on a fair, and thorough
interpretation of existing law and factual circumstance apparent upon the record. Thank You
for these considerations!

RELIEF SOUGHT

I really mostly just want this case and all its aggravations to plain go away * - dismissed
with prejudice, the same as that earlier, November 4th MOTION TO DISMISS asked for. But, to
reiterate what [ previously asked for then, I think that car payments paid after repossession, and
all ray property lost or stolen from my car after this same repossession (including expensive
clothes, and tools, and CDs) should more fairly be compensated for, along with whatever cost
and punitive damages that this Court feels appropriate to award me as reimbursement of all my
time, trouble and aggravation in having had to defend myself against these bogus and completely
unwarranted claims b> Plaintiff

ADDENDUM ~~ NOTICE TO COURT

Where does the quality of thorough lea\e off and *no longer concise begin?' Unable to
answer that question to myself, one possible answer that occurred to me as I initially labored
over a DOCKETING

STATEMENT

foi my Appeal, was to combine what 1 imagined a Docketing

Statement's separation of issues from factual circumstances would entail, and since this no
longer made for an exactly concise explanation of the disputed, and most important facts in the
matter, to then call the emerging document an Appellant's Brief combined with an initial
Docketing Statement - which is, more or less, what this document (as a summarization of all my
arguments.) has evolved into. However, in an effort to be less taxing to your patience. I have
repeated some of what I imagined a concise Docketing Statement would look like, with a more
thorough explanation of my primary issues, told within the context of the essential story behind
those issues, then called this, in its entirety, my APPELLANT'S

BRIEF,

even though a shorter

version of the same was initially used as a DOCKETING STATEMENT, and already mailed to you as
such. Now, I can only hope that no surprises develop between now and the deadline for me to
file my Appellant's Brief, (this, which you now hold in your hands,) because the Utah State
Prison's Con-Quest Drug Program where 1 am currentl) housed has taken away all further access
to the computers, effective immediately upon my completion of this one. last document: and that
is why I ha\ e attempted to effectively summarize all of my arguments for Appeal herein - out of
a more economical use of this Court's time and eyesight straining, and now, while I still had this
last, and limited opportunity to type these pages. ] hope this can be seen as an acceptable
deviation from \our rules
Similarly, along with re\ ocation of any further computer privileges at this prison facility
where I am currently housed, the limitations imposed upon me by my confinement make it
impossible for mc to get this document copied Ten Time (2 to the opposing attorneys,) and
then Velio-bound with double-sided printing, as the Supreme Court's letter that I have received
seems to indicate (Checklist for Briefs - Rules 24. 26. and 27) are required. Of course, I do not
wish to lose this case for simple formatting protocols: and this begs the question, can this
Appeal of mine be postponed or held in suspension long enough for me to be released from

prison on March 23, 2010, and then resumed at a time soon after, which would allow me to
seek out and obtain the legal advice/representation I so sorely need, along with the freedom
and related wherewithal to more perfectly comply with this Court's expectations of me
pursuant to Court rules and procedure? Please try to understand that I am doing the very best
I possibly can here with the limited resources available to me, and also, that I am sorry for any
inconvenience that this may cause you.
If this Court's clerk can help me remedy the deficiency at a monetary cost, then tell me
how much I owe for the extra Xerox copying, and I will pay monthly installments on these costs,
or maybe even just try to borrow this extra expense money from my mother in order to reimburse
the Court's cost of this all at once? . . . In any case, Thank You, also for these considerations!

DETERMINATIVE LAW
Utah Rules of Evidence - Utah Code Annotated

Rule 402*

U

A1I relevant evidence is admissible55

"relevant" means evidence having any tendency to make the decision of any fact
this is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less
probable that it would be without the evidence.
ie. Appreciable Probative Value: that is. rationally tending to persuade people of
the probability or possibility of some alleged fact.

Rule 20L

(Judicial notice of adjudicative facts)
"A judicially notice fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that
it is either (1) generally known within the tenitorial jurisdiction of the trial court,
or, 2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose
accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. '*

Rule 803 (8) (B) Hearsay Exceptions: (ie. not excluded by the hearsay rale:) "matters
observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which matters there was a
duty to report"

Rule 902.

(Self-authentication, Generally.) hxtrinsic c^ idence of authenticity as a
condition precedent to admissibility is not required with respect to the following*':
(a; 12 (A) "these records were made at or near the time of the occurrence of
the matters set forth by, or from information transmitted by a person with
knowledge of those matters."

Rule 11 (b) (2) "The claims, defenses and other legal contentions therein are warranted by
existing law or by a non-frivolous argument for the extension, modification, or
reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law*,f

Rule 11 (b) (3) "the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support, or if
specifically so identified are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable
opportunity for further investigation or discovery."
Mitigation of Damages doctrine: "The principle requiring a plaintiff after an injur}7 or
breach of contract, to make reasonable efforts to
alleviate the effects of the injury or breach."

Note: This Notice appears at the bottom of my car loan contract in big, bold letters: ANY
HOLDER OF THIS CONSUMER CREDIT CONTRACT IS SUBJECT TO ALL CLAIMS AND DEFENSES
WHICH THE DEBTOR COULD ASSERT AGAINST THE SELLER OF GOODS OR SERVICES OBTAINED
PURSUANT HERETO OR W I T H THE PROCEEDS HEREOF*.

Also, Utah Uniform Commercial Code

CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing and attached document (Appellant's Brief,)
was sent to thefollowingpeople by FIRST CLASS, PREPAID MAIL, on the date specified, for
Appellate Case No. 20090398 (Which is an Appeal from 3rd District Civil Court, Judge Kate A.
Toomev, Case #080903840,)
TO: Richard C. Terry and Douglas Oviatt
Attorney for Plaintiff
39 Exchange Place
Suite 100
Salt Lake City, UT. 84111
Utah Court of Appeals
Appellate Clerk's Office
450 South State Street, Fifth Floor
P.O. Box 140230
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0230
DATED THIS

Jffr

day of S^P/bn^f*

, 2009.

BY:

Harry F. SiuyVille, Jr., PRO SE
#17265
c/o Utah State Prison
P.O. Box 250
Draper, UT 84020

PREVIOUSLY SUBMITTED ARGUMENTS AND EVIDENCE ATTACHED AS
EXHIBITS

NOTICE TO TIPS COURT REGARDING EVIDENCE ALREADY SUBMITTED:

At the very least, I'm hoping that this honorable Appeals Court will review the record of
all the Court Pleadings, back and forth, from both sides, with a critical and discerning eye
focused on discovering the truth - because the truth is really on my side here, no matter how
inexpertly I might present these arguments and supporting evidence. It was a sudden and
adamant refusal by prison staff to make 6 Xerox copies for me that then in turn required me to
mail the Original signed and notarized Affidavit page from Mirror Image Auto Body and Paint
Affidavit direct to Judge Toome\ - this in turn then forced me to have to ask the Third District
Court*s Clerk to accept my $5.00 reimbursement payment to copy this page 2 times, (for the
benefit of courtesy copies to the opposing attorneys, and back to me for file copy purposes.)
irregular as this was to ha\e to ask them for. Similarly, if my Neu Evidence submission in late
February somehow got separated from the corresponding signature foundations of same, this
awkwardness in the second

ADUI/I PROBATION AND PAROLE DOCUMENT

(that was itself taken

from the actual police report, to establish the fact that at the initial arrest on 12/3 07* the arrest
which precipitated my car's impound that same night, and proving thereby, given that the traffic
stop allegation of "'driving erratically/' this supposedly (according to Plaintiff) ";wwstarting/inoperable " car of mine in question here - in direct refutation, AGAIN, of Plaintiff s
bogus and disingenuous allegations regarding this cm- of mine that they would have you believe
it was ""inoperable and wouldn't start*'. . .then that awkwardness, too. should rightfulh be
attributed to the limitations of a PRO SI* defense thrust upon me in the middle of a prison
incarceration.
Of course, it would have been less irregular to have had the 2 principals of Mirror Image
Auto Body and Paint both sign in front of a notary public the Affidavit from this business which,
from man and wife co-owners* Dick and Shannon Weirick, we originally intended . . . In the end,
my Affidavit (which was prepared without benefit of telephone calls between us, only
correspondence, my phone calls being limited) was signed and notarized at the banlv by Shannon.

alone, who is also the office manager there, no doubt because Dick was unable to tear himself
away from the painting booths come the time for this to be done; it already was being rushed to
get to me before the March 2nd Court Hearing, and I would not have wanted to impose on these
kind people that have always treated me professionally, helpfully, and fairly in more than this...
Again, it is the limitations imposed upon me by my present incarceration that prevents me from
more smoothly managing and presenting my evidence, but still, that shouldn't really make
testimony from the Mirror Image wife, business partner/co-owner. and office manager of an
automotive business that was personally familiar with the true, and actual condition of my car
any less credible regarding the same. Please remember what relatively minor damage that was
pending, and only partially begun at the time their formal Estimate for body work and painting
was done, (just shortly before this Plaintiff took my car away from me,) was a fact of which they
were personally familiar regarding the actual and true condition of my car: personally familiar
first-hand from the perspective of automotive expertise, personally observed, since that is the
only way a formal Estimate for pending repair work can be done...
And also, please consider; if these circumstances make my evidence somehow less
credible (trying to forestall here, whatever Judge Toomey's unspecified problems with it could
be.) couldn't somebody from the Court simply pick up the phone and call these people to satisfy
that both principles at Mirror Image Auto Body and Paint, believe their collective business
statement and testimony to be true? (Dick and Shannon Weirick, co), phone # (801) 748-4993)
which business of automotive body shop and painting expertise know my car by personal
familiarity, know that they already had installed the bumper support, and as the formal Estimate
for pending repairs that was early submitted by mc shows, that the only repairs of any kind that
my car was needing - io be restored to a mint, show-room quality of appearance - would have
necessitated (in October, less than two months prior to Plaintiffs lies,) $51L00 total repair
expense.
This, like so many other things in this case of mine, could be. upon further discovery
opportunities, completely verified, and for as little trouble as a phone call or two, perhaps made
by your Court clerks in a research capacity? Because everything here, (and that I have ever said
to either of the Courts,) is the plain unvarnished truth of the matter, every single one of my
contentions could be further corroborated and verified beyond a shadow of a doubt, for this

Court's full satisfaction. If I were not in prison at this moment I could further come up with
photographs of my car just prior to its repossession, depositions from other people than just
Mirror Image Auto Body and Paint personally familiar with my 2003 Mitsubishi Eclipse in
question here, along with complete service records for as long as 1 owned this car.
Plaintiff is telling greatly exaggerated lies about my car's real and true condition of repair
when, they repossessed it, because that is the only possible way for them to now7 try to justify the
fact that my 2003 Mitsubishi Eclipse, with a Kelly Blue Book resell value at the time of some
$9,000.00 was sold for but a fraction of its real, true value - at great negligence, and purely
reckless incompetence, and not in any manner that can really, except superficially, be made to
seem reasonable or responsible, instead of purely rushed and hasty, first in its initial and
unnecessary repossession, and secondarily, even more so in the manner by which they then sold
it to the salvage yard. The Sheriff deputy's towing receipt is a direct contradiction of such lies as
these submitted to the Courts by Plaintiff. All of my evidence so far and just to this point, should
clearly show that I was treated very shabbily by this Plaintiff, and anything but a complete
dismissal in the case would be a ; green-light' message to this Plaintiff to 'just keep doing what
you're doing, because you can always lie and exaggerate about it later.'
Myself, personally, I Thank You, again, and sincerely, for these considerations!
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JORDAN CREDIT UNION,

:

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER

Plaintiff,
vs.

CASE NO. O0Oq<O384O

HARRY F. SUNIVILLE,
Defendant

On November 21, 2008, Plaintiff Jordan Credit Union ("JCU7') submitted its Motion
for Summary Judgment. Defendant Harry Suniville filed an opposition and JCU responded.
A hearing was held March 2, 2009, and the Court took the matter under advisement. The
motion is now ready for decision.
BACKGROUND
On October 5, 2005, Mr. Suniville signed a Retail Installment Contract and Security
Agreement ("Contract") with JCU for the purchase of a car.

Mr. Suniville borrowed

$12,829.00 and agreed to make monthly payments, using the car as collateral. The
Contract provided that Mr. Suniville would keep the car in his possession and in good
condition and repair. It also provided that default would occur upon failure to perform a
contractual obligation, or when JCU, "in good faith, believe[s] that you cannot, or will not,
perform the obligations you have agreed to in this Contract/' The Contract provided that
upon default JCU could accelerate the entire debt, repossess the car, and initiate legal
action to collect the amount left owing after the car is sold, plus collection costs, attorney
fees, court costs, towing fees, repossession costs, repairs and storage costs.
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On December 3, 2007, JCU was notified that Mr. Suniville's car had been
impounded. JCU deemed this a default under the Contract and repossessed the car. On
December 11, 2007, JCU sent a letter to Mr. Suniville's address of record notifying him that
it was repossessing the car, but that in the alternative Mr. Suniville could pay off the
balance and impound fee by December 20, 2007 and retain the vehicle. Mr. Suniville did
not respond within the given time period.
JCU attempted to sell the car at auction but found no buyers. JCU's mechanic
found that the car required about $2600.00 worth of repairs, excluding necessary engine
work, but even then the car would likely sell for about $3500-$4000, yielding a slim, if any,
profit. JCU opted for the less burdensome route and on January 23, 2008 sold the car to
a junk yard for $200.00. JCU moves for summary judgment on its claims of breach of
contract and unjust enrichment, requesting the Court to order Mr. Suniville to pay $8778.12
in unpaid principal, plus impound fees, interest on the loan, and attorney fees and court
costs.
DISCUSSION
Rule 7(c)(1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, requires an opposition to a motion to
be filed within ten days of service of the motion. Mr. Suniville filed his objection on January
5, 2009, over six weeks from the date JCU filed its motion. Mr. Suniville's opposition is
untimely. The Court affords pro se litigants "'every consideration that may reasonably be
indulged.'" Thompson v. Dep't of Corrections, 2007 UT App 97, *1 (unpublished) (quoting
Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1213 (Utah 1983)). Nevertheless, "[a] party who
represents himself will be held to the same standard of knowledge and practice as any
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qualified member of the bar." In re Cannatella, 2006 UT App 89, fl 5, 132 P.3d 684
(citation omitted). Mr. Suniville's motions and oppositions filed with this Court lack proper
titles, form and content, both procedural and substantive.
Even if Mr. Suniville had filed a timely opposition, his objection is substantively
lacking. He has not demonstrated an issue of material fact as required to defeat a motion
for summary judgment.

His submissions are based upon hearsay, unsubstantiated

opinions, and irrelevancies. Mr. Suniville argues that he never missed a car payment, so
he has not defaulted on the contract. However, JCU based its determination of default on
the fact that the car had been in impound for a week before JCU was notified by the
impound lot and that JCU did not receive any response to the letter it sent Mr. Suniville.
That Mr. Suniville had diligently paid his monthly payments for over two years is irrelevant;
JCU reasonably concluded that Mr. Suniville had defaulted under the terms of the contract.
Mr. Suniville argues that the $200.00 JCU recovered from the sale of the car was
below its actual value and that JCU failed to mitigate damages. JCU complied with the
Utah Uniform Commercial Code in its reasonable attempt to sell the repossessed car. The
statute allows a creditorto sell collateral in a "commercially reasonable manner," meaning:
(a) in the usual manner on any recognized market;
(b) at the price current in any recognized market at the time of the
disposition; or
(c) otherwise in conformity with reasonable commercial practices
among dealers in the type of property that was the subject of the
disposition.
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9a-627(2). The Utah Court of Appeals held that the sale of a
repossessed car is commercially reasonable it: ( i j the lender does not engage in selfdealing, (2) the debtor is given notice of the sale, and (3) the lender advertises the sale and
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gets a fair price. Chrysler Dodge Country, U.S.A., Inc. v. Curley, 782 P.2d 536, 539-42
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). Here, JCU sold the car to a junk yard, so it did not engage in selfdealing. It also gave Mr. Suniville notice by letter that it was repossessing the car and
would sell it unless Mr. Suniville paid off his loan within a given period of time. While JCU
gave Mr. Suniville one day less than the 10 days notice required by the Agreement, the
error was harmless because even if the letter had given Mr. Suniville another day, Mr.
Suniville would not have received the letter in time because it went to his mother's house
and he was incarcerated. As the court in Chrysler Dodge found in a similar fact-situation,
"there is no evidence that [the creditor] was injured by lack of notice." Id. at 541. Lastly,
JCU was required to sell the car through advertising and for a fair price. Id . The Utah
Court of Appeals held:
It is the duty of the secured party to obtain the best possible
price for the benefit of the debtor. However, the secured party
does not have to use extraordinary means. . . . There is no
requirement or prohibition that the dealer must sell at
wholesale or retail, but only that the secured party obtains the
best possible price under the circumstances
"Of prime
importance, are the secured party's attempts to obtain a fair
price for the collateral by advertising the collateral or otherwise
notifying potential buyers that the collateral is for sale." . . .
Public advertising is not mandatory, however.
Id. at 541 (citations omitted). JCU attempted to sell the car at auction and got no bidders.
It could have put a considerable amount of repairs into the car, but there was no guarantee
that it would recoup its investment. Underthe circumstances, JCU decided to cut its losses
and get the $200.00.
Mr. Suniville argues that there is an issue of material fact regarding whether tne car
was in running order at the time of impoundment on December 3, 2007. He submitted an
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unsigned affidavit from his prison caseworker, who speculates that the car must have been
functional since Mr. Suniville was arrested while driving the car. JCU's mechanic's sworn
declaration stated that the car was not running. His testimony is based upon personal
knowledge, unlike the conclusory statements submitted by Mr. Suniville.
JCU was within its rights under the Contract to find Mr. Suniville in default. A court's
determination of commercial reasonableness is to be determined on a case-by-case basis.
See Chrysler Dodge, 782 P.2d. at 541. This Court has discretion to consider whether
JCU's sale of the car was reasonable. JCU had previously attempted to sell the car at
auction but had no bidders. The sale of the car for $200.00 was a fair attempt to mitigate
damages.
ORDER
As required for a motion for summary judgment, the Court draws all reasonable
inferences in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Employing these standards,
the Court determines that Mr. Suniville has not demonstrated a genuine issue of material
fact, and the Plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

The Court GRANTS

Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment.

DATED this

[0

day of April, 2009.

/ A V " T ; X V

Judge Kate A. Toomey
District Court Judge

-\.
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Harry F. Suniville, Jr.
PROSE
ill 7265
c/o Utah State Prison
P.O. Box 250
Draper, UT. 84020
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT CIVIL COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH
Harry F. Suniviile, Jr.
Defendant/Respondent
vs.
Jordan Credit Union
Plaintiff

NOTICE TO COURT,
AND TO PLAINTIFF,
REGARDING NEW EVIDENCE
Case # 080903840
Judge Kate A. Toomey

Comes now before this Court, Harry F. Suniville, Jr., PRO SE; and as the Defendant in
the above-notaled action, hereby respectfully submits to this Court my NOTICE TO COURT,
AND TO PLAINTIFF, REGARDING NEW EVIDENCE, that I am hereby introducing into
the record.
New Evidence has recently become available to me, but it is evidence that primarily
serves the purpose of validating and authenticating certain contentions of mine already and
specifically stated previously by me in both of my previous answers to this Court. In fact, this
newest Affidavit/Declaration by the owners of Mirror Image Auto Body and Paint simply
provides some signature authentication and foundation to the document already provided by
them - a formal estimate of needed repairs - which was attached as an "Exhibit C" to my
November 4t!\ '08, filed MOTION TO DISMISS AND DEFENDANT'S ANSWER TO
PLAINTIFF'S

[ORIGINAL]

COMPLAINT. In both this initial pleading, (Answer to the

Original Complaint,) and in my second that was tiled to this Court on December 4th, '08, entitled
(MEMORANDUM AND REPLY SUBMITTED IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS AND
DEFENDANT'S ANSWER TO PLAINTIFF'S [ORIGINAL] COMPLAINT, AND AS AN OPPOSING
RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT,)

1 have already, and always,

attested to my car's real and true condition of repair as being quite different from Plaintiffs
bogus and disingenuous allegations, and similarly I have always insisted and contended that my
car was running just fine right up until my arrest on Decembei 3 rd , '08, ^lilu lib t>ub&equeiii
impound by Officers of the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office.
Since both of these issues directlj and relevantly support a key fact and point of mine that
Plaintiff recklessly, improvident!}', and utterly failed to mitigate the damages incurred to them

(and to me, also.) by their impetuous, arbitrary and capricious decision to repossess my car right
outfromunder me for no legitimate reason whatsoever, (none that stands up to close scrutiny,)
both of these enclosed Affidavit/Declaration documents are made available for this Court's
consideration in support of my previously stated position. And, while there has been a Hearing
scheduled in this matter for March 2nd, '09, it is my understanding that in offering these two
documents into evidence, it is my obligation to also make these two records ''available for
inspection sufficiently in advance of their offer into evidence to provide an adverse party with a
fair opportunity to challenge them." Accordingly, they are hereby being shared with Plaintiff,
also.

CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing and attached document (NOTICE TO
COURT, AND TO PLAINTIFF, REGARDING NEW EVIDENCE) was sent to the
following people by FIRST CLASS, PREPAID MAIL, on the date specified, for Case
#080903840.
TO:

DATED THIS

££rtk

day

Richard C. Terry and Douglas Oviatt
Attorneys for Plaintiff
39 Exchange Place
Suite 100 "
Salt Lake City, UT. 84111
of

t&frSfa'Pf1^

0

|Hap7 F. 'Sunivi
#17265
c/o Utah State Prison
P.O. Box 250
Draper, UT. 84020

2009.

Exhibit B

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT CIVIL COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH

Harry F. Suniville, Jr.
Defendant/Respondent

AFFIDAVIT / DECLARATION
FROM MIRROR IMAGE AUTO
BODY AND PAINT

vs.
Case # 080903840

Jordan Credit Union
Plaintiff

Judge Kate A. Toomey

STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

) ss.
)

I, Dick and Shannon

jj/t^/R

I fc

_, do solemnly state as follows:

1. I am/We are over the age of eighteen (18) and have personal knowledge of the facts
set forth below.
2. I am a certified mechanic (or wife and business partner) and I have worked in the
automotive repair industry practically all my life (for ,%Q number of years). My main areas
of professional expertise are auto body repairs and painting.
3. I/We derive our income from a business centered around that same expertise, and we
call our company Mirror Image Auto Body and Paint. Our business address is currently located
at 608 W. Center Street, Midvale, UT. 84047.
4. We are both well acquainted with Harry F. Suniville, Jr., because on several occasions
in the past we have been asked to perform inspection, estimation, and auto body jepairs, plus
painting services, on a succession of different Mitsubishi Eclipse automobiles owned by him,
starting with autumn, 2003.
5. On or about October 9lh, 2007, we were asked by Harry F. Suniville, Jr., to inspect his
nQX

'°" n o r*A ")nm mnHpi vpar Mit^nhishi Frlinse and to nrovide a renair estimate for the work

enough to pay for an after-market front fiberglass bumper panel, and for the painting which
would be required to fix his front end entirely; and these repairs were put on hold and left
pending at customer's request, until such time as he could come up with the money required to
pay for the newest repairs (to his front fender.) At that time, it was our plan that then all of the
needed auto body repairs could be made at once and simultaneously. This is always the better
plan because then all required auto body painting can be flawlessly matched.
7. At the time of this, the last estimate on record at our shop, it is my belief, and my
strong recollection, that for the final estimate price of $511.8I, (body work parts and labor,)
Harry's car could have been fixed up and made cosmetically (from an auto body and paint
perspective,) "good as new" - that is, restored to a 'showroom quality' condition of repair. We
have submitted a true and correct copy of this formal Repair Estimate, and it is attached to this
hereto as Exhibit A.
8. Furthermore, I know for a fact that Harry's front bumper assembly, although broken
off in places at the bottom, needed no new front bumper support, (a $95.00 part,) because Harry
had already paid for a new front bumper support: one which we previously had installed for him
as a cash purchase, and because he wanted to ensure himself- while replacement of the broken
fiberglass front bumper panel remained in limbo - that all the other extrinsic and attached parts
of the bumper assembly, and that didn't need repair, nor replacement, as they were already "good
as new" (that is, reflector plastic, turn signal lights, and both front headlight assemblies) could
stay solidly affixed - without shake or rattle. In other words, his broken front bumper fiberglass
was previously, at our shop, and by one of our mechanics, firmly tied down to a brand new,
replacement, front bumper support.
9. Now, I have had opportunity just recently to read a document submitted to this Court
by Jordan Credit Union titled "Declaration of Ken Martinez" and it is my honest opinion: freely
submitted here in consideration of "front bumper support," falsely alleged as needed, and many
other seeming inconsistencies, also, but mostly based upon my/our own personal knowledge and
recall - and especially submitted in the interest of simple justice - that he (this "Ken Martinez")
is plainly lying with regards to the state of, and condition of repairs on Harry's car.
10. For one thing, I have already stated what I know about the front bumper support.
And I want to personally contradict the testimony of this "Ken Martinez" relative to same,
because we know by our own shop's records, and personal knowledge, that this front bumper
support allegedly needed had already been replaced!
11. In truth, I/we find this "Declaration of Ken Martinez" plainly laughable and
ludicrous, because by professional experience, nobody can accurately price anything (neither

after-market used parts, nor new, factory/replacement parts,) without first knowing the exact
model year of the car to which estimates are being made. Additionally, it is plain to me that this
is a fraudulent and greatly exaggerated assessment of the true condition of Harry's car, and I/we
base this opinion on personal knowledge of Harry's car as I/we last saw it in October '07.
12. Accordingly, I now have had occasion to read Harry's answer to the lawsuit
complaint to which he has subsequently been forced to defend himself. Specifically, I/we have
now have had an opportunity to actually read parts of Harry's answer to this lawsuit, and the case
he makes therein (called

MEMORANDUM AND REPLY SUBMITTED IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS

AND DEFENDANT'S ANSWER TO PLAINTIFF'S [ORIGINAL] COMPLAINT, AND AS AN OPPOSING RESPONSE
TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT)

@ §3, §5, §6, §8, §9, § 10 on Pages 4-7, AND,

based upon my/our personal and professional knowledge of this car in question, particularly in
regards to this car's actual and true condition of repair - as we personally know and recall it to
be in October '07 - we both wish to weigh in and hereby attest and testify under oath that to the
very best of our knowledge and belief, Everything that Harry has told this Court and stated
therein is factually true.
13. Moreover, based upon my own professional knowledge and experience, when an
automobile's car ignition system requires a computer chip ignition key to operate, and as Harry's
2003 Mitsubishi required, that car will simply not start and run for more than a second or two,
until, with a computer code supplied only by Mitsubishi Motors, a new computer chip key has
been made to order by key-code specifications. It is an expensive proposition then to duplicate
such a key; and locksmiths typically charge $125.00 and more to duplicate an ignition key that is
capable of operating the car.
14. Also, based upon my professional experience, if everything wrong with Harry's car
were really true - all that this "Ken Martinez" has alleged - then there is not a mechanic in this
world who would have passed the car for safety and emissions testing and certification, as I
personally know would have been required for Harry's mandatory, by end-of-October deadline,
in order that the current registration be renewed with new current-registration (October) stickers,
as required by the Utah State Department of Motor Vehicles. In fact, we both do actually recall
that the expense of this was one of the reasons why our own Mirror Image body shop repairs
were left pending and in climbo' at that time, back in October when the last formal Mirror Image
Estimate of Repairs was deferred and postponed pending the availability of the last $500.°° or so
required with the plan being that, then, all of the then-pending repairs required to perfectly
restore Harry's car to a showroom quality of repairs could be made all at once, then
simultaneously painted, all at once. Certainly, official records at the Utah State Department of

Motor Vehicles could confirm mid verify, corroborate, the accuracy of this par', of our statement,
regarding these October vehicle registration - and prerequisite safety and emissions testing
certifications.
WE BOTH DO SOLEMNLY DECLARE UNDER CRIMINAL PENALTY OF THE
STATE OF UTAH THAT THE FOREGOING IS TRUE AND CORRECT.
FURTHER, THESE AFFIANTS SAITH NAUGHT.
EXECUTED ON

Feb ,

/Q

, 2009.

BY
Dick

nt 7

^

^^ZfflgrikHk
Declarant
Mirror Image Auto Body and Paint
608 W. Center Street
Midvale. UT 84047

BY

STAfE n F

TT

TAH

)
) ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Subscribed, sworn to, and acknowledged before me on this
("0
day of _ _ J E k k ,
• 2009 > b y
$ W v \ 4 h UJciVts<U£. &
_____ __rrrrTTirZ7_.
- signer(s) of the above instrument, who duh acknowledged to me
that he/she executed the same.
My Commission Expires ffi - > ^

^QO^

Notary Seal

MIRROR IMAGE
AUTO/BODY & PAINT
608 W. CENTER STREET
MIDVALE, UT 84047

|

Date

Estimate #

!

10/9/200*

48

!

Phone #
801-748-4993
HARRY SUNNYVILLE
2003 MITSUBISHI ECLIPSE

Description
1 REPLACE RH FENDER
| LABOR
| REPAINT RH FENDER
PAINT & SUPPLIES

Rate

Qty

Total
175.00
40.00
44.00
44.00

1
3
3

Subtotal
Sales Tax (6.85%)
Total

175.00T
40.00T
132.00T
132.00T

$479>00
$32 81

$511.81

CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing and attached document
(AFFIDAVIT/DECLARATION FROM MIRROR IMAGE AUTO BODY AND PAINT)
was sent to the following people by FIRST CLASS, PREPAID MAIL, on the date specified, for
Case #080903840.
TO:

DATED THIS

•^Q-fa

Richard C. Terry and Douglas Oviatt
Attorneys for Plaintiff
39 Exchange Place
Suite 100
Salt Lake City, UT. 84111

day of _

/<$fHZ\.

Harry F. Seville, Jr., PRO SE
#172/5
c/o Utah State Prison
P.O. Box 250
Draper, UT. 84020
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SENTENCE MEMORANDUM

TO:

BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLE

RECE!VED

FROM:

ERJC BARKER, INVESTIGATING OFFICER

\££ fl 3 2008

ADULT PROBATION AND PAROLE, SALT LAKE IIGARCWF PARDONS
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
DATE:

12/02/2008

OFFENDER #:8481
RE:

SUNIVTLLE5HanyF
THIRD DISTRICT - SALT LAKE CITY CASE#: 071909070
OFFENSE: DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL,
THIRD DEGREE FELONY.

Per the request of the Board of Pardons and Parole, the following is submitted for your
consideration:
PLEA BARGAIN:
The defendant was originally charged with:
Count 1.
Count 2.
Count 3.
Count 4.
Count 5.
Count 6.

Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol/Drugs, Third Degree Felony.
Possession of a Controlled Substance, Third Degree Felony,
Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, Class B Misdemeanor.
Ignition Interlock Violation, Class B Misdemeanor.
Driving on a Denied License, Class B Misdemeanor.
Improper Backing, Infraction.

Thru plea negotiations the defendant pled to:
Count 1.
Count 2.
Count 3
Count 4.

Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol/Drugs, Third Degree Felony.
Dismissed.
Dismissed.
Dismissed.

m

OFFICIAL VERSION:
On December 03, 2007, Officei Barrett from the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office observed the;/*,'
defendant, Harry Suniville driving in an erratic way. Officer Barrett initiated aTxaffic stop on the \'
vehicle the defendant was driving. Upon speaking with the defendant, Officer Barrett observed *" ~ '
the defendant's slurred speech and inability to complete ordered tasks., The*defendant had \ „ - *
several warrants for his arrest and was driving a vehicle on a denied l i c e n s e ^ ^ i f e v ' , />
ScerBanSttsea^
•esiduc inside it •^a_.we-lL^-c-:^:u:--J-1

"

Exhibit "A"

VICTIM IMPACT STATEMENT:
iThere:is no; victim ih this case,

RESTITUTION:
SThere Tsitid restihltibh deteimm

CUSTODY STATUS:
Judge Atherton from the Salt Lake Third District Court sentenced Mr. Suniville to "the Utah State
Prison on October 10, 2008, for a term of 0-5 years for case #071909070, Mr. Suniville is
currently serving this sentence.
CIUMINA3D HISTORY UPDATE:
•(Update any arrest/convictions-since the last Pre/Post Sentence Report)
:>DATE;^
D3/10/2008-:

ARRESTING AGENCY
:-Salt Lake County Sheriff

06/20/2008'

•Adult Probation and Parole

OFFENSE
WA- Theft, Felony •*
WA- Possession of a Controlled Substance, FelonyWA- pUI, Felony
' BW- Possession of Drag Paraphernalia

DISPOSITION
No Disposition •-•

Justice Court'Warrant'"'

PROBATION/PAROLE HISTORY:
Mr. Suniville was first placed on supervised probation with Adult Probation and Parole in 1983,
after completing a diagnostic evaluation. Mr. Suniville successfully completed this probation in
1984. After this date, Mr. Suniville acquired numerous charges and served substantial amounts .
of time at the Utah State Prison and granted numerous opportunities to comply witlf p a i ^ & ' M P
Suniville's parole was revoked or terminated as an inmate case on several occasions.
On April 21, 2008, Judge Skanchy in the Salt Lake Third District Court placed Mr. Suniville on
36 months probation with Adult Probation and Parole for case #071902846. Mr. Suniville
acquired case #071909070 prior to being sentenced on this case.
Mr. Suniville failed to initiate the terms of probation set by Judge Skanchy's Court. Mr.
Suniville has had the opportunity to complete probation as well as parole with Adult Probation
and Parole stemming back to 1981. Several of these opportunities were terminated as an inmate
case.
Mr. Suniville was sentenced to probation with Adult Probation and Parole for case # 071902846.
Due to violations of the terms of probation the defendant's probation was terminated
unsuccessfully.

PENDING CASES:
According to a search of the Utah State Courts X Change System, the defendant has no pending
cases.

EVALUATIVE SUMMARY:
Mr. Suniville has been placed on supervised probation as well as supervised parole with Adult
Probation and Parole on numerous occasions. Mr. Suniville has displayed a history of noncompliance with the conditions set by the courts as well as the Board of Pardons. Mr. Suniville
has had the majority of his supervised cases terminated unsuccessfully and parole being revoked
and terniinated as inmate cases. Adult Probation and Parole believes the defendant has a lack of
desire to comply with these conditions and shown this inability throughout the past two decades
of supervised probation and parole attempts.
On the Level of Service Inventory, an internal assessment tool, used by this agency to determine
the level of supervision and the risk to reoffend, the defendant scored in the High Risk category
with the following areas identified as his highest areas of need and risk:
3

Harry F. Suniville, Jr.
PROSE
#17265
c/o Utah State Prison
P.O. Box 250
Draper, UT. 84020
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT CIVIL COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH

Harry F. Suniville, Jr.
Defendant/Respondent
vs.
Jordan Credit Union
Plaintiff

MEMORANDUM AND REPLY
(Submitted in SUPPORT OF
Motion to Dismiss and Defendant's
ANSWER TO PLAINTIFF'S
[Original] COMPLAINT), AND AS AN
OPPOSING RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Case # 080903840
Judge Kate A. Toomey

Comes now before this Court, Harry F. Suniville, Jr., PRO SE, and as the Defendant in
the above-notated action, hereby submits this MEMORANDUM AND REPLY (In support of
my preceding Motion to Dismiss, and Defendant Answer to Plaintiffs [Original] Complaint,)
AND which is also hereby respectfully submitted in Opposition Response and Reply to
Plaintiffs OPPOSING MEMORANDUM AND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
Here it may now be required or appropriate for me to point out that my MOTION TO
DISMISS AND DEFENDANT'S ANSWER TO PLAINTIFF'S [ORIGINAL] COMPLAINT, (the pleading that I
filed with this Court November 4th, '08) is not, (as Plaintiff asserts,) really a "renewed"
MOTION TO DISMISS, insomuch as it was the only argument (besides this one you now hold
in your hand,) so far submitted by me in answer to Plaintiff's Original Complaint - since this
Court set aside the Default Judgment against me in its MINUTE ENTRY dated October 8th, but
allowing, nonetheless, an open window for Plaintiff to start the proceedings anew by mailing me
a copy of their original Complaint, which I did not have, up until its receipt by me on October
21, the benefit of having anytime ever before then received.
Now, Plaintiff has submitted a Motion for Summary Judgment, along with their
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, and in
Opposition to Defendant's "Renewed" Motion to Dismiss [Henceforth referred to as Plaintiffs
new Memorandum. . .] - And this is my Opposing Response and Reply to that.
Quite frankly, I continue to be astounded at Plaintiffs impudence in continuing to pursue
this lawsuit even after the egregious abuse and mistreatment of me as their used-to-be car loan
customer is brought to light, and when their apology would seem, to me at least, to be the more
deserved and appropriate response under these circumstances.
Now replying to these newly-filed Plaintiff Motion for Summary Judgment, and Plaintiff
Memorandum of Points and Authorities In Support of Motion for Summary Judgment and In

Opposition to Defendant's Renewed Motion to Dismiss, both of which were delivered to me at
evening mail call on Tuesday night, November 25 ,1 will follow Plaintiffs example, in order to
avoid unnecessary duplication and in consideration of a more economical use of the Court's
time, by requesting that these facts and arguments offered herein in reply, and in support of and
favoring my MOTION TO DISMISS, to also appropriately be considered as my address of, and
my Opposition Response to, Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, (along with its
Supporting Memorandum). I believe these facts and arguments presented herein also, and
accordingly - including some 25 material disputes as to genuine issue of fact - support a Court
denial of said Motion for Summary Judgment.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs Memorandum starts off by saying my Motion "raises no new issues or presents
any new and relevant facts to be addressed . . . Plaintiff objects to the entirety of Defendant's
motion as hearsay and lacking any proper foundation. The motion consists of nothing more than
baseless accusations and conclusions, none of which are supported by a single piece of relevant
and admissible evidences. Because Defendant has provided no admissible evidence for the
Court to consider in connection with his motion to dismiss, the same should be denied." (Pg. 2,
Plaintiffs Memorandum of Points and Authorities)
However, the Original Complaint filed against me was based entirely upon an alleged
failure by me "to make payments when due pursuant to the^terms of the loan agreement" {Their
words: See #7, First Cause of Action); and in the Complaint's Second [and only other] "Cause
of Action," (@ #14,) it is based upon the unfounded and redundant allegation that, "Defendant
has had the use, benefit and possession of all the funds loaned to them [him?] without
compensating Plaintiff.. ." Moreover, both the supposed "Breach of Contract," and "Unjust
Enrichment," which are the First and Second {and only) Cause(s) of Action, as named in this
Complaint, individually and collectively pivot upon this key point: an alleged failure of me to
make my car payments [plural payments] on time. Accordingly then, in my Defendant
MOTION TO DISMISS, I effectively showed, supported by notarized affidavit from U.S. Bank
Private Client Group Vice President Michael Poulter, and other evidence(s) as well, that these
Plaintiff allegations, which were the very foundation of their Complaint against me, was a
foundation made of sand: that their case against me must necessarily fall, andfail, once the
foundational basis crumble and is proven to be false - which it was.
Now, it is almost laughable for Plaintiff to go backwards and try to clean it up, to switch
up/change the foundational allegation by now saying (See newest Plaintiff Memorandum, @pg.
9,) "Defendant failed to make the required payment" [singular payment] and "This claim is
based on the fact that the debt was accelerated by Plaintiff following default and pursuant to the
Agreement."
One has to interject the question, here directed to Plaintiff, how is a notarized affidavit
from Jordan Credit Union Collection Officer Michelle Rogers any more credible than a notarized
statementfrommy mothers' bank Vice President, and why, if my Motion and evidence really
"raises no new issues or presents any new and relevant facts to be addressed," has it required you
to change your entire story in pursuit of these bogus claims?
Fortunately, I have faith that this Court will give impartial and even-handed consideration
to the true facts of this case - will throw the lawsuit out of court if such is the appropriate relief
and remedy when one party changes their whole story mid-stream, or submits pleadings and

argument so transparently 'squirming' and disingenuous as has this Plaintiff Jordan Credit
Union.
Moreover, since this case at issue also pivots upon this loan contract here at issue, I
would hope and pray for this Court to furthermore bear in mind the intrinsic 'Big Picture' here at
stake. That it will reinforce my faith and belief in the fairness of Courts generally, by
considering the precedent being set if a lender like Jordan Credit Union is allowed to just run
rough-shod over the rights and legitimate property interests of those who choose to finance their
purchase of a car.
Please consider how you would feel, personally, to be so shabbily mistreated by a lender;
and how nobody in his right mind would dare to finance a car if these kinds of lender behavior
(as characterized by the words and actions of the Plaintiff themselves,) were the norm.
Please consider that in big bold all capital letters near the bottom of the Loan Agreement
and Contract are the words: "NOTICE: ANY HOLDER OF THIS CONSUMER CREDIT CONTRACT IS
SUBJECT TO ALL CLAIMS AND DEFENSES WHICH THE DEBTOR COULD ASSERT AGAINST THE SELLER
OF GOODS AND SERVICES OBTAINED PURSUANT HERETO OR WITH THE PROCEEDS HEREOF." Also,

that even though I am, in my stumbling and awkward pro se ignorance, at a loss to know enough
to specifically invoke what surely must be inherent Consumer Protections written into laws and
regulations like Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, (Article 9, and elsewhere,) and in
the Courts' precedent interpretations of same, to be used in my defense - that doesn't make these
claims, protections and defenses any less real or relevant to this case at hand. Finally, I would
hope and pray this Court to pay special attention to the Plaintiffs own words in their version of
the foregoing events, and of Plaintiff s actions that their own words describe with this central
question always in mind: were they acting like prudent and responsible business people when
they made their decisions relevant to this case at hand, or could their preceding actions more
properly be regarded, (and as I would certainly characterize them,) as arbitrary, capricious, hasty
and reckless?
Sometimes the truth, or more of it than a dissembling person would choose to tell, will
inadvertently slip out; I believe Plaintiffs choice of words, (See newest Plaintiff Memorandum,
[and version of events] @ Pg. 12,) "Plaintiff... in the end opted for the less burdensome route"
is a poignant case-in-point because it is an unintended but succinct self-described summarization
and revelation of Plaintiff s impetuous and callous disregard of me, and of my own inherent
property rights in the car loan collateral/asset and vehicle (my car!) here at issue. They made
absolutely zero effort at any step along the way to treat either me, or my/their collateral asset
property, with any respect whatsoever on the assumption that I could be made to pay under the
terms of this contract no matter how irresponsible and hasty, arbitrary and capricious, their own
actions in regards to it. And that, in my humble opinion, surely constitutes the more egregious
"Breach of Contract," by Plaintiff, to be herein considered.
DISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS
1. Once again, freshly stated anew, these are some of the disputed material facts in this case.
In plain language. I strongly dispute Plaintiffs allegations regarding my car's condition. I
believe and assert that my car was kept in reasonably good condition and repair for the 2+ years
that I faithfully made my car payments on time to the Plaintiff. In Plaintiffs most recent
rendition of their story, (their latest Memorandum of Points ...) they allege it was not, and they
attempt to partially explain their decision to repossess my carfromoff the impound lot where it

was being temporarily stored as being based on this disputed allegation that it, (my car) was not
kept in good condition. Interestingly, Plaintiff in their own latest Memorandum of Points, can be
seen to contradict themselves:
"At the time of the initial [only] notice of repossession sent to Defendant, the issues
related to the true condition of the vehicle were not known." [Emphasis added] (See Plaintiff
Memorandum of Points... Pg. 5 @ f 12; and Affidavit of Michelle Rogers @ 1[ 14). Remember,
this notice of repossession mailed to my mother's house - the only notice they ever bothered to
send anywhere, and not received by me until January 17th, the day I got out of jail - was dated
12/11/07, and it informed me, (See Exhibit C, Attached to Affidavit of Michelle Rogers,) "On
12/10/2007, Jordan Credit Union repossessed the 2003 Mitsubishi used as collateral on the above
loan."
However, these statements of theirs are contradicted elsewhere, (See Plaintiff
Memorandum of Points... Pg. 3 @ | 4 ; and Affidavit of Michelle Rogers @ f7) where they
allege, "While the Collateral remained impounded... Plaintiff learned that the vehicle had
extensive body damage and would not start. [Emphasis added] On the good faith belief that he
would be unable to make the required payments on the loan, and to mitigate the damage and
protect its interest in the Collateral, Jordan repossessed the Collateral from the impound lot on or
about December 10, 2007."
2. What's more, I dispute both parts of this allegation (extensive body damage and
would not start) regarding my car's true condition of maintenance and repair. And, I assert that
it can only remain an undisputed material fact - one that directly contradicts Plaintiff allegations
- that this car was running just fine right up until the traffic stop by S.L. County Sheriffs that
resulted in my arrest and the impound of my vehicle. This begs the question: Where does this
falsely alleged and non-existent, so-called "engine problem" come from?
Were I not so handicapped of resources like unlimited phone calls, or access to legal selfhelp and law books that many people not presently incarcerated might tend to take for granted particularly were I not so pressured by time restraints in keeping to Court-filing deadlines - there
are several relevant issues come immediately to mind as screaming for more extensive scrutiny
by means of discovery.
3. First, I have previously stated, in my first Defendant response to this original
Complaint (my Motion to Dismiss, and Defendant's Answer to Plaintiffs [original] Complaint,)
that there were some admittedly then-pending body damage repairs that needed to be made on
my car when it was impounded. I also provided this Court an Exhibit C, therein, which was a
previously obtained formal Estimate for all of these needed repairs, dated October 9, 2007, from
Mirror Image Body and Paint. It is where I get all of my body damage repairs made - both
previously on this very same car in question, and on cars that I have owned before this one especially my 1997 Mitsubishi Eclipse that I sold when I upgraded to this newer 2003 now at
issue. I go to them because they, (owners Dick and his wife Shannon, who over time have also
become my friends,) do first-class, excellent showroom quality work at a fraction of the cost
some other body shops might charge for the same amount of work. As an example, when my
previous car, (before this one at issue, the 1997 Mitsubishi Eclipse,) was "run over" by a large
semi-truck, crushing a comer of its roof, in turn shattering the front windshield and drivers' side
window, with extensive door and quarter panel damage, too, the first estimate for body damage
repairs I obtained was in excess of $4400.00, the second one came in closer to $4800.00, and
then my very expert auto mechanic (Lynn's Auto, Murray, where all my cars get very expertly
mechanically-maintained,) recommended I take it to Mirror Image Auto Body and Paint: and

there it was fixed for cgood as new' at a cost of only $1500.00 (approximately). We
subsequently hung before-and-after photos of my car, and of their extremely professional repairs,
on their office wall to advertise for future, quality-seeking customers!
4. Now consider this Plaintiff-submitted "Declaration" of Ken Martinez whose name and
business appear nowhere on any on-line directory, in any capacity as an auto repair business (at
least none that my prison caseworker could find when he 'surfed' Google and Dex, and other
directories looking,) and whose credentials are stated to be, "I have been asked on several
occasions to perform inspection, estimation and repair services on vehicles repossessed by
Jordan Credit Union." In this "Declaration" he further asserts, u 8. Jordan Credit Union declined
to have the repairs made because the cost was greater than what the car would sell for at
auction." Doesn't such a statement seem just a little contrived, and coached, and self-serving,
coming as it does from a "several occasions" in the past mechanic for a financial institution like
Plaintiff Jordan Credit Union? - particularly if the sale of a $9,000.00 car for only $200.00 was
really an "arms-length" transaction, as Plaintiff alleges?
5. When I contacted the salvage yard owner who ended up buying my 2003 Mitsubishi
Eclipse in my efforts to try and reverse the outrageously ludicrous transaction whereby my
$9,000.00 Kelly Blue Book-valued car had been sold to him for only $200.00, he refused, not
surprisingly; and, he asked me to provide him a key for my car because the necessary computerchip key, (with codes available only from Mitsubishi: my car had a keyless entry and ignition
lock system which made duplicate keys very hard to come by, or at least expensive, since by
personal experience, key duplication cost in excess of $125.00,) - that is, the only key then
existing, had stayed in my pocket when I was taken to jail. And this, of course, in turn then begs
the question: what was Ken Martinez using for a key when he was determining my car "would
not start"? Too, does this help to explain all his confusion about windows supposedly broken?
6. Moreover, I question, and I dispute, altogether, and most firmly, many more aspects of
this "Declaration's" assertions as well because I believe it is a deliberate exaggeration and
distortion of the true condition of my car now belatedly, and at second-hand, alleged by Plaintiff
solely to strengthen their bogus claims in this matter.
Next consider this: in his so-called inspection and estimation of repair services, this selfdescribed "mechanic" [notice: not auto body mechanic] identified my car as a "2002 Mitsubishi
Eclipse"- and with the model year wrong, (mine was a 2003,) how can he possibly, and
accurately price replacement parts?
7. Additionally, there was nothing at all wrong with either headlight assembly, though
his greatly exaggerated Estimate lists them both as needing replacement at a cost of $265.00
apiece. His same estimate invoice says a Passenger Window was broken, and a taillight, and that
a rightfronttire was "flat." Now, if the car had truly lacked both headlights, and a taillight,
doesn't it seem likely that the Sheriff who cited me for not having an "Ignition Interlock
Device," (which I never have been required to have on any car of mine, and who also cited me
for DUI even though my breathalyzer testing at the time of arrest showed 0.00, and blood testing
at the scene of arrest also resulted in 0.00 blood toxicology,) - would then overlook such basic
vehicle equipment violations as these would be?
8. Now taming back to his written testimony, (See "Declaration", @ 6) he states "body
damage to the entire right side of the vehicle," in addition to bothfrontheadlight assemblies,
passenger window broken,... broken tail light, flat tire, and missing gas cap. In addition, the
vehicle would not start." (I ask again, what ignition key was he using?) And, here, different
from the written and itemized Estimate, (See Attachment to his written "Declaration(s)") my

"driver automatic window" also turns up to be allegedly, "non-operating," and yet, it is the
Driver Door Glass which he says needs replacement on the left side, bottom, of his formal
Estimate of Repairs - and it is the Passenger Window broken on the right side of his itemized
Estimate of Repairs! With window replacements priced at $420.00 this is not an insignificant
discrepancy, and he has told three differing accounts on only two pieces of paper! Moreover,
when I last saw my car, no window was broken, and my Exhibit from the Impound Tow Truck
driver will prove this to be so.
9. Furthermore, on this "Declaration's" attached itemized Estimate of Repairs, note that
the gas lid is listed at a replacement cost of $45.00! Additionally, that the alleged replacement
cost of a bumper support is listed at $95.00: Yet, Mirror Image Auto Body and Paint would tell
you that we had already replaced the front bumper support preparatory to the complete, thenpending (at the time of repossession) body shop repairs that would have rendered my car
cosmetically to a "good as new" state of repair.
10. In November/October of '07, the Mirror Image Auto Body and Paint formal estimate
of pending repairs (and which I previously submitted to this Court in my most recent pleadings
as an Exhibit C,) priced all of my then-pending and needed repairs at $511.81 - and these
included repairs to the front fiberglass bumper, which we 'jerry-rig' and temporarily repaired by
tying down the old, broken one to the newly-installed bumper support, with arrangements then
made for a new front bumper cover (already paid for in advance, early October) and that was part
of the final and complete repairs which we at that time put on hold for the remaining $500.00,
(earmarked from my Christmas money,) to be paid. Then, and that way, everything needing the
slightest bit of attention to keep this prized sports car of mine a 'hot' car could all be painted at
once. Hence, and in short, this temporary, 'jerry rig' repair of the broken front bumper - tied to
the newly-installed bumper support, so that all adjacent parts could be held in place securely, not
to rattle around, possibly fall off- could not have been made at all except that the bumper
support that Ken Martinez has alleged was needed was already installed and in place.
Here, I suppose I have raised questions by herein admitting that there were, in fact, some
automotive body shop repairs then pending for this car here in question and that it would have
been "less burdensome" or more convenient to ignore altogether. Except that I have faith that
even a simple man telling the simple truth can prevail in our Courts if the unvarnished truth of
things supports such a verdict. In life, sometimes the truth can be messy, maybe inconvenient, or
at least complicated. Too, as I write this, I am also now remembering that some of these thenpending auto body repair charges were being deferred and juggled against other expenses, and
these other expenses, necessarily put first, included the annual licensing and registration,
complete with complete safety and emission testing that always has been due on this particular
car of mine before the end of October. Certainly, anybody who has ever owned a car will
appreciate the fact that car maintenance is usually a 'work in progress.' I still have a full set of
service receipts and records on this car which would prove beyond a shadow of a doubt that all
routine and preventative mechanical maintenance and repairs were always made on time for as
long as I had this car under contract of the Loan Agreement. Similarly, when this credit union
lender first asked me to ensure that the full insurance which I have always carried on this car including comprehensive and collision insurance coverage - was renegotiated with my insurance
carrier to include a higher-priced policy of less deductible on the comprehensive and collision
insurance parts of my coverage package, I readily and promptly attended to that responsibility of
mine, also.

Still, because the cost of all the then-pending body damage repairs on my car were less
than the deductible, it remained for me to do this as I could afford to, ie. with Christmas money
from my mother. It was by far the more prudent and economical of choices regarding same for
these repairs to the front end (requiring a new fiberglass bumper cover @ $235.00,) and to the
passenger side front-fender panel (@ $125.00 as itemized by Ken Martinez; $175.00 @ Mirror
Image Auto Body and Paint,) because it is far easier and better to paint everything all at once,
besides being less intrusive to the car's normal, day-to-day usage.
One other consideration also played into this minimal delay of mine in getting everything
fixed for good as new, with my car restored to an excellent, almost 'mint' condition of
maintenance and repair with Christmas money, and that was the circumstances of my apartment
complex neighbor, next door to me in Apartment 4, having made October arrangements with me
to compensate me in $50.00 installments out of his weekly paychecks as a means of paying for
the approximate $250.00 in damages to my right front fender when his drunken and uninsured
girlfriend hit my car with her own when sloppily parking her car in the stall immediately
adjacent to my #5 apartment parking stall. I agreed to this arrangement - in the interest of
neighbor relations - not to file an insurance claim because these repairs were only half the
amount of my deductible, and thus would have represented an out-of-pocket expense anyway,
(given her uninsured status,) figuring that $250.00 in installments was better than nothing
coming from her non-existent insurance coverage. They were a purely cosmetic dent damage
anyway, a dent that did not affect in any way my headlight, nor my wheel.
I apologize to this Court for all these many words: but at least they have the virtue of
being unvarnished truth, even if somewhat complicated to explain - and with the advantage that
every aspect of these circumstances surrounding the roughly $500.00 then pending to complete
all repairs can be completely confirmed and verified by all these other persons, and facts,
involved.
11. Since obviously, taking all of these facts and circumstances and arguments of mine
into consideration, into account, there remains a lot of controverted material facts relative to
Plaintiffs allegation that my car was in terrible condition when they arbitrarily decided to
repossess it - particularly since, depending upon which version of their story one chooses to
believe regarding my car's true and actual condition, its condition after impound is being used as
a justification for their capricious decision to accelerate the loan payments and to repossess this
loan collateral. Perhaps even more importantly, the true condition of my car has a very direct
bearing on my own argument that they failed miserably to mitigate their alleged collateral
deficiency damages by selling my car - the collateral asset - for a mere pittance of its real and
true, actual value.
12. Because this is a core issue at the heart of this case, I inquire of the Court, "What
would it take to depose these 2 witnesses from "Ken Martinez" and from Mirror Image Body and
Paint, respectively? To depose other witnesses I might call in my defense to set the record
straight regarding my prized sports car service and maintenance records, or the neighbors and
friends who would not hesitate to confirm my story that this car (regardless some relatively
minor and pending, purely cosmetic repairs to the front bumper and passenger-side (right) front
fender,) was always kept in a reasonably good condition and state of repair? How can I, without
Court extensions of filing deadlines, introduce into the record photographs of my car to lend
better credence to these assertions of mine, and to my side of these very substantial, and
significant, disputed material facts?

13. Meanwhile, I wish to now introduce into the record my Exhibit A, Attached which is the Vehicle Impound Report issued by Guillermo Blanco Towing at the date and time of
my arrest and the subsequent decision by S.L. County Sheriff to impound my car. (Please Note
that with all or nearly all of my Exhibits herein, including this one here at hand, and previously
too, I am sending the OriginaL and not a copy, to this Court.) This Vehicle Impound Report,
issued by the arresting officer and Guillermo Blanco Towing necessarily addresses the condition
of the vehicle being impounded with some small thoroughness, lest the owner of the vehicle
when coming to the impound lot to reclaim the vehicle try to blame them for pre-existing
damages. This, very sadly for me, turns out to be the last time I ever saw my car, (though I had
already been hauled off in handcuffs before this Report was ever written,) - and that's because
Plaintiff Jordan Credit Union interjected themselves between myself and Blanco Towing by
maliciously and capriciously repossessing my car from off the Blanco Towing Impound Lot.
And, a close examination directly contradicts the greatly exaggerated claims of damage alleged
by Plaintiff to this car at issue.
Nowhere does this Vehicle Impound Report's list of pre-existing damages list, for
example, broken windows, flat tires, missing gas lids, nor broken headlights, broken taillights all of which the itemized Estimate and "Declaration" submitted by Plaintiff- now obviously
fraudulently - does allege! Furthermore, when one compares the reported odometer reading
between this Vehicle Impound Report and the Itemized Estimate submitted by Plaintiff, it would
appear either he or the repossession company drove my "non-starting" car an additional 40
miles!
14. Given all of these contradictions that are clearly evident throughout Plaintiffs
contentions that my car was not kept in an overall and reasonably good condition of repair, as I
believe, and testily that it was, their contention that $2665.00 would be required to fix my car,
not including engine repairs (as declared by their affidavits), or "well in excess of $3,000.00 to
make the car saleable," (See new Plaintiff Memorandum of Points... @ Pg. 11) there probably
exists right here, alone, grounds adequate enough — if not to throw their case out of Court in its
entirety - then to at least dismiss their Motion for Summary Judgment on the basis of all these
disputed material facts?
II. PLAINTIFF IS IN BREACH OF CONTRACT
Plaintiff is in Breach of Contract: both the 'letter' of the Loan Contract Agreement has been
violated by them, along with and as well as its 'spirit'.
«15. I dispute "reasonable notice," as Plaintiff has asserted. Plaintiffs new Memorandum
of Points... places much of the emphasis and focus of their arguments upon the Loan Contract
Agreement that I signed at the time I purchased my car, and a copy of said Contract is submitted
by them as an Exhibit A, Attached to Affidavit of Michelle Rogers. Then they have repeatedly
asserted that I "was given proper and reasonable notice of the default and the pending action."
(See new Plaintiff Memorandum, @ pg. 10; also as a so-called Fact #8 @ Pg. 4; and in Michelle
Rogers' Affidavit @ #11, also.)
Yet, the letter that they sent to me at my mother's house OH December II t h , (See
Plaintiff Exhibit C, Attached to Michelle Rogers' Affidavit) and which they freely admit was
their only outgoing attempt at any kind of communication with me throughout the course of this
entire fiasco, very clearly says, "Unless $9312.37 is delivered to the credit union in cash or
cashier's check by 12/20/07, the credit union will advertise the collateral for sale and solicit bids.

We will then sell the collateral to the highest approved bidder... A sale may take place at any
time without further notice to you. If you need more information about the sale you may write
us or call us." Finally, from the last paragraph of their letter, "Personal belongings must be
claimed by 12/02/2007, or they will be disposed of." This last is a pretty telling representation of
the 'sloppy' work that characterizes Plaintiffs arbitrary and capricious, reckless, hasty and
arrogant, most of all incompetent, actions for every step of the way henceforth forward - the sale
of my car, particularly.
But, anyway, back to the heart of this argument: By far more importantly, turn now
back to the Loan Contract in question (See my highlighted Exhibit B, Attached). "You agree
that if any notice is required to be given to you of an intended sale or transfer of the Property,
notice is reasonable if mailed to your last known address, as reflected in our records, at least 10
clays before the date of the intended sale or transfer (or such other period of time as is required
by law)." Because 12/11 is 9, not 10 days' notice before the intended sale of 12/20/07, Plaintiff
is clearly in default of their own obligations to this 'two-way street' Contractual Agreement!
And thus contradicting their very own alleged material facts re. Reasonable notice by the very
evidence they have themselves provided! Very clearly, "Reasonable Notice" never was provided
in this case at issue.
16. Perhaps even more importantly and central to my primary argument, they have
themselves also breached the essential spirit of this Contract, as well as its letter.
Plaintiffs Exhibit B, submitted in their newest pleadings, is the Notice of Impounded
Vehicle sent to Jordan Credit Union as the title holder of my car by the Utah State Tax
Commission advising them that my car was impounded to Blanco Towing's Impound Yard.
Note that the only thing 'scary' or irreversible about this notice is the advisement that towing and
daily storage fees will be required to get the car out of impound, and that "Failure to claim
vehicle listed above within 30 days may result in the sale of the vehicle at public auction," and
dated December 3rd. Presumably this letter triggered all of Plaintiff s behavior that followed.
According to Michelle Rogers, (See her Affidavit @ f7; also, Plaintiffs newest Memorandum,
Pg. 3 @ f4) "Because the Collateral had been impounded and was no longer in Defendant's
possession, Defendant was in default under the terms of the Agreement."
The Contract Agreement does have a provision that says "You will keep the Property in
your possession in good condition and repair... Unless otherwise agreed in writing, the
Property will be located at your address..." But, it also says, "By choosing any one or more of
these remedies, we do not waive our right to later use another remedy. By deciding not to use
any remedy, we do not give up our right to consider the event a default if it happens again."
[Emphasis added] In other words, lender, (in this case Plaintiff Jordan Credit Union,) reserves
the right always to make subjective judgment regarding same, and exercise these rights to default
and to the full extent of the law and this contract, //the situation seems to call for such dire
measures, seems to present a problem that places in jeopardy the lender's security interest in the
collateral (car) purchased with the proceeds of the car loan they elected to accept.
People financing a car enter into these kinds of agreements with their eyes open (one
would assume or hope), certainly: For example, everyone knows that if they fail in their primary
and most important obligation - namely, their agi cement to make all of their agreed-upon car
payments on time, they will very soon afterward lose the car. Similarly, that the lender's
security interest in the vehicle collateral must be protected at all times - meaning full insurance
to the lender's complete satisfaction, and the car commensurately and also kept in good
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if they fail in these primary obligations and responsibilities to the lender.
However, and nonetheless, the Contract is a two-way street, and the borrower, as the
registered owner of the vehicle in question has his own vested property rights and interests at
stake in his purchase of it, and thus is surely entitled to reasonable assurance and expectations
that the lender will accordingly respect his own property rights, and treat him fairly and in
accordance with, and in harmony with, reasonable and responsible, acceptable and established
standards of normal business lender behavior not willy-nilly considering him in default at the
slightest deviation from the "fine print', surely In other words, provided he has met all of his
most important obligations to the lender, the registered owner of the vehicle is surely entitled to
just a little leeway with regards to where he parks his vehicle: different from his home if he's
sleeping over at a girlfriend's house, or on vacation out of town, for example. Provided he has
insurance policy coverage on the vehicle that allows it, (and no jeopardy to the lender,) perhaps
he's not constantly and technically "in possession" of the vehicle at all times because some other
licensed driver has been given permission to drive his car; or as another example, perhaps he's
not constantly and technically "in possession" if the car's been left overnight at the service
mechanic's shop.. . Yet, despite these small Tine print' deviations from the "in possession"
clause, is there any reasonable-thinking person who would really and truly consider him to be "in
default" of the car loan contract? \nd, certainly, if his important obligation to keep his car in
reasonably good condition of maintenance and repair has been met, if all the important
mechanical maintenance, preventative maintenance, upkeep and repair has been satisfied, and
evidences diligent care and concern for the legitimate property interests of the lender, then "in
good faith" nearly everyone would have an unstated understanding that inevitably sometimes a
needed repair is on pending status while waiting for parts, money, time enough, etc. and surely
that person is not then "in default" if his car has been allowed to go unwashed, say - or in my
case, if pending cosmetic repairs have been temporarily postponed until all the money to make a
pending repair had become available. (Remember, my car had just finished passing safety and
emissions testing that were required for the car's annual registration and licensing obligations,
and that were renewed for another year by State of Utah's October Renewal,)
These are only common-sense exceptions to the rule - but in retrospect, conunon sense
has become to seem a very rare commodity in Plaintiffs 'scheme of things' because they have
used the term "good faith" to mean "we can do anything we want - regardless the vested rights
and interests of the car loan customer." In Plaintiffs vernacular, the term "good faith" has
become an oxymoron because they use this term to justify the most arrogant, disrespectful, and
malicious of behaviors on their own part - and if I ever hear the term from them again, rest
assured, I'll be holding on to my wallet. Without reservation, I adamantly dispute the so-called
material "facts" as alleged by them whenever and wherever they have used the term in their
explanations for all that herein follows the triggering event, which was the car's impound and
temporary storage at the tow yard
Plaintiff tells us, (Please see plaintiffs newest Memorandum... ^4, Michelle Rogers'
Affidavit @ f7) "On the good faith belief that he would be unable to make the required
payments on the loan, and to mitigate the damage and protect its interest in the Collateral, Jul dan
repossessed the Collateral from the impound lot on or about 12/10/07."
And, (@ Plaintiffs newest Memorandum... <|5, Michelle Rogers' Affidavit (a) f8,j on the good
faith belief by the lender that an obligation would not or could not be performed is considered a
default," , .Except as prohibited by law. [Emphasis added].

18. it is not very hard to see that this was a yen large assumption {presumption, more
like,) for them to be making on the basis of so little information. It is also yet one more of thai
so-called "material facts" that I vigorously dispute because on the basis of these flimsy
presumptions, Plaintiff accelerated the loan's entire outstanding, unpaid balance; and then they
repossessed my car right out from under me - from my rightful partial ownership, established by
2+ years of monthly car payments already paid to them, on time, like clockwork, each and every
month - when they just up and decided, (without one iota of attempted communication with me
their December 11th letter, and the only notice they ever evm bothcied to send, reported my ear's
repossession as a "done deal' and an accomplished fact; and by then, my car had already been
repossessed when they mailed this letter to me,) to take it from me and from off the impound lot
where it was temporarily stored! I believe this decision made by them was entirely impetuous
and imprudent, as well as malicious, arbitrary, and capricious - coming at me as it did without
the slightest attempt, or courtesy whatsoever, to try and talk to me first, seemingly with zero
regards for the uncontroverted fact that 1 had been for them, up until the impound and their
subsequent decision to repossess, an entirely trouble-free, steady and reliable with my on-time,
every-time car loan payments, kind of car loan customer. Talking to me first, or through my
family, would most certainly have put all their collateral security-based cares and concerns (read
after-the-fact excuses, more like,) to rest.
19, I mean, Does it really seem to be prudent businc 11 • ion-making at wo:
MI
they stoop to say, (Please see Plaintiffs newest Memorandum... @ Pg. 9) "Plaintiff
i
knowledge at that the time that Defendant's situation was any different from the nui ij \ (lier
cases in which debtor's [debtors] simply defaulted and attempted to walk away from their
obligations." ? This after 2+ years of making every single one of my car loan payments on time?
ill. Plaintiff s weak, ieeble, and ineffectual efforts lo eoinimimodlc with me were
ineffective and not at all reasonable given that they surely must linvi by then known where these
monthly car payments were coming to them from: ie, niy mother's bank (I) S, Bank Private
Client Group). Moreover, there are (and always have been) 2 Salt Lake City telephone directory
phone book listings for Suniville; both are family members, and both would have immediately
intervened to protect both mine, and the Plaintiffs interests in my car, if only the problem had
been ie any way communicated to anybody.
With such momentous news as this to communicate their single Notice of Repossession
letter, dated December 1 l !l and which was their only effort to communicate with me in any
way whatsoever - sent as a Certified- Return Receipt Requested Mail or even as a telegram,
would have been far more reasonable. Obviously, even a delinquent car loan customer would
have received more and/or different mail than did I.
Morcovei, the Impound Notice mailed to them as the title holder by the Utah State Tax
Commission made it evident, as well very likely, that 1 was in Salt Lake County Jail -put there
by the S.L. County Sheriffs Office (the same as my car was impounded,) as a result of an arrest
for DDL One single telephone call to the jail would have confirmed this. It would also, by far,
have saved everyone concerned a great deal of trouble because J, or my family acting in my
behalf, wouid have immediately taken steps to protect my car from such dire and unexpected
response precipitated by Jordan Credit Union. My point bears repeating, I think: even a
delinquent customer, behind on his car loan payments, would have received more notice than
was sent to me.

Plaintiff has tried to argue that it was I who had a "duty to communicate," that I was
given proper and reasonable notice of the default and the pending action (which is itself
predicated on false presumptions, and hardly a reasonable amount of notice, clearly contradicted
even by the terms, and requirements of the Loan Contract Agreement itself, (and as I have
already shown to be clearly defined therein.) fhen, Also: that, "After receiving no
communication from Defendant," (Please see Plaintiffs newest Memorandum.. . @ Pg. 6, f B ,
Michelle Rogers' Affidavit @ ^[15) "Jordan sought offers from salvage yards and accepted the
only offer received which was for $200.00"! How could I possibly be expected to remedy
what I didn't know was happening? Please consider: I might just as easily been on an
extended vacation out of town,, and inaccessible to the reach of ordinary mail. Isn't it far' more
"reasonable" an expectation that before entering into a transaction that obviously represented
such a "bath" and egregious loss for them, as well as for me, that in the interests of pure common
sense, as well as prudent business practices, they might have tried just a little harder to contact
me first? Wouldn't this have been, by their own words, the by far "less burdensome route"?
if only to explore the potentiality by at least somehow attempting to assure themselves that
their single letter had actually been received?
Quite easily, I could have refinanced the accelerated loan balance with some other
financial institution, (and been done with Jordan Credit Union once and for all,) for the out-ofpocket additional expense of repossession (stated to be $869.00, according to the one, only,
Notice of Repossession, which was ineffectually mailed to me after the repossession had become
accomplished fact) - and which presumably, mostly, represents the charges incurred at Blanco
Towing which I was intending and prepared to pay anyway.
Reversing or reconsidering the default decision might have kept me in the loan with
payments of $226.00 paid to them,, monthly for a long time afterwards (according to the terms of
our Loan Contract Agreement.) So isn't it logical then, to at least wonder why they made not the
slightest effort to somehow at least explore the barest possibility of that before they next
proceeded to just flush all of mmdand their collateral asset straight down the drain by accepting
a single, one time payment of only $200.00?
In fact, every other decision and action taken by Jordan Credit Union in response, and
which, step by step, in turn precipitated all these problems that followed, seems rushed, hasty,
and ill-considered, (as well as mean-spirited, malicious even) but mostly, reckless, capricious
and arbitrary. . . One almost has to wonder whether they already had a pre-conceived agenda
they were putting into momentum - almost as though they hoped that I wouldn't step up to
salvage the loan, and save my car?
21. So here I must now ask this Court another critical question: How can a deposition be
arranged to be taken from whichever Jordan Credit Union loan officer was in charge of my car
loan when all these preceding and critical decisions were being made? Plaintiff has introduced
into the record an Affidavit from Michelle Rogers - but v^ as it actually she who was in charge of
these reckless decisions at the time? Here is why I am starting to speculate and wonder about the
worst:
j n m ear iier pleading to this Court, I once stated that every time Plaintiff" Jordan Credit
IJnion has filed a new piece of paper, I learn something new about my car. In Plaintiffs newest
Memorandum.
it is stated that my car was "sold for $200.00 to Midvale All Small Auto, Inc. •
rd
on January 23 , W . Plaintiff mailed this Court an Exhibit A on September 18th that was
attached to the Memorandum in Opposition (before this Court's Decision and Minute Entry that
set the default judgment aside.) It was a notarized record of S.I County Jail Records, and it

shows that I was first released from jail, (following the December 3 r arrest that resulted in the
temporary impound of my car,) on January 17, '08. My own Verizon cellular phone records
confirm and verify what I also remember: that from my very first communication with Jordan
Credit Union, (talking to someone whose name I do not exactly remember, except that it was the
person I was told that I must talk to because she was in charge of my loan account, and car - I
wrote it all down, of course, but I do not have those notes with me here,) always,'from the very
first conversation, the sale of my car was being reported as a 'done deal' and accomplished fact.
I remember asking her incredulously, "You sold my $9,000.00 car to a salvage yard for
$200.00!" "Yes," she answered, "it had some front end damage and we couldn't get the car to
start.".. . Incredible!
But here's my point, which is a huge question: Out of jail, wrhich was not until about 5pm
on January 17th, which was a Thursday, too late to call anybody then, I began my calls to ailimportantly retrieve my car, on the following morning, Friday, 1/18/08 - and I was told that the
girl I needed to talk to at Jordan Credit Union was unavailable to talk with me until that
following Monday, which would have been January 21, '08, Now learning that the sale of my
car did not take place, according to Plaintiffs newest Memorandum , until January 23 rd, then I
was either being lied to when I talked to her, or she avoided all of my telephone calls for three
days while she made the final aiTangements that sold my car for a mere pittance of its actual, real
and true value!
Apparently there is a law already in place that is meant to ensure that the sal-' of a
repossessed vehicle does not involve any self-dealing (by proxy, or otherwise, presumal* •
Given the very fishy smell emanating from this transaction, especially in light of my own
inquiries being stalled and/or avoided for 3 long days before - by Plaintiffs own admission
this sale had been finalized, completed on January 23rd, I think it would be very interesting
indeed to get both these parties in Court:, or before a Deposition Hearing?
22, So, here again, I most vehemently dispute everything about the so-called material
"facts," as characterized and alleged by this Plaintiff, regarding both the "reasonable" and
adequate Notice provided me, the customer, by Plaintiff- along with nearly everything else
about the sale of my car by them, and which I, in turn, must instead characterize as arbitrary and
capricious, especially hasty and recklessly impetuous, as well as mean-spirited and malicious, or
worse, . . There was no adequate or reasonable Notice provided me, nor was this car of mine
sold for a fair price.
23. I have already shown how, by far, the best pru ,- Plaintiff could have received for the
collateral asset would have been simply to have left me *,?•
k.:p\ the loan,, alive, and thereby
received every last penny as we originally contracted between us by the terms of the Contractual
Loan Agreement It would appear they very arrogantly and cavalierly assumed (presumed) that
my mother's bank would compensate them for the entire amount of any collateral deficiency
owing, regardless how reckless and impetuous their own failure to mitigate the collateral
deficiency damages. It would appear they just didn't care, in their rash to find the "less
burdensome'" n.'-uie. Unfortunately for them, neither my mother nor my bank has the slightest
>i TL nor inclination, to continue to help me pay for a car I no longer have. Sadly, I have
oeen sent to prison ten times over the last twenty-two years, and haven't a single valuable or
worthwhile asset to my name, nor do I have any marketable job skills or prospects, either. Still,
if this Court, should decide no[ to rale in my favor, it will be a shame for my credit to have been,
fruitlessly ruined by the egregiously remiss and unfair treatment of me by this Plaintiff. . , and
for the bad precedents being set, to the detriment of everyone else behind me who might be

considering to finance a car - particularly from this Plaintiff whose bad behavior would then
have been encouraged, rewarded and protected, no matter that they have demonstrated a callous
indolence and disregard for my own rights and reasonable expectations in this matter.
24. It is my contention that Plaintiffs Notice of Repossession, dated 12/11/07 - which
was their only attempt at communication with me - and which said, (see Plaintiffs Exhibit C)
"A sale may take place at .any time without further notice to you. If you need more information
about the sale you may write us or call us," was a most inadequate notice which not only violates
the Loan Contract itself, (and as I have already shown, please see #15, herein,) which required
10, not 9 days notice between December 11th and December 20 t! ; it also seems to fall far short of
the 'reasonable notice of the sale' required to be given to the debtor, as proscribed by law.
25. Neither was Plaintiffs decision to sell my/their collateral asset, (my car!,) to a
salvage yard for a mere pittance of its real, true and actual value a "commercially reasonable"
decision. Just now please consider that when the original Loan Agreement and Contract was
made and accepted by this Plaintiff (October 2005,) my car's retail value was accepted to be
worth $11,500.00 which was the amount of the loan, zero down payment required, (the amount
financed being $12,829.00 after fees and sales tax were added on.) This car was also accepted to
be, at that time, an adequate collateral "uffici.:n!)y er^-r.^- ^ n™-?* -heir ow^ ^mritv ; r the
amount loaned to me.
Now, only 25 months later, (25 monthly payments later,) they 'stretch and scramble' to
make the sale of this collateral seem more reasonable in their arguments, by purporting that its
value had sunk to a mere (See Plaintiffs new Memorandum. .. @ Pg. 11) "wholesale price of
the vehicle . .. between $3200.00 and $4400.00" However, this is a wholesale Trade-in value
and it is one year more dated (Kelly Blue Book, 10/28/2008) than when they actually sold my
car for $200.00, as evidenced by their self-serving Exhibit CD' (attached to Michelle Rogers'
Affidavit) which, being a year, different, newer, of course places less valuation on my car than it
was worth in December, 2007.
26. Even still, their own Suuiiii;. •
•
^comiiigyet one more disputed-socalled material "facts" in this case. Firs: i... .-i .,d. * - ause, as I have already shown, their
allegation that my car needed $2600.00 for enormoush in Hated and exaggerated costs of repair,
additional to an undiagnosed engine problem, and as decided by Ken Martinez, lacks credibility,
(to say it kindly.)
Moreover, even if this Court were accepting of that testimony despite its contradiction of
record by both Mirror Image Auto Body and Paint, AND by the tow and impound receipt
showing no broken windows, headlights, taillights, etc. . , the math is still 'wrong insomuch as
$4400.00 (disputed) less greatly exaggerated costs of repairs @ $2600.00 (also disputed,) leaves
a collateral asset amount of $1800.00, not $200.00. Furthermore, what prudent and responsible
business person would ever loan at retail, and sell for wholesale? Other credit unions sometimes
park their repossessed automobiles outside the business with FOR SALE signs in the window,
presumably to best recoup their money in loans gone bad, ie. when a loan., customer fails to make
his promised payments. Jordan Credit Union seems not to care about any of that: it was far
easier for them to hastily sell my car willy-nilly for any old price so long as it was quick and
**•»'; 'Mess burdensome," and because they figured I could be made to pay for their improvident
akes, no matter how badly they behaved, As such, for egregious and. cavalier FAILURE TO
MITIGATE THEIR. DAMAGES, one might almost regard, this resulting collateral, deficiency a s
their just and deserved 'rewards'. Most certainly, this disposition of collateral has not been made
•' -r ,-onformity with reasonable commercial practices among dealers," and. as Article 9 of the

Uniform Commercial Code proscribes. As 'the Utah Coui.
vehicle must be sold for a "fair price," (sans self-dealing.

^

• :\r- previously ruled, the

CONCLUSION
I lad I been
*. my ^wn %.
.; au ,;e sold it for its true worth, retail to a
private buyer, and had money leu over after \M\ ing off my loan completely, like as not and this
more closely approximates what any "reasonable commercial practices among dealers" would
similarly dictate under these circumstances, 'vol. the "less burdensome" route? Less burdensome
would have been to take a few extra minutes to try and communicate to me, Plaintiffs steady
and reliable customer for over 2 years. It was also a cuurtc:;\ that I had every right to expect.
They loaned for $12,000.00, then sold for $200.00: no wonder they lost money and there's a
collateral deficiency let over once the smoke from their rash and hasty, arrogant and arbitrary
caprices clears the air.
Accordingly, 1 pray for this court s rem
-uu ^ u ^ i claims Ariu. .
f 1
additionally argue that 1 should my ^ ^- »^
^ •.
• the pockets of this Plaintiff
(who, in their original Complaint, a
. argument against their pre* ;ousi
obtained judgment by default against m^. too - were seeking to \sup' a default judgment through
which would have been a judgment obtained for exactly double thi mn<>unt tkev *?r*v are more
modestly alleging their collateral deficiency to bel)
I hereby seek compensation for the full 2 months car loan payments accepted b>
after they already had repossessed my car, and also for a fair and modest $250.00 replacement
costs borne by me when all of my personal property inside the vehicle turned up missing, which
included a sizeable amount of expensive, as well as sentimentally-valued and irreplaceable
clothing, (and which included my Flame-In-Go's Prison Firefighter 'Hot Shots' crew sweatshirt.;
Additionally, I pray this Court's relief for any other punitive cost relief and damages which this
Court feels it to now be appropriate to award me. This has been an entirely unwarranted
Complaint since its inception: one neither I, nor this Court, should ever have had to waste its
time with. Thank You for these considerations.

CERTIFIC A I"E OF NOTIFICATION
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing and attached document (Memorandum and
Reply In Support of My Preceding Motion to Dismiss, and Defendant Answer to Plaintiffs
[Original] Complaint, AND as an OPPOSITION RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT) was sent to the following people by FIRST CLASS,
PREP AID MAIL on the date specified, for Case #080903840.
Tu. tv-KiioR. L. i'erry, and Douglas Oviatt
Attorneys for Plain .
39 Exchange Plact
Suite 100
Salt Lake City, I
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attested to m> car's leal and true condition of lepair as being quite different tiom Flamtitt b
bogus and disingenuous allegations, and similaih I ha^e al\Aa>s insisted and contended that my
car was tunning ju&l fine light up until m> aixesl on December 3 rd . '08, and its subsequent
impound b> Offieeis of the Salt Lake Count) Sheriffs Office
Since both of these issues directl} and iele\anth support a ke> fact and point of mine that
Plaintiff leckiessh impicn ideutl) and utterh failed to mitigate the damages inclined to tnem

Ham F. Simi\ille, Ji.
PROSE
//17265

c'o Utah State Prison
P.O. Box 250
Draper, UT. 84020
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT CIVIL COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH
Harry F. Suniville, Jr.
Defendant/Respondent
vs.
Jordan Credit Union
Plaintiff

NOTICE TO COURT,
AND TO PLAINTIFF,
REGARDING NEW EVIDENCE
Case # 080903840
Judge Kate A. Toomey

Comes nov\ before this Court. Harry F. Suniville, Jr., PRO SE. and as the Defendant in
the above-notated action, hereby respectfully submits to this Court my NOTICE TO COURT,
AND TO PLAINTIFF, REGARDING NEW EVIDENCE, that I am hereby introducing into
the record.
New Evidence has recently become available to me. but it is evidence that primarily
serves the purpose of validating and authenticating certain contentions of mine already and
specifically stated previously by me in both of my previous answers to this Court, In fact, this
newest Affidavit/Declaration by the owners of Mirror Image Auto Bod) and Paint sirnph
provides some signature authentication and foundation to the document ahead} provided by
them - a formal estimate of needed repairs - which was attached as an "Exhibit C" to my
November 4th, m

filed MOTTON TO DISMISS AND DEFENDANT'S ANSWER TO

PLAINTIFF'S [ORIGINAL] COMPLAINT. In both this initial pleading, (Answer to the
Original Complaint,) and in my second that was tiled to this Court on December 4th, '08. entitled
(MEMORANDUM AND R E P L \ SUBMITTED IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS AND
DEFENDANT'S ANSWER TO PLAINTIFF'S [ORIGINAL] COMPLAINT, AND AS AN OPPOSING
RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMAR\ JUDGMEN r,)

I have ahead}, and always,

attested to my car's real and true condition of repair as being quite different from Plaintiffs
bogus and disingenuous allegations, and similarly I ha^ e always insisted and contended that my
cai was running just fine right up until my arrest on Decembei 3 rd . '08, and its subsequent
impound b> Officers of the Salt Lake Count} Sheriffs Office.
Since both of these issues direct!) and relevant!) support a key iact and point of mine that
Plaintiff reckiessiv impiovideiitK> and utterly failed to mitigate the damages inclined to them

j to me, also.) by their impetuous, arbitrary and capricious decision to repossess my car right
Rjit from

under me for no legitimate reason whatsoe\ei\ (none that stands up to close scrutiny,)

froth of these enclosed Affidavit/Declaration documents are made available foi this Court's
consideration in support of my pre\iously stated position. And, while there has been a Hearing
scheduled in this mattei foi March 2nd, '09, it is my understanding that in offering these two
documents into evidence, it is my obligation to also make these two records "available foi
inspection sufticiently in advance of their offer into evidence to provide an adverse party with a
fair opportunity to challenge them/' Accordingly, they are hereby being shared with Plaintiff,
also.

CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I hereb} certify that a cop} of the foiegoing and attached document (NOTICE TO
COURT, AND TO PLAINTIFF, REGARDING NEW EVIDENCE) was sent to the
following people by FIRST CLASS, PREPAID MAIL, on the date specified, for Case
#080903840.
TO.

DATED THIS

J-C^

Richard C Terr} and Douglas 0\ iatt
Attorneys foi Plaintiff
39 Exchange Place
Suite 100 "
Salt Lake City, UT. 84111

day of / ^ V > ^ / ^ ^

, 2009

Harry F.Suniville, Ji., PRO SE
#17265

c/o Utah State Prison
P.O. Box 250
Draper, UT. 84020

Exhibit B
AFFIDAVIT / DECLARATION
FROM MIRROR IMAGE AUTO
BODY AND PAINT

jJelendant/Respondent

vs.
Case # 080903840

Jordan Credit Union
Plaintiff

Judge Kate A. Toomey

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
I, Dick and Shannon

)
) ss.
)

[{JfZ / / ? / u/

, do solemnly state as follows:

1. 1 am/We are over the age of eighteen (18) and have personal knowledge of the facts
set forth below.
2. I am a certified mechanic (or wife and business partner) and I have worked in the
automotive repair industry practically all my life (for c*jQ number of years). My main areas
of professional expertise are auto body repairs and painting.
3. I/We derive our income from a business centered around that same expertise, and we
call our company Mirror Image Auto Body and Paint. Our business address is currently located
at 608 W. Center Street, Midvale, UT. 84047,
4. We are both well acquainted with Harry F. Suniville, Jr., because on several occasions
in the past we have been asked to perform inspection, estimation, and auto body icpairs, plus
painting services, on a succession of different Mitsubishi Eclipse automobiles owned by him,
starting with autumn, 2003.
5. On or about October 9,h, 2007, we were asked by Harry F. Suniville, Jr., to inspect his
cayenne red 2003 model year Mitsubishi Eclipse, and to provide a repair estimate for the work
that would be required to fix a dent on this car's passenger-side front fender. I believe he might
have explained at that time that this newer dent on his car had been caused by a drunken
apartment-complex neighbor.
6. At the time of this estimation for new repair services required, there were then
pending between us, by previous verbal contract and understanding, some as-yet-unmade repairs

enough to pay for an after-market front fiberglass bumper panel, and for the painting which
ivould be required to fix his front end entirely; and these repairs were put on hold and left
pending at customer's request, until such time as he could come up with the money required to
pay for the newest repairs (to his front fender.) At that time, it was our plan that then all of the
needed auto body repairs could be made at once and simultaneously. This is always the better
plan because then all required auto body painting can be flawlessly matched.
7. At the time of this, the last estimate on record at our shop, it is my belief, and my
strong recollection, that for the final estimate price of $511.8i, (body work parts and labor,)
Harry's car could have been fixed up and made cosmetically (from an auto body and paint
perspective,) ccgood as new" - that is, restored to a 'showroom quality' condition of repair. We
have submitted a true and correct copy of this formal Repair Estimate, and it is attached to this
hereto as Exhibit A.
8. Furthermore, I know for a fact that Harry's front bumper assembly, although broken
off in places at the bottom, needed no new front bumper support, (a $95.°° part,) because Harry
had already paid for a new front bumper support: one which we previously had installed for him
as a cash purchase, and because he wanted to ensure himself- while replacement of the broken
fiberglass front bumper panel remained in limbo -that all the other extrinsic and attached parts
of the bumper assembly, and that didn't need repair, nor replacement, as they were already "good
as new" (that is, reflector plastic, turn signal lights, and both front headlight assemblies) could
stay solidly affixed - without shake or rattle. In other words, his broken front bumper fiberglass
was previously, at our shop, and by one of our mechanics, firmly tied down to a brand new,
replacement, front bumper support.
9. Now, I have had opportunity just recently to read a document submitted to this Court
by Jordan Credit Union titled "Declaration of Ken Martinez" and it is my honest opinion: freely
submitted here in consideration of "front bumper support," falsely alleged as needed, and many
other seeming inconsistencies, also, but mostly based upon my/our own personal knowledge and
recall - and especially submitted in the interest of simple justice - that he (this "Ken Martinez")
is plainly lying with regards to the state of, and condition of repairs on Harry's car.
10. For one thing, 1 have already stated what I know about the front bumper support
And I want to personally contradict the testimony of this "Ken Martinez" relative to same,
because we know by our own shop's records, and personal knowledge, that this front bumper
support allegedly needed had already been replaced!
11. In truth, I/we find this "Declaration of Ken Martinez" plainly laughable and
ludicrous, because by professional experience, nobody can accurately price anything (neither

after-market used parts, nor new, factory/replacement parts,) without first knowing the exact
model year of the car to which estimates are being made. Additionally, it is plain to me that this
is a fraudulent and greatly exaggerated assessment of the true condition of Harry's car, and I/we
base this opinion on personal knowledge of Harry's car as I/we last saw it in October '07.
12. Accordingly, I now have had occasion to read Harry's answer to the lawsuit
complaint to which he has subsequently been forced to defend himself. Specifically, I/we have
now have had an opportunity to actually read parts of Harry's answer to this lawsuit, and the case
he makes therein (called

MLMORANIHJM AND RLPLY SUBMIIIKD IN SUPPORI

o* MOIION 10

DISMISS

AND DLFENDANI'S ANSWER io PLAIN IJNM'S [ORIGINAL] COMPLAINI, AND AS AN OPPOSING RESPONSE
TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT)

@ §3, §5, §6, §8, §9, §10 on Pages 4-7, AND,

based upon my/our personal and professional knowledge of this car in question, particularly in
regards to this car's actual and true condition of repair - as we personally know and recall it to
be in October '07 - we both wish to weigh in and hereby attest and testify under oath that to the
very best of our knowledge and belief, Everything that Harry has told this Court and stated
therein is factually true.
13. Moreover, based upon ray own professional knowledge and experience, when an
automobile's car ignition system requires a computer chip ignition key to operate, and as Harry's
2003 Mitsubishi required, that car will simply not start and run for more than a second or two,
until, with a computer code supplied only by Mitsubishi Motors, a new computer chip key has
been made to order by key-code specifications. It is an expensive proposition then to duplicate
such a key; and locksmiths typically charge $125.00 and more to duplicate an ignition key that is
capable of operating the car.
14. Also, based upon my professional experience, if everything wrong with Harry's car
were really true - all that this "Ken Martinez" has alleged - then there is not a mechanic in this
world who would have passed the cai for safety and emissions testing and certification, as I
personally know would have been required for Harry's mandatory, by end-of-October deadline,
in order that the current registration be renewed with new current-registration (October) stickers,
as required by the Utah State Department of Motor Vehicles. In fact, we both do actually recall
that the expense of this was one of the reasons why our own Mirror Image body shop repaiis
were left pending and in climbo' at that time, back in October when the last formal Mirror Image
Estimate of Repairs was deferred and postponed pending the availability of the last $500.00 or so
required with the plan being that, then, all of the then-pending repans required to perfectly
restore Harry's cai to a showroom quality of repairs could be made all at once, then
simultaneously painted, all at once Certainly, official records at the Utah State Department of

Motor Vehicles could confirm and \erify, corroborate, the accuracy cf this pari of our statement,
regarding these October vehicle registration - and prerequisite safety mid emissions testing
certifications.
WE BOTH DO SOLEMNLY DECLARE UNDER CRIMINAL PENALTY OF THE
STATE OF UTAH THAT THE FOREGOING IS TRUE AND CORRECT.
FURTHER, THESE AFFIANTS SAITH NAUGHT.
EXECUTED ON

Feb ,

JO

, 2009.

BY
Dick

(MmZMMi^

BY

shannon_
tKLik-Declarant
Mirror Image Auto Body and Paint
608 W. Center Street
Mich ale, UT 84047

^ T A ' H P H I TTTAT4

) ss.

COUNTY OF SALI' LAKE )
Subscribed, sworn to. and acknowledged before me on this
F^b>.
. 2009. by
SWyv*h UJaVi^L &
_, signcr(s) of the above instrument, who duh acknowledged to mc
that he she executed the same.
fO

da\ of

M) Commission Expires

ffi

>^

Q^Q^)

Notarv Seal

-^T-J.
^

w

w

KAREN FREHNER
Notary Public
State of Utah
My Comm. Expires Aug 28, 2009
99
Q s hSLcuT84ii7i
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OR IMAGE
'TO/BODY &

Estimate

PAINT

g W. CENTER STREET
VALE, UT 84047

|

Date

Estimate #

j
i

10/8/200*

48

!

Phone #
801-748-4993
HARRY SUNNYVILLE
2003 MITSUBISHI ECLIPSE

;
\ REPLACE RH FENDER
| LABOR
| REPAINT RH FENDER
PAINT & SUPPLIES

Description

Rate

Qty
I

Total
175.00
40.00
44.00
44.00

1
3
3

Subtotal
Sales Tax (6.85%)
i otal

175.00T
40.00T
132.00T
132.00T

W90Q
$3281

$5ii.8i

|

CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing and attached document
(AFFIDAVIT/DECLARATION FROM MIRROR IMAGE AUTO BODY AND PAINT)
was sent to the following people by FIRST CLASS, PREPAID MAIL, on the date specified, for
Case #080903840.
TO:

DATED THIS

^fV^>

Richard C. Terry and Douglas Oviatt
Attorneys for Plaintiff
39 Exchange Place
Suite 100
Salt Lake City, UT. 84111

day of

Harry F. SiMiiville, Jr., PRO SE
#17205

c/o Utah State Prison
P.O. Box 250
Draper, UT. 84020

OH -10/59o
SENTENCE MEMORANDUM

TO:

BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLE

RECEIVED

FROM:

ERIC BARKER, INVESTIGATING OFFICER

QQ~ 0 3 200B

ADULT PROBATION AND PAROLE, SALT LAKE JBO^BOKDF PARDONS
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
DATE:

12/02/2008

OFFENDER #:8481
RE:

SUNIVILLE, Hany F
THIRD DISTRICT - SALT LAKE CITY CASE#: 071909070
OFFENSE: DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL,
THIRD DEGREE FELONY.

Per the request of the Board of Pardons and Parole, the following is submitted for your
consideration:
PLEA BARGAIN:
The defendant was originally charged with:
Count 1.
Count 2.
Count 3.
Count 4.
Count 5.
Count 6.

Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol/Drugs, Third Degree Felony.
Possession of a Controlled Substance, Third Degree Felony.
Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, Class B Misdemeanor.
Ignition Interlock Violation, Class B Misdemeanor.
Driving on a Denied License, Class B Misdemeanor.
Improper Backing, Infraction.

Thru plea negotiations the defendant pled to:
Count 1.
Count 2,
Count 3.
Count 4.
Counts.
Count 6,

Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol/Drugs, Third Degree Felony.
Dismissed.
Dismissed.
Dismissed.
Dismissed.
Dismissed.
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PROBATION/PAROLE HISTORY:
Mr. Suniville was first placed on supervised probation with Adult Probation and Parole in 1983,
after completing a diagnostic evaluation. Mr. Suniville successfully completed this probation in
1984. After this date, Mr. Suniville acquired numerous charges and served substantial amounts
of time at the Utah State Prison and granted numerous opportunities to comply with jparbl^Mi^
Suniville's parole was revoked or terminated as an inmate case on several occasions.
On April 21, 2008, Judge Skanchy in the Salt Lake Third District Court placed Mr. Suniville on
36 months probation with Adult Probation and Parole for case #071902846. Mr. Suniville
acquired case #071909070 prior to being sentenced on this case.
Mr. Suniville failed to initiate the terms of probation set by Judge Skanchy's Court. Mr.
Suniville has had the opportunity to complete probation as well as parole with Adult Probation
and Parole stemming back to 1981. Several of these opportunities were terminated as an inmate
case.
Mr. Suniville was sentenced to probation with Adult Probation and Parole for case # 071902846.
Due to violations of the terms of probation the defendant's probation was terminated
unsuccessfully.

PENDING CASES:
According to a search of the Utah State Courts X Change System, the defendant has no pending
cases.

EVALUATIVE SUMMARY:
Mr. Suniville has been placed on supervised probation as well as supervised parole with Adult
Probation and Parole on numerous occasions. Mr. Suniville has displayed a history of noncompliance with the conditions set by the courts as well as the Board of Pardons. Mr. Suniville
has had the majority of his supervised cases terminated unsuccessfully and parole being revoked
and terminated as inmate cases. Adult Probation and Parole believes the defendant has a lack of
desire to comply with these conditions and shown this inability throughout the past two decades
of supervised probation and parole attempts.
On the Level of Service Inventory, an internal assessment tool, used by this agency to determine
the level of supervision and the risk to reoffend, the defendant scored in the High Risk category
with the following areas identified as his highest areas of need and risk:
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Harry F. Suniville, Jr.
PROSE
#17265
c/o Utah State Prison
P.O. Box 250
Draper, UT. 84020
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT CIVIL COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH

MEMORANDUM AND REPLY
(Submitted in SUPPORT OF
Motion to Dismiss and Defendant's
ANSWER TO PLAINTIFF'S
[Original] COMPLAINT), AND AS AN
OPPOSING RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Harry F. Suniville, Jr.
Defendant/Respondent
vs.
Jordan Credit Union
Plaintiff
1

Case # 080903840
Judge Kate A. Toomey

Comes now before this Court, Harry F. Suniville, Jr., PRO SE, and as the Defendant in
the above-notated action, hereby submits this MEMORANDUM AND REPLY (In support of
my preceding Motion to Dismiss, and Defendant Answer to Plaintiffs [Original] Complaint,)
AND which is also hereby respectfully submitted in Opposition Response and Reply to
Plaintiffs OPPOSING MEMORANDUM AND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
Here it may now be required or appropriate for me to point out that my MOTION TO
DISMISS AND DEFENDANT 'S ANSWER TO PLAINTIFF 'S [ORIGINAL] COMPLAINT, (the pleading that I
filed with this Court November 4th, '08) is not, (as Plaintiff asserts,) really a "renewed"
MOTION TO DISMISS, insomuch as it was the only argument (besides this one you now hold
in your hand,) so far submitted by me in answer to Plaintiffs Original Complaint - since this
Court set aside the Default Judgment against me in its MINUTE ENTRY dated October 8th, but
allowing, nonetheless, an open window for Plaintiff to start the proceedings anew by mailing me
a copy of their original Complaint, which I did not have, up until its receipt by me on October
21, the benefit of having anytime ever before then received.
Now, Plaintiff has submitted a Motion for Summary Judgment, along with their
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, and in
Opposition to Defendant's "Renewed" Motion to Dismiss [Henceforth referred to as Plaintiffs
new Memorandum. . .] - And this is my Opposing Response and Reply to that.
Quite frankly, I continue to be astounded at Plaintiffs impudence in continuing to pursue
this lawsuit even after the egregious abuse and mistreatment of me as their used-to-be car loan
customer is brought to light, and when their apology would seem, to me at least, to be the more
deserved and appropriate response under these circumstances.
Now replying to these newly-filed Plaintiff Motion for Summary Judgment, and Plaintiff
Memorandum of Points and Authorities In Support of Motion for Summary Judgment and In

Opposition to Defendant's Renewed Motion to Dismiss, both of which were delivered to me at
evening mail call on Tuesday night, November 25th, I will follow Plaintiffs example, in order to
avoid unnecessary duplication and in consideration of a more economical use of the Court's
time, by requesting that these facts and arguments offered herein in reply, and in support of and
favoring my MOTION TO DISMISS, to also appropriately be considered as my address of, and
my Opposition Response to, Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, (along with its
Supporting Memorandum). I believe these facts and arguments presented herein also, and
accordingly - including some 25 material disputes as to genuine issue of fact - support a Court
denial of said Motion for Summary Judgment.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs Memorandum starts off by saying my Motion "raises no new issues or presents
any new and relevant facts to be addressed . . . Plaintiff objects to the entirety of Defendant's
motion as hearsay and lacking any proper foundation. The motion consists of nothing more than
baseless accusations and conclusions, none of which are supported by a single piece of relevant
and admissible evidences. Because Defendant has provided no admissible evidence for the
Court to consider in connection with his motion to dismiss, the same should be denied." (Pg. 2,
Plaintiffs Memorandum of Points and Authorities)
However, the Original Complaint filed against me was based entirely upon an alleged
failure by me "to make payments when due pursuant to the terms of the loan agreement" (Their
words: See #7, First Cause of Action); and in the Complaint's Second [and only other] "Cause
of Action," (@ #14,) it is based upon the unfounded and redundant allegation that, "Defendant
has had the use, benefit and possession of all the funds loaned to them [him?] without
compensating Plaintiff..." Moreover, both the supposed "Breach of Contract," and "Unjust
Enrichment," which are the First and Second (and only) Cause(s) of Action, as named in this
Complaint, individually and collectively pivot upon this key point: an alleged failure of me to
make my car payments [plural payments] on time. Accordingly then, in my Defendant
MOTION TO DISMISS, I effectively showed, supported by notarized affidavit from U.S. Bank
Private Client Group Vice President Michael Poulter, and other evidence(s) as well, that these
Plaintiff allegations, which were the very foundation of their Complaint against me, was a
foundation made of sand: that their case against me must necessarily fall, andfail, once the
foundational basis crumble and is proven to be false - which it was.
Now, it is almost laughable for Plaintiff to go backwards and try to clean it up, to switch
up/change the foundational allegation by now saying (See newest Plaintiff Memorandum, @pg.
9,) "Defendant failed to make the required payment" [singular payment] and "This claim is
based on the fact that the debt was accelerated by Plaintiff following default and pursuant to the
Agreement."
One has to interject the question, here directed to Plaintiff, how is a notarized affidavit
from Jordan Credit Union Collection Officer Michelle Rogers any more credible than a notarized
statement from my mothers' bank Vice President, and why, if my Motion and evidence really
"raises no new issues or presents any new and relevant facts to be addressed," has it required you
to change your entire story in pursuit of these bogus claims?
Fortunately, I have faith that this Court will give impartial and even-handed consideration
to the true facts of this case - will throw the lawsuit out of court if such is the appropriate relief
and remedy when one party changes their whole story mid-stream, or submits pleadings and

argument so transparently 'squirming' and disingenuous as has this Plaintiff Jordan Credit
Union.
Moreover, since this case at issue also pivots upon this loan contract here at issue, I
would hope and pray for this Court to furthermore bear in mind the intrinsic 'Big Picture' here at
stake. That it will reinforce my faith and belief in the fairness of Courts generally, by
considering the precedent being set if a lender like Jordan Credit Union is allowed to just run
rough-shod over the rights and legitimate property interests of those who choose to finance their
purchase of a car.
Please consider how you would feel, personally, to be so shabbily mistreated by a lender;
and how nobody in his right mind would dare tofinancea car if these kinds of lender behavior
(as characterized by the words and actions of the Plaintiff themselves,) were the norm.
Please consider that in big bold all capital letters near the bottom of the Loan Agreement
and Contract are the words: "NOTICE: ANY HOLDER OF THIS CONSUMER CREDIT CONTRACT is
SUBJECT TO ALL CLAIMS AND DEFENSES WHICH THE DEBTOR COULD ASSERT AGAINST THE SELLER
OF GOODS AND SERVICES OBTAINED PURSUANT HERETO OR WITH THE PROCEEDS HEREOF." Also,

that even though I am, in my stumbling and awkward pro se ignorance, at a loss to know enough
to specifically invoke what surely must be inherent Consumer Protections written into laws and
regulations like Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, (Article 9, and elsewhere,) and in
the Courts' precedent interpretations of same, to be used in my defense - that doesn't make these
claims, protections and defenses any less real or relevant to this case at hand. Finally, I would
hope and pray this Court to pay special attention to the Plaintiffs own words in their version of
the foregoing events, and of Plaintiff s actions that their own words describe with this central
question always in mind: were they acting like prudent and responsible business people when
they made their decisions relevant to this case at hand, or could their preceding actions more
properly be regarded, (and as I would certainly characterize them,) as arbitrary, capricious, hasty
and reckless?
Sometimes the truth, or more of it than a dissembling person would choose to tell, will
inadvertently slip out; I believe Plaintiffs choice of words, (See newest Plaintiff Memorandum,
[and version of events] @ Pg. 12,) "Plaintiff... in the end opted for the less burdensome route"
is a poignant case-in-point because it is an unintended but succinct self-described summarization
and revelation of Plaintiff s impetuous and callous disregard of me, and of my own inherent
property rights in the car loan collateral/asset and vehicle (my car!) here at issue. They made
absolutely zero effort at any step along the way to treat either me, or my/their collateral asset
property, with any respect whatsoever on the assumption that I could be made to pay under the
terms of this contract no matter how irresponsible and hasty, arbitrary and capricious, their own
actions in regards to it. And that, in my humble opinion, surely constitutes the more egregious
"Breach of Contract/' by Plaintiff, to be herein considered.
DISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS
1. Once again, freshly stated anew, these are some of the disputed material facts in this case.
In plain language, I strongly dispute Plaintiffs allegations regarding my car's condition. I
believe and assert that my car was kept in reasonably good condition and repair for the 2+ years
that I faithfully made my car payments on time to the Plaintiff. In Plaintiffs most recent
rendition of their story, (their latest Memorandum of Points ...) they allege it was not, and they
attempt to partially explain their decision to repossess my car from off the impound lot where it

was being temporarily stored as being based on this disputed allegation that it, (my car) was not
kept in good condition. Interestingly, Plaintiff in their own latest Memorandum of Points, can be
seen to contradict themselves:
"At the time of the initial [only] notice of repossession sent to Defendant, the issues
related to the true condition of the vehicle were not known." [Emphasis added] (See Plaintiff
Memorandum of Points... Pg. 5 @ Tfl2; and Affidavit of Michelle Rogers @ K 14). Remember,
this notice of repossession mailed to my mother's house - the only notice they ever bothered to
send anywhere, and not received by me until January 17th, the day I got out of jail - was dated
12/11/07, and it informed me, (See Exhibit C, Attached to Affidavit of Michelle Rogers,) "On
12/10/2007, Jordan Credit Union repossessed the 2003 Mitsubishi used as collateral on the above
loan."
However, these statements of theirs are contradicted elsewhere, (See Plaintiff
Memorandum of Points. .. Pg. 3 @ ^[4; and Affidavit of Michelle Rogers @ ^|7) where they
allege, "While the Collateral remained impounded... Plaintiff learned that the vehicle had
extensive body damage and would not start. [Emphasis added] On the good faith belief that he
would be unable to make the required payments on the loan, and to mitigate the damage and
protect its interest in the Collateral, Jordan repossessed the Collateral from the impound lot on or
about December 10, 2007."
2- What's more, I dispute both parts of this allegation (extensive body damage and
would not start) regarding my car's true condition of maintenance and repair. And, I assert that
it can only remain an undisputed material fact - one that directly contradicts Plaintiff allegations
- that this car was running just fine right up until the traffic stop by S.L. County Sheriffs that
resulted in my arrest and the impound of my vehicle. This begs the question: Where does this
falsely alleged and non-existent, so-called "engine problem" come from?
Were I not so handicapped of resources like unlimited phone calls, or access to legal selfhelp and law books that many people not presently incarcerated might tend to take for granted particularly were I not so pressured by time restraints in keeping to Court-filing deadlines - there
are several relevant issues come immediately to mind as screaming for more extensive scrutiny
by means of discovery.
3. First, I have previously stated, in my first Defendant response to this original
Complaint (my Motion to Dismiss, and Defendant's Answer to Plaintiffs [original] Complaint,)
that there were some admittedly then-pending body damage repairs that needed to be made on
my car when it was impounded. I also provided this Court an Exhibit C, therein, which was a
previously obtained formal Estimate for all of these needed repairs, dated October 9, 2007, from
Mirror Image Body and Paint. It is where I get all of my body damage repairs made - both
previously on this very same car in question, and on cars that I have owned before this one especially my 1997 Mitsubishi Eclipse that I sold when I upgraded to this newer 2003 now at
issue. I go to them because they, (owners Dick and his wife Shannon, who over time have also
become my friends,) do first-class, excellent showroom quality work at a fraction of the cost
some other body shops might charge for the same amount of work. As an example, when my
previous car, (before this one at issue, the 1997 Mitsubishi Eclipse,) was "run over" by a large
semi-truck, crushing a corner of its roof, in turn shattering the front windshield and drivers' side
window, with extensive door and quarter panel damage, too, the first estimate for body damage
repairs I obtained was in excess of $4400.00, the second one came in closer to $4800.00, and
then my very expert auto mechanic (Lynn's Auto, Murray, where all my cars get very expertly
mechanically-maintained,) recommended I take it to Mirror Image Auto Body and Paint: and

iere it was fixed for 'good as new' at a cost of only $1500.00 (approximately). We
ibsequently hung before-and-after photos of my car, and of their extremely professional repairs,
n their office wall to advertise for future, quality-seeking customers!
4. Now consider this Plaintiff-submitted "Declaration" of Ken Martinez whose name and
usiness appear nowhere on any on-line directory, in any capacity as an auto repair business (at
sast none that my prison caseworker could find when he 'surfed' Google and Dex, and other
lirectories looking,) and whose credentials are stated to be, "I have been asked on several
occasions to perform inspection, estimation and repair services on vehicles repossessed by
ordan Credit Union." In this "Declaration" he further asserts, "8. Jordan Credit Union declined
o have the repairs made because the cost was greater than what the car would sell for at
mction." Doesn't such a statement seem just a little contrived, and coached, and self-serving,
;oming as it does from a "several occasions" in the past mechanic for a financial institution like
Plaintiff Jordan Credit Union? - particularly if the sale of a $9,000.00 car for only $200.00 was
really an "arms-length" transaction, as Plaintiff alleges?
5. When I contacted the salvage yard owner who ended up buying my 2003 Mitsubishi
Eclipse in my efforts to try and reverse the outrageously ludicrous transaction whereby my
$9,000.00 Kelly Blue Book-valued car had been sold to him for only $200.00, he refused, not
surprisingly; and, he asked me to provide him a key for my car because the necessary computerchip key, (with codes available only from Mitsubishi: my car had a keyless entry and ignition
lock system which made duplicate keys very hard to come by, or at least expensive, since by
personal experience, key duplication cost in excess of $125.00,) - that is, the only key then
existing, had stayed in my pocket when I was taken to jail. And this, of course, in turn then begs
the question: what was Ken Martinez using for a key when he was determining my car "would
not start"? Too, does this help to explain all his confusion about windows supposedly broken?
6. Moreover, I question, and I dispute, altogether, and most firmly, many more aspects of
this "Declaration's" assertions as well because I believe it is a deliberate exaggeration and
distortion of the true condition of my car now belatedly, and at second-hand, alleged by Plaintiff
solely to strengthen their bogus claims in this matter.
Next consider this: in his so-called inspection and estimation of repair services, this selfdescribed "mechanic" [notice: not auto body mechanic] identified my car as a "2002 Mitsubishi
Eclipse"- and with the model year wrong, (mine was a 2003,) how can he possibly, and
accurately price replacement parts?
7. Additionally, there was nothing at all wrong with either headlight assembly, though
his greatly exaggerated Estimate lists them both as needing replacement at a cost of $265.00
apiece. His same estimate invoice says a Passenger Window was broken, and a taillight, and that
a right front tire was "flat." Now, if the car had truly lacked both headlights, and a taillight,
doesn't it seem likely that the Sheriff who cited me for not having an "Ignition Interlock
Device," (which I never have been required to have on any car of mine, and who also cited me
for DUI even though my breathalyzer testing at the time of arrest showed 0.00, and blood testing
at the scene of arrest also resulted in 0.00 blood toxicology,) - would then overlook such basic
vehicle equipment violations as these would be?
8. Now turning back to his written testimony, (See "Declaration", @ 6) he states "body
damage to the entire right side of the vehicle," in addition to both front headlight assemblies,
passenger window broken,. . . broken tail light, flat tire, and missing gas cap. In addition, the
vehicle would not start." (I ask again, what ignition key was he using?) And, here, different
from the written and itemized Estimate, (See Attachment to his written "Declaration(s)") my

"driver automatic window" also turns up to be allegedly, unon-operating," and yet, it is the
Driver Door Glass which he says needs replacement on the left side, bottom, of his formal
Estimate of Repairs - and it is the Passenger Window broken on the right side of his itemized
Estimate of Repairs! With window replacements priced at $420.00 this is not an insignificant
discrepancy, and he has told three differing accounts on only two pieces of paper! Moreover,
when I last saw my car, no window was broken, and my Exhibit from the Impound Tow Truck
driver will prove this to be so.
9. Furthermore, on this "Declaration's" attached itemized Estimate of Repairs, note that
the gas lid is listed at a replacement cost of $45.00! Additionally, that the alleged replacement
cost of a bumper support is listed at $95.00: Yet, Mirror Image Auto Body and Paint would tell
you that we had already replaced the front bumper support preparatory to the complete, thenpending (at the time of repossession) body shop repairs that would have rendered my car
cosmetically to a "good as new" state of repair.
10. In November/October of '07, the Mirror Image Auto Body and Paint formal estimate
of pending repairs (and which I previously submitted to this Court in my most recent pleadings
as an Exhibit C,) priced all of my then-pending and needed repairs at $511.81 - and these
included repairs to the front fiberglass bumper, which we 'jerry-rig' and temporarily repaired by
tying down the old, broken one to the newly-installed bumper support, with arrangements then
made for a new front bumper cover (already paid for in advance, early October) and that was part
of the final and complete repairs which we at that time put on hold for the remaining $500.00,
(earmarked from my Christmas money,) to be paid. Then, and that way, everything needing the
slightest bit of attention to keep this prized sports car of mine a 'hot' car could all be painted at
once. Hence, and in short, this temporary, 'jerry rig' repair of the broken front bumper - tied to
the newly-installed bumper support, so that all adjacent parts could be held in place securely, not
to rattle around, possibly fall off- could not have been made at all except that the bumper
support that Ken Martinez has alleged was needed was already installed and in place.
Here, I suppose I have raised questions by herein admitting that there were, in fact, some
automotive body shop repairs then pending for this car here in question and that it would have
been "less burdensome" or more convenient to ignore altogether. Except that I have faith that
even a simple man telling the simple truth can prevail in our Courts if the unvarnished truth of
things supports such a verdict. In life, sometimes the truth can be messy, maybe inconvenient, or
at least complicated. Too, as I write this, I am also now remembering that some of these thenpending auto body repair charges were being deferred and juggled against other expenses, and
these other expenses, necessarily put first, included the annual licensing and registration,
complete with complete safety and emission testing that always has been due on this particular
car of mine before the end of October. Certainly, anybody who has ever owned a car will
appreciate the fact that car maintenance is usually a 'work in progress.' I still have a full set of
service receipts and records on this car which would prove beyond a shadow of a doubt that all
routine and preventative mechanical maintenance and repairs were always made on time for as
long as I had this car under contract of the Loan Agreement. Similarly, when this credit union
lender first asked me to ensure that the full insurance which I have always carried on this car including comprehensive and collision insurance coverage - was renegotiated with my insurance
carrier to include a higher-priced policy of less deductible on the comprehensive and collision
insurance parts of my coverage package, I readily and promptly attended to that responsibility of
mine, also.

Still, because the cost of all the then-pending body damage repairs on my car were less
:han the deductible, it remained for me to do this as I could afford to, ie. with Christmas money
from my mother. It was by far the more prudent and economical of choices regarding same for
:hese repairs to the front end (requiring a new fiberglass bumper cover @ $235.00,) and to the
passenger side front-fender panel (@ $125.00 as itemized by Ken Martinez; $175.00 @ Mirror
image Auto Body and Paint,) because it is far easier and better to paint everything all at once,
resides being less intrusive to the car's normal, day-to-day usage.
One other consideration also played into this minimal delay of mine in getting everything
Ixed for good as new, with my car restored to an excellent, almost 'mint5 condition of
naintenance and repair with Christmas money, and that was the circumstances of my apartment
complex neighbor, next door to me in Apartment 4, having made October arrangements with me
o compensate me in $50.00 installments out of his weekly paychecks as a means of paying for
he approximate $250.00 in damages to my right front fender when his drunken and uninsured
girlfriend hit my car with her own when sloppily parking her car in the stall immediately
idjacent to my #5 apartment parking stall. I agreed to this arrangement - in the interest of
teighbor relations - not to file an insurance claim because these repairs were only half the
mount of my deductible, and thus would have represented an out-of-pocket expense anyway,
given her uninsured status,) figuring that $250.00 in installments was better than nothing
oming from her non-existent insurance coverage. They were a purely cosmetic dent damage
nyway, a dent that did not affect in any way my headlight, nor my wheel.
I apologize to this Court for all these many words: but at least they have the virtue of
eing unvarnished truth, even if somewhat complicated to explain - and with the advantage that
very aspect of these circumstances surrounding the roughly $500.00 then pending to complete
11 repairs can be completely confirmed and verified by all these other persons, and facts,
ivolved.
11. Since obviously, taking all of these facts and circumstances and arguments of mine
lto consideration, into account, there remains a lot of controverted material facts relative to
laintiff s allegation that my car was in terrible condition when they arbitrarily decided to
^possess it - particularly since, depending upon which version of their story one chooses to
elieve regarding my car's true and actual condition, its condition after impound is being used as
justification for their capricious decision to accelerate the loan payments and to repossess this
>an collateral. Perhaps even more importantly, the true condition of my car has a very direct
taring on my own argument that they failed miserably to mitigate their alleged collateral
jficiency damages by selling my car - the collateral asset - for a mere pittance of its real and
ue, actual value.
12. Because this is a core issue at the heart of this case, I inquire of the Court, "What
ould it take to depose these 2 witnesses from "Ken Martinez" and from Mirror Image Body and
lint, respectively? To depose other witnesses I might call in my defense to set the record
raight regarding my prized sports car service and maintenance records, or the neighbors and
ends who would not hesitate to confirm my story that this car (regardless some relatively
inor and pending, purely cosmetic repairs to the front bumper and passenger-side (right) front
ader,) was always kept in a reasonably good condition and state of repair? How can I, without
>urt extensions of filing deadlines, introduce into the record photographs of my car to lend
tter credence to these assertions of mine, and to my side of these very substantial, and
piificant, disputed material facts?

13. Meanwhile, I wish to now introduce into the record my Exhibit A, Attached which is the Vehicle Impound Report issued by Guillermo Blanco Towing at the date and time of
my arrest and the subsequent decision by S.L. County Sheriff to impound my car. (Please Note
that with all or nearly all of my Exhibits herein, including this one here at hand, and previously
too, I am sending the Original, and not a copy, to this Court.) This Vehicle Impound Report,
issued by the arresting officer and Guillermo Blanco Towing necessarily addresses the condition
of the vehicle being impounded with some small thoroughness, lest the owner of the vehicle
when coming to the impound lot to reclaim the vehicle try to blame them for pre-existing
damages. This, very sadly for me, turns out to be the last time I ever saw my car, (though I had
already been hauled off in handcuffs before this Report was ever written,) - and that's because
Plaintiff Jordan Credit Union interjected themselves between myself and Blanco Towing by
maliciously and capriciously repossessing my car from off the Blanco Towing Impound Lot.
And, a close examination directly contradicts the greatly exaggerated claims of damage alleged
by Plaintiff to this car at issue.
Nowhere does this Vehicle Impound Report's list of pre-existing damages list, for
example, broken windows, flat tires, missing gas lids, nor broken headlights, broken taillights all of which the itemized Estimate and "Declaration" submitted by Plaintiff- now obviously
fraudulently - does allege! Furthermore, when one compares the reported odometer reading
between this Vehicle Impound Report and the Itemized Estimate submitted by Plaintiff, it would
appear either he or the repossession company drove my "non-starting" car an additional 40
miles!
14. Given all of these contradictions that are clearly evident throughout Plaintiffs
contentions that my car was not kept in an overall and reasonably good condition of repair, as I
believe, and testify that it was, their contention that $2665.00 would be required to fix my car,
not including engine repairs (as declared by their affidavits), or "well in excess of $3,000.00 to
make the car saleable," (See new Plaintiff Memorandum of Points... @ Pg. 11) there probably
exists right here, alone, grounds adequate enough - if not to throw their case out of Court in its
entirety - then to at least dismiss their Motion for Summary Judgment on the basis of all these
disputed material facts?
II. PLAINTIFF IS IN BREACH OF CONTRACT
Plaintiff is in Breach of Contract: both the 'letter' of the Loan Contract Agreement has been
violated by them, along with and as well as its 'spirit'.
-15. I dispute "reasonable notice," as Plaintiff has asserted. Plaintiffs new Memorandum
of Points.. . places much of the emphasis and focus of their arguments upon the Loan Contract
Agreement that I signed at the time I purchased my car, and a copy of said Contract is submitted
by them as an Exhibit A, Attached to Affidavit of Michelle Rogers. Then they have repeatedly
asserted that I "was given proper and reasonable notice of the default and the pending action."
(See new Plaintiff Memorandum, @ pg. 10; also as a so-called Fact #8 @ Pg. 4; and in Michelle
Rogers' Affidavit @ #11, also.)
Yet, the letter that they sent to me at my mother's house on December 11 th , (See
Plaintiff Exhibit C, Attached to Michelle Rogers' Affidavit) and which they freely admit was
their only outgoing attempt at any kind of communication with me throughout the course of this
entire fiasco, very clearly says, "Unless $9312.37 is delivered to the credit union in cash or
cashier's check by 12/20/07, the credit union will advertise the collateral for sale and solicit bids.

We will then sell the collateral to the highest approved bidder... A sale may take place at any
time without further notice to you. If you need more information about the sale you may write
us or call us." Finally, from the last paragraph of their letter, "Personal belongings must be
claimed by 12/02/2007, or they will be disposed of." This last is a pretty telling representation of
the 'sloppy' work that characterizes Plaintiffs arbitrary and capricious, reckless, hasty and
arrogant, most of all incompetent, actions for every step of the way henceforth forward - the sale
of my car, particularly.
But, anyway, back to the heart of this argument: By far more importantly, turn now
back to the Loan Contract in question~(See my highlighted Exhibit B, Attached). "You agree
that if any notice is required to be given to you of an intended sale or transfer of the Property,
notice is reasonable if mailed to your last known address, as reflected in our records, at least 10
days before the date of the intended sale or transfer (or such other period of time as is required
by law)." Because 12/11 is 9, not 10 days' notice before the intended sale of 12/20/07, Plaintiff
is clearly in default of their own obligations to this 'two-way street' Contractual Agreement!
And thus contradicting their very own alleged material facts re. Reasonable notice by the very
evidence they have themselves provided! Very clearly, "Reasonable Notice" never was provided
in this case at issue.
16. Perhaps even more importantly and central to my primary argument, they have
themselves also breached the essential spirit of this Contract, as well as its letter.
Plaintiffs Exhibit B, submitted in their newest pleadings, is the Notice of Impounded
Vehicle sent to Jordan Credit Union as the title holder of my car by the Utah State Tax
Commission advising them that my car was impounded to Blanco Towing's Impound Yard.
Note that the only thing 'scary' or irreversible about this notice is the advisement that towing and
daily storage fees will be required to get the car out of impound, and that "Failure to claim
vehicle listed above within 30 days may result in the sale of the vehicle at public auction," and
dated December 3rd. Presumably this letter triggered all of Plaintiff s behavior that followed.
According to Michelle Rogers, (See her Affidavit @ f7; also, Plaintiffs newest Memorandum,
Pg. 3 @ f4) "Because the Collateral had been impounded and was no longer in Defendant's
possession, Defendant was in default under the terms of the Agreement."
The Contract Agreement does have a provision that says "You will keep the Property in
your possession in good condition and repair . . . Unless otherwise agreed in writing, the
Property will be located at your address..." But, it also says, "By choosing any one or more of
these remedies, we do not waive our right to later use another remedy. By deciding not to use
any remedy, we do not give up our right to consider the event a default if it happens again."
[Emphasis added] In other words, lender, (in this case Plaintiff Jordan Credit Union,) reserves
the right always to make subjective judgment regarding same, and exercise these rights to default
and to the full extent of the law and this contract, i/the situation seems to call for such dire
measures, seems to present a problem that places in jeopardy the lender's security interest in the
collateral (car) purchased with the proceeds of the car loan they elected to accept.
People financing a car enter into these kinds of agreements with their eyes open (one
would assume or hope), certainly: For example, everyone knows that if they fail in their primary
and most important obligation - namely, their agreement to make all of their agreed-upon car
payments on time, they will very soon afterward lose the car. Similarly, that the lender's
security interest in the vehicle collateral must be protected at all times - meaning full insurance
to the lender's complete satisfaction, and the car commensurately and also kept in good

condition and repair - or again, they should not be surprised to soon lose their car to repossession
if they fail in these primary obligations and responsibilities to the lender.
However, and nonetheless, the Contract is a two-way street, and the borrower, as the
registered owner of the vehicle in question has his own vested property rights and interests at
stake in his purchase of it, and thus is surely entitled to reasonable assurance and expectations
that the lender will accordingly respect his own property rights, and treat him fairly and in
accordance with, and in harmony with, reasonable and responsible, acceptable and established
standards of normal business lender behavior - not willy-nilly considering him in default at the
slightest deviation from the Tine print', surely. In other words, provided he has met all of his
most important obligations to the lender, the registered owner of the vehicle is surely entitled to
just a little leeway with regards to where he parks his vehicle: different from his home if he's
sleeping over at a girlfriend's house, or on vacation out of town, for example. Provided he has
insurance policy coverage on the vehicle that allows it, (and no jeopardy to the lender,) perhaps
he's not constantly and technically "in possession" of the vehicle at all times because some other
licensed driver has been given permission to drive his car; or as another example, perhaps he's
not constantly and technically "in possession" if the car's been left overnight at the service
mechanic's shop... Yet, despite these small 'fine print' deviations from the "in possession"
clause, is there any reasonable-thinking person who would really and truly consider him to be "in
default" of the car loan contract? And, certainly, if his important obligation to keep his car in
reasonably good condition of maintenance and repair has been met, if all the important
mechanical maintenance, preventative maintenance, upkeep and repair has been satisfied, and
evidences diligent care and concern for the legitimate property interests of the lender, then "in
good faith" nearly everyone would have an unstated understanding that inevitably sometimes a
needed repair is on pending status while waiting for parts, money, time enough, etc. and surely
that person is not then "in default" if his car has been allowed to go unwashed, say - or in my
case, if pending cosmetic repairs have been temporarily postponed until all the money to make a
pending repair had become available. (Remember, my car had just finished passing safety and
emissions testing that were required for the car's annual registration and licensing obligations,
and that were renewed for another year by State of Utah's October Renewal)
These are only common-sense exceptions to the rule - but in retrospect, common sense
has become to seem a very rare commodity in Plaintiffs 'scheme of things' because they have
used the term "good faith" to mean "we can do anything we want - regardless the vested rights
and interests of the car loan customer." In Plaintiffs vernacular, the term "good faith" has
become an oxymoron because they use this term to justify the most arrogant, disrespectful, and
malicious of behaviors on their own part - and if I ever hear the term from them again, rest
assured, I'll be holding on to my wallet. Without reservation, I adamantly dispute the so-called
material "facts" as alleged by them whenever and wherever they have used the term in their
explanations for all that herein follows the triggering event, which was the car's impound and
temporary storage at the tow yard.
Plaintiff tells us, (Please see Plaintiffs newest Memorandum... f4, Michelle Rogers'
Affidavit @ |7) "On the goodfaith belief that he would be unable to make the required
payments on the loan, and to mitigate the damage and protect its interest in the Collateral, Jordan
repossessed the Collateral from the impound lot on or about 12/10/07."
And, (@ Plaintiffs newest Memorandum... f5, Michelle Rogers' Affidavit @ |8,) "on the good
faith belief by the lender that an obligation would not or could not be performed is considered a
default." .. .Except as prohibited by law. [Emphasis added].

18. It is not very hard to see that this was a very large assumption {presumption, more
like,) for them to be making on the basis of so little information. It is also yet one more of their
so-called "material facts" that I vigorously dispute because on the basis of these flimsy
presumptions, Plaintiff accelerated the loan's entire outstanding, unpaid balance; and then they
repossessed my car right out from under me - from my rightful partial ownership, established by
2+ years of monthly car payments already paid to them, on time, like clockwork, each and every
month - when they just up and decided, (without one iota of attempted communication with me:
their December 11th letter, and the only notice they ever even bothered to send, reported my car's
repossession as a 'done deal' and an accomplished fact; and by then, my car had already been
repossessed when they mailed this letter to me,) to take it from me and from off the impound lot
where it was temporarily stored! I believe this decision made by them was entirely impetuous
and imprudent, as well as malicious, arbitrary, and capricious - coming at me as it did without
the slightest attempt, or courtesy whatsoever, to try and talk to me first, seemingly with zero
regards for the uncontroverted fact that I had been for them, up until the impound and their
subsequent decision to repossess, an entirely trouble-free, steady and reliable with my on-time,
every-time car loan payments, kind of car loan customer. Talking to me first, or through my
family, would most certainly have put all their collateral security-based cares and concerns (read
after-the-fact excuses, more like,) to rest.
19. I mean, Does it really seem to be prudent business decision-making at work when
they stoop to say, (Please see Plaintiffs newest Memorandum. .. @ Pg. 9) "Plaintiff had no
knowledge at that the time that Defendant's situation was any different from the many other
cases in which debtor's [debtors] simply defaulted and attempted to walk away from their
obligations." ? This after 2+ years of making every single one of my car loan payments on time?
20. Plaintiffs weak, feeble, and ineffectual efforts to communicate with me were
ineffective and not at all reasonable given that they surely must have by then known where these
monthly car payments were coming to them from: ie. my mother's bank (U.S. Bank Private
Client Group). Moreover, there are (and always have been) 2 Salt Lake City telephone directory
phone book listings for Suniville; both are family members, and both would have immediately
intervened to protect both mine, and the Plaintiffs interests in my car, if only the problem had
been in any way communicated to anybody.
With such momentous news as this to communicate, their single Notice of Repossession
letter, dated December 11th - and which was their only effort to communicate with me in any
way whatsoever - sent as a Certified, Return Receipt Requested Mail or even as a telegram,
would have been far more reasonable. Obviously, even a delinquent car loan customer would
have received more and/or different mail than did I.
Moreover, the Impound Notice mailed to them as the title holder by the Utah State Tax
Commission made it evident, as well very likely, that I was in Salt Lake County Jail - put there
by the S.L. County Sheriffs Office (the same as my car was impounded,) as a result of an arrest
for DUI. One single telephone call to the jail would have confirmed this. It would also, by far,
have saved everyone concerned a great deal of trouble because I, or my family acting in my
behalf, would have immediately taken steps to protect my car from such dire and unexpected
response precipitated by Jordan Credit Union. My point bears repeating, I think: even a
delinquent customer, behind on his car loan payments, would have received more notice than
was sent to me.

Plaintiff has tried to argue that it was I who had a "duty to communicate," that I was
given proper and reasonable notice of the default and the pending action (which is itself
predicated on false presumptions, and hardly a reasonable amount of notice, clearly contradicted
even by the terms, and requirements of the Loan Contract Agreement itself, (and as I have
already shown to be clearly defined therein.) Then, Also: that, "After receiving no
communication from Defendant," (Please see Plaintiffs newest Memorandum... @ Pg. 6, f 13,
Michelle Rogers' Affidavit @ f 15) "Jordan sought offers from salvage yards and accepted the
only offer received which was for $200.00"! How could I possibly be expected to remedy
what I didn't know was happening? Please consider: I might just as easily been on an
extended vacation out of town and inaccessible to the reach of ordinary mail. Isn't it far more
"reasonable" an expectation that before entering into a transaction that obviously represented
such a "bath" and egregious loss for them, as well as for me, that in the interests of pure common
sense, as well as prudent business practices, they might have tried just a little harder to contact
me first? Wouldn't this have been, by their own words, the by far "less burdensome route"? . ..
if only to explore the potentiality by at least somehow attempting to assure themselves that
their single letter had actually been received?
Quite easily, I could have refinanced the accelerated loan balance with some other
financial institution, (and been done with Jordan Credit Union once and for all,) for the out-ofpocket additional expense of repossession (stated to be $869.00, according to the one, only,
Notice of Repossession, which was ineffectually mailed to me after the repossession had become
accomplished fact) - and which presumably, mostly, represents the charges incurred at Blanco
Towing which I was intending and prepared to pay anyway.
Reversing or reconsidering the default decision might have kept me in the loan with
payments of $226.00 paid to them monthly for a long time afterwards (according to the terms of
our Loan Contract Agreement.) So isn't it logical then, to at least wonder why they made not the
slightest effort to somehow at least explore the barest possibility of that before they next
proceeded to just flush all of mind and their collateral asset straight down the drain by accepting
a single, one time payment of only $200.00?
In fact, every other decision and action taken by Jordan Credit Union in response, and
which, step by step, in turn precipitated all these problems that followed, seems rushed, hasty,
and ill-considered, (as well as mean-spirited, malicious even) but mostly, reckless, capricious
and arbitrary... One almost has to wonder whether they already had a pre-conceived agenda
they were putting into momentum - almost as though they hoped that I wouldn't step up to
salvage the loan and save my car?
21. So here I must now ask this Court another critical question: How can a deposition be
arranged to be taken from whichever Jordan Credit Union loan officer was in charge of my car
loan when all these preceding and critical decisions were being made? Plaintiff has introduced
into the record an Affidavit from Michelle Rogers - but was it actually she who was in charge of
these reckless decisions at the time? Here is why I am starting to speculate and wonder about the
worst:
In an earlier pleading to this Court, I once stated that every time Plaintiff Jordan Credit
Union has filed a new piece of paper, I learn something new about my car. In Plaintiffs newest
Memorandum..., it is stated that my car was "sold for $200.00 to Midvale All Small Auto, Inc.
on January 23rd, y08. Plaintiff mailed this Court an Exhibit A on September 18th that was
attached to the Memorandum in Opposition (before this Court's Decision and Minute Entry that
set the default judgment aside.) It was a notarized record of S.L. County Jail Records, and it

shows that I was first released from jail, (following the December 3 r arrest that resulted in the
temporary impound of my car,) on January 17, J08. My own Verizon cellular phone records
confirm and verify what I also remember: that from my very first communication with Jordan
Credit Union, (talking to someone whose name I do not exactly remember, except that it was the
person I was told that I must talk to because she was in charge of my loan account, and car - 1
wrote it all down, of course, but I do not have those notes with me here,) always, from the very
first conversation, the sale of my car was being reported as a 'done deal' and accomplished fact.
I remember asking her incredulously, "You sold my $9,000.00 car to a salvage yard for
$200.00!" "Yes," she answered, "it had some front end damage and we couldn't get the car to
start.".. . Incredible!
But here's my point, which is a huge question: Out of jail, which was not until about 5pm
on January 17th, which was a Thursday, too late to call anybody then, I began my calls to ailimportantly retrieve my car, on the following morning, Friday, 1/18/08 - and I was told that the
girl I needed to talk to at Jordan Credit Union was unavailable to talk with me until that
following Monday, which would have been January 21, '08. Now learning that the sale of my
car did not take place, according to Plaintiffs newest Memorandum..., until January 23rd, then I
was either being lied to when I talked to her, or she avoided all of my telephone calls for three
days while she made the final arrangements that sold my car for a mere pittance of its actual, real
and true value!
Apparently there is a law already in place that is meant to ensure that the sale of a
repossessed vehicle does not involve any self-dealing (by proxy, or otherwise, presumably.)
Given the very fishy smell emanating from this transaction, especially in light of my own
inquiries being stalled and/or avoided for 3 long days before - by Plaintiffs own admission this sale had been finalized, completed on January 23rd, I think it would be very interesting
indeed to get both these parties in Court, or before a Deposition Hearing? . . .
22. So, here again, I most vehemently dispute everything about the so-called material
"facts," as characterized and alleged by this Plaintiff, regarding both the "reasonable" and
adequate Notice provided me, the customer, by Plaintiff- along with nearly everything else
about the sale of my car by them, and which I, in turn, must instead characterize as arbitrary and
capricious, especially hasty and recklessly impetuous, as well as mean-spirited and malicious, or
worse. . . There was no adequate or reasonable Notice provided me, nor was this car of mine
sold for a fair price.
23. I have already shown how, by far, the best price Plaintiff could have received for the
collateral asset would have been simply to have left me in it - kept the loan alive, and thereby
received every last penny as we originally contracted between us by the terms of the Contractual
Loan Agreement. It would appear they very arrogantly and cavalierly assumed (presumed) that
my mother's bank would compensate them for the entire amount of any collateral deficiency
owing, regardless how reckless and impetuous their own failure to mitigate the collateral
deficiency damages. It would appear they just didn't care, in their rush to find the "less
burdensome" route. Unfortunately for them, neither my mother nor my bank has the slightest
obligation, nor inclination, to continue to help me pay for a car I no longer have. Sadly, I have
been sent to prison ten times over the last twenty-two years, and haven't a single valuable or
worthwhile asset to my name, nor do I have any marketable job skills or prospects, either. Still,
if this Court should decide not to rule in my favor, it will be a shame for my credit to have been
fruitlessly ruined by the egregiously remiss and unfair treatment of me by this Plaintiff... and
for the bad precedents being set, to the detriment of everyone else behind me who might be

considering to finance a car - particularly from this Plaintiff whose bad behavior would then
have been encouraged, rewarded and protected, no matter that they have demonstrated a callous
indolence and disregard for my own rights and reasonable expectations in this matter.
24. It is my contention that Plaintiffs Notice of Repossession, dated 12/11/07 - which
was their only attempt at communication with me - and which said, (see Plaintiffs Exhibit C)
"A sale may take place at any time without further notice to you. If you need more information
about the sale you may write us or call us," was a most inadequate notice which not only violates
the Loan Contract itself, (and as I have already shown, please see #15, herein,) which required
10, not 9 days notice between December 11th and December 20th; it also seems to fall far short of
the 'reasonable notice of the sale' required to be given to the debtor, as proscribed by law.
25. Neither was Plaintiffs decision to sell my/their collateral asset, (my car!,) to a
salvage yard for a mere pittance of its real, true and actual value a "commercially reasonable"
decision. Just now please consider that when the original Loan Agreement and Contract was
made and accepted by this Plaintiff (October 2005,) my car's retail value was accepted to be
worth $11,500.00 which was the amount of the loan, zero down payment required, (the amount
financed being $12,829.00 after fees and sales tax were added on.) This car was also accepted to
be, at that time, an adequate collateral sufficiently enough to meet their own security in the
amount loaned to me.
Now, only 25 months later, (25 monthly payments later,) they 'stretch and scramble' to
make the sale of this collateral seem more reasonable in their arguments, by purporting that its
value had sunk to a mere (See Plaintiffs new Memorandum... @ Pg. 11) "wholesale price of
the vehicle . . . between $3200.00 and $4400.00" However, this is a wholesale Trade-In value
and it is one year more dated (Kelly Blue Book, 10/28/2008) than when they actually sold my
car for $200.00, as evidenced by their self-serving Exhibit CD' (attached to Michelle Rogers'
Affidavit) which, being a year different, newer, of course places less valuation on my car than it
was worth in December, 2007.
26. Even still, their own submitted math is wrong, becoming yet one more disputed socalled material "facts" in this case. First, and primarily because, as I have already shown, their
allegation that my car needed $2600.00 for enormously inflated and exaggerated costs of repair,
additional to an undiagnosed engine problem, and as declared by Ken Martinez, lacks credibility,
(to say it kindly.)
Moreover, even if this Court were accepting of that testimony despite its contradiction of
record by both Mirror Image Auto Body and Paint, AND by the tow and impound receipt
showing no broken windows, headlights, taillights, etc... the math is still wrong insomuch as
$4400.00 (disputed) less greatly exaggerated costs of repairs @ $2600.00 (also disputed,) leaves
a collateral asset amount of $1800.00, not $200.00. Furthermore, what prudent and responsible
business person would ever loan at retail, and sell for wholesale? Other credit unions sometimes
park their repossessed automobiles outside the business with FOR SALE signs in the window,
presumably to best recoup their money in loans gone bad, ie. when a loan customer fails to make
his promised payments. Jordan Credit Union seems not to care about any of that: it was far
easier for them to hastily sell my car willy-nilly for any old price so long as it was quick and
easy, 'less burdensome," and because they figured I could be made to pay for their improvident
mistakes, no matter how badly they behaved. As such, for egregious and cavalier FAILURE TO
MITIGATE THEIR DAMAGES, one might almost regard this resulting collateral deficiency as
their just and deserved 'rewards'. Most certainly, this disposition of collateral has not been made
"in conformity with reasonable commercial practices among dealers," and as Article 9 of the

Uniform Commercial Code proscribes. As the Utah Court of Appeals has previously ruled, the
vehicle must be sold for a "fair price," (sans self-dealing.)
CONCLUSION
Had I been left in charge of my own car, Fd have sold it for its true worth, retail to a
private buyer, and had money left over after paying off my loan completely, like as not - and this
more closely approximates what any "reasonable commercial practices among dealers" would
similarly dictate under these circumstances. Not the "less burdensome" route? Less burdensome
would have been to take a few extra minutes to try and communicate to me, Plaintiffs steady
and reliable customer for over 2 years. It was also a courtesy that I had every right to expect.
They loaned for $12,000.00, then sold for $200.00: no wonder they lost money and there's a
collateral deficiency let over once the smoke from their rash and hasty, arrogant and arbitrary
caprices clears the air.
Accordingly, I pray for this Court's relief from these bogus and unjust claims. And, I
additionally argue that I should myself be compensated from out of the pockets of this Plaintiff
(who, in their original Complaint, and in their vehement argument against their previously
obtained judgment by default against me, too - were seeking to 'slip' a default judgment through
which would have been a judgment obtained for exactly double the amount they now are more
modestly alleging their collateral deficiency to bel)
I hereby seek compensation for the full 2 months car loan payments accepted by them
after they already had repossessed my car, and also for a fair and modest $250.00 replacement
costs borne by me when all of my personal property inside the vehicle turned up missing, which
included a sizeable amount of expensive, as well as sentimentally-valued and irreplaceable
clothing, (and which included my Flame-In-Go's Prison Firefighter 'Hot Shots' crew sweatshirt.)
Additionally, I pray this Court's relief for any other punitive cost relief and damages which this
Court feels it to now be appropriate to award me. This has been an entirely unwarranted
Complaint since its inception: one neither I, nor this Court, should ever have had to waste its
time with. Thank You for these considerations.

CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing and attached document (Memorandum and
Reply In Support of My Preceding Motion to Dismiss, and Defendant Answer to Plaintiffs
[Original] Complaint, AND as an OPPOSITION RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT) was sent to the following people by FIRST CLASS,
PREPAID MAIL on the date specified, for Case #080903840.
TO: Richard C. Terry, and Douglas Oviatt
Attorneys for Plaintiff
39 Exchange Place
Suite 100
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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>d ol any prepaid u n e v n n r i insurnnro promiums may be
Irom us or Irom Iho msurunce company narnod in youi
•"fi/lilicjie ol insurance
SHIP A N D DUTIES T O W A R D PROPERTY Oy giving us a
teresi in Ihc Property you reprr«u»nl nnd agree to the following
sr*( unty intcrcbl will nol exlpnd lo consume! goods unless
t arquiio righL I D thorn withm JO d lys nltLr we fmiei mio Ihu.
rtracl nr thr y are installed in ui rfllued to Iht Vchu I I
J will delnno our mliirL^ls in the Property iqarnst ciiims nnrtn
anyone alsr You will do whatLvLf u ntcr ss iry to kepp out
rm lo the Pioperty i h e a d ol the claim ol anyone Hsr
e spcunty mtr rnst you are qiving us in the P openy cumcb
ead of the claim of any other ol your ocnoral or secured
dilors N ou agree lo sign i n y addilioml documents or provide
with m v additional mlorinalion w*» m a / rcquia lo ktet) our
im to It-tn Propprty dln.mJ of Iho claim of anyone else You will
I do anything to change our Intornsl in thp Property
u will KLI p the Properly in your po^sussion in good condition
d repair You will use Ihe Property lor its intended and lawful
rposts Unless ollwrwise agretd in writing Hie Pioperty will
located at your address listed on paqe I of ihis Conlraci
>u will not attempt lo sell the Properly (unless il is properly
nnliliod inventory) or olherwise transfer any rights in tho
operty to anyone olso without our prior written consent
)U will pay all taxes and assessments on Ihe Property as they
come due
3U will notify us of any loss or damage to the Property You will
ovide us reasonable access lo the Property lor Ihe purpose ol
specfion Our entry und inspection must be accomplished
vvfufly and without breaching the peace
J L T You will be tn default on this Conlraci if any one of the
3 occurs (except a t prohibited by law)
ou fan L> portorm BI ) obligation tnal you nave undertaKen in
Is Conlraci
to In good faith believe thut you cannot or will nol pay or
crform Ihe obligations you have agreed to In this Conlraci
u default you agree to pay our costs lor collecting amounts
including without limitation court costs attorneys foes and
t r e p o s s e s s i o n repair storage a n d safe of fhe Property
q this Contract
i e v e n ! of default occurs as lo any one of you we may
e our remndies Hgainsl any or all of you
D f E S II you are In dofauft on this Contract we have all of the
OE provided by law and this Contract
Vc may require you lo immediately pay us sub/eel lo any
elund required by law the remaining unpaid balanro ol .the
mount financed finonct Lhnrges and all othor agreed charges
Ve r m y pay hvr»s assessments or olhor liens or make repairs
o the Proprrty il VDU have nol done J>O We are nol required to
lo so Any amounl wc pay will be added lo the amount you owe
is and will be due immediately This amounl wiH earn tinance
.barge* Irom Ihe date paid al the posl maturity rale described
n Ihn PHOMISF TO PAY ANO PAYMENT TERMS section unlil
i nd in lull
tye may requirr you lo ma.kP Ihe Prnpprty availablp to us at a
)hce w« dt ngnale Hint is reasonably convenient to you and us
\i. rruy iirrrodiulGly akr p o r r »,nn o h i Pron?rt> hy logrfi
)rorHSs or sell help but in doing i o we muy not breach Iho
Miace or unlawfully inter onto /oui piomses Wc may then sell
hr» Property and apply v l n t WP rnrtMvn as provided by law to out
casonjble expenses arxf then toward your obligations
xrept w f i m t)rohibiled by l3w we may sue you foi ndcfiimml

«» p^?r,jwe ma ,r r8qu,re addmo n^Tro rrt b y B ^^^o™ 0 ^ oa" 2
°"

an

*

5Uch

P0*^

, n t h e BVBn<

°'

toSS

°f ^ ^ " ^

5

P a V™ n < <"*** * * " J ? " •"»«*««•• P " * * * * 5 , 0 b B US"J
*£%""
« * • * » » » P'°P**V Y o " J ^ t h j l « ^ J T ^ X ^ r ^ Y o u
cover the amounts you still owe us you w*l pay the drfference You
may purchase or provide the Insurance t h r o u g h any insurance
company reasonably acceptable to us You wdl keop me insuiance In
lull force and effect until this Contruct Is paid in lull
|( y o u | a | | to o b , d | n 0 f m j , n l u | p , h l s , n s U rance 0 f n a r n e us as a
loss payee we may oblam insurance to protect our Interest in lho
Pmperty This insunnce may includo coverages nol required o, you
This in ur nice may be written by a company othei Ihun ono you
would choose II may be written ol B rate higher Wun u rate you could
obtain il y >u puichaoed the prooerty inburonco roquued by this
Contrarl We will add the pmmium lor this insurance to Iho amount
yon owe us Any nmount we pay will bo due immediately This
amounl will c u m finrincu chaiqes Irom Ihe dale paid at the post
maturity rale I I L ^ M I M ri in Ihu PROMISE TO PAY AND PAYMENT
' E K M S iPctior unlil pfnd in lull
O B L I G A T I O N S I N D E P E N D E N T Earn person who signs this
Conn i d agrnRs lo pay this Cnnlrart ncrording to its terms This
mcd/is ihe lollowmg
A You must pay \hn Contract even il someone else has also
siuncd il
B Wc may release any co buyer or guarantor i n d you will still be
obligaled lo pay this Contract
C Wo may roleas*» nny socunty and yDU will still be obligaled to
p i y this Conlraci
D II we give up any of our right* il will nol affect your duty lo pay
this Conlraci
£ If we extend new credit or renew this Conlraci II will nol affect
your duty lo pay this Conlraci
W A R R A N T Y Warranty information is provided lo you separately
W A I V E R I D the e r l e n t permitted by law y o u agrBe to give up
y o u r r i g h t s to r e q u i r e u« to do c e r t a i n t h i n g *
We are n o t
required to (1) demand payment ol amount» duo (2) give notice
that • m o u n t s due have not be«n paid or hBve not boon paid m
the appropriate amount time or mnnneT or (3) give notice thai
we Intend to make or are making this Contract Immediately due
T H I R D P A P T V AGREEMEH"1"
By signing bolow you agree tc gfve us a socunty Interest m the
Property described In Ihe SALE section Y D U also agree to the
lerms ol Ihis Contract including the W A I V E R section above
except thai you will not be liable lor the payments rt requires Your
interesl in the P r o p e r t y may be used to s a l i s l y the B u y e r s
obligation You agree that we may renew extend change this
Contract or release any party or property wtthoul releasing you
Irom this Contract We may lake t r e s e steps without notice or
demand upon you
YDU acknowledge receipt of a complalnd copy ol this Contract

Signature

Date

NOTICE ANY HOLDER OF THIS CONSUMER CREDIT
CONTRACT IS SUBJECT TO ALL CLAIMS AND DEFENSES
WHICH THE DEBTOR COULO ASSERT AGAINST THE SELLER
OF GOODS OR SERVICES OBTAINED PURSUANT HERETO OR
WITH THE PROCEEDS HEREOF RECOVERY HEREUNDER BY
THE DEBTDR SHALL NOT EXCEED AMOUNTS PAID BY_ THE
DEBTOR HEREUNDER
IF V 0 U A Q E BUYING A USED ^EHIC E THE INFORMATION
YOU SEE OH THE WINDOW FORM FOR THIS VEHICLE IS
PART OF THIS CONTRACT INFORMATION ON THE WINDOW
FORM OVERRIDES ANY CONTRARY PROVISIONS IN THE
CONTRACT OF SALE

A S S I G N M E N T BY S E L L E R
cits ui»d i--»i0ir thes RetjH Inst dlnton! Conunrt and Getunty Agr«>omonl ( f nnlii»a) lo thu Arsti|non lit successors and »8slgns Including all UB rights
d inloirsl m this Conlnct and any yuHiunlue o*ocutod HI connection wilh HiK Contiuel belter gives Aisigrxie lull p o m * otthoi in its uwn nurrw or in
namr to n k o «« lotP* ™ °<h»r actions which Solior could havo t <ken undor Ihis Contract (SFPARATE AGREEMCNT II this. A6»Kjnmont Is m»de under
ns ol o sofwiHle ugien-nwiil as intfcatud on puye 1 tlw lonns ot the. icaigrwminl o«o dacenbod in a sopirato wnttng(c) and not as prov>ded below)
or w,irrjnl«;
, Contract rppreM.Mli, » s^lu by Soller to Duyor on o timt pncc batm. and rwl ot» d casl busts
r Homnnis ctmlnnmif in this Contract ar« true end correct
down paynwrt was made by Ihe Buyer in the manner siatod un pagu l ol this Ctjnir<tei dnd exeont tor the ^pptcation ot wry mnmiiacUjter t> rebate no
nl lho dnwn pn^mrnt wafi lonnr d or pud tolhe Duycrby 5c«or or Sailor's roprosonlalivns
s ilo w i s complated m accordance witti all appticjbk. Itdurui dnd •itulc laws niKi regulations
> Controet is vulni dtid enlorcnnblo in accordinco with lis lonns
nomas und signatures on Ihu Conlraci ere nol forged lIclltioiA or usaurned and atr true and correct
3 COMIMLI IS vo^lud m Hio i>Hter Ireo ol all lions is nol subject to any daims oi dafunses of the Buyor and iruy bn sold or ©signed by the Solior
amolotoly Oiled m copy ol this Conlrod was dolrvered to HK. Duyor at the Iwm. of onocution
Vohldc lias bLeti r> Jrvtw06 to Iho Buyor m pood condilion and has been acc«plod by Guyer
l«r hds or will period o socunly Inttresl in IHB Property In Javor of the /usigrtec
ny ol tliea" wdrronlioc ts breached or unlrue SA»m will upon Asstgnoc s demand purchnso ihis Conlraci Irom Assignee The purchase shall be in cash
imounl ol the unpaid balance finclodinq finance charges) plui HH. casts and oxpenscs ol Assignee including attorney; leas
Icr v l l n JLmriiy A^Mjnr-c in pn) loss Kiislained by il bewuw ol |ud»cial set-oH or BS tho rosutt ol a rocoven/ made againsl Assigneo as a resuH of o
w Uelense Buyer h is agdmsl Sollcr
lo wiiivcb nollcp of Ilvr HCcnulnnre ol ihis Ajwignmonl nol ice ol non-paymonl or non poriormanco and notlco o* any other rernedios availablo to
<s.
HJMIX may without notice lo Se»r»r ttnd wiHioul tidecting UH* Imbirty of Selloi undor jhis Arwonniont compound oi roloaae any rights against and grant
lnn<- ol Hmn lor pnymiini lo bo rmdc to Buyer and any othor parson obligated undei Ihis Contruel
1
3 S O T H T n w i E IMI^C^TLO ON PACE 1 THIS ASSIGNMENT li, WITHOUT FtECOURSE
Rl C n t j n r r

II linn A Mgmnont r muJe wilh re'course'

. Indiuitod on p^ya I A^jyuec tjkos l h „ Aswy»««»o(il wdh cudam i»ghuj ol locourse tigamsl
«i "->"mnn
nnrtwnnnrn ndnr tins r o n l t ^ r l Sflllflr will UJMXI demand rnpunJi isn thrs

$9 -^ - ^ J 3 ^ -

Setter
M O M E N T CONTRACT
&{/fllTY AGHEfMEHT

ACCESS jurro

BEfflBVBI^

22^ utf'cm, IT Miw

£***T „nd •vour' mean each Buyer above and
" V o U B S S S C jointly anditndrviduaUy
^ ^ n the Solter above ts
v
« ' loree to purchase t r o r T ^ r T r — — • ^ g g o r e and assigns
fesTcSSdart
socunly agreement (Contract) Iho
"^t'dnd'us"

^
^
ton ol

^

^

to

Year

^

2003

ohick.

^

V,N
4A3A*3«***
L t No/Year

— £5?*

ed

torms ^

g
j 7

^

*

f

^

L

^

" ^

aCCCSSOn

°5

and

anachmems

7 6

D N e w ^ p Used

ion of
f

nth
n*Y

To secure vour n^i—'

•

,

1 and

>as dtUchrnenls W ^ ™ "

; - s i g n to us and & £ ? * £ &

TTTh^oTitract you oive us a socunty interest In the Vehicle oil

P ^ o m u n c e under the terms * » »
S

3

^

'

^

^

A

?

^

|0^,Mer

^ a , , ^ properly and proceeds ol the Property

' e f U n d S ° ' " * **"*"*

"*

" " "

C

°n"°ClS ^

'

^

" ^

S E T O P A Y A N D P A Y M E N T T E R M S Vou promise to pay us the pnnanal amount ol S _ 1 2 B 2 S L M _ ^
P'us ..nance
Un
accruing on the unpaid bafdnc
I
^ J « « — % P*' y e a f l r , H " t U d d y S
'" m u , u r r t y F l n a n c e c h a ' 9 « * accrue on o
day t u s * Aher r n a . l v or niter you defdutf and we d»m„nd payment we will earn fmance charges on the unpaid
»'

1 3 W .

% por yoa/ You auroe lo pay this Contract acrordirxj to the payment .chodule and late charge provisions shown «

™ IN LENDING DISCLOSURES You TJSO agree to pay any additional amounts according to the terms and conditions of Irus Contract
ITIONAL FINANCE C H A R G E
* <> «ho Cash Puce

You agruo \a pav an additional finance charge ol S

i/J

D pa.d proportionally with each payment You agree .ha. I

that will be U paid in cash

j/A

ol the prepa.d l.nance ctMryui,

mroJunddb«B il you puy th.b Conmci in M before the moturily ddtu
A Y M E N T YOL ateo agree to pay or apply Hi » » Cash Pnce on u. bolo.o todays date any cash rebate and net trade in value described

3

MIZATION OF AMOUNT FINANCED

0 You agrBe to make deterred payments as part ol the cash down payment as reflected in

monl Schedule
T R U T H IN L E N D I N G D I S C L O S U R E S
ANNUAL
ENTAGE RATE
sl ol your credit as
yearly rale

FINANCE
CHARGE
The dollar amounf (he
credit will cost you

5.5&t

21*1.32

nt S c h o d u l e
r ol Payments

%

c

12S29

$

M

Your payment schedule will be
Amount ol Payments

;—rrosrnc

1493«. 52
When Payments Are Due

worruLT wanaiw u/i9/*a

226.22

£6

ty

TOTAL SALE P R I C E
AMOUNT P N A N C E D TOTAL OF PAYMENTS
The amount ol credit
The amount you w»H have Tho total cost of your purcruis« on
provided to you or on
paid when you have made credit, induing your down payment ol
your behafl
oil scheduled payments.

You are giving a security interest m tlvj Motor Vehicle purchasod
a . - , * — J l a v s ty?

Charge M a payment is more than

I of

vou

* * fa charged
v k i a h *vitrr i j i

gr*«tw

t b * dslin**^***- * » o u n t o r 93m, HJ d u l l u x * ,

rment If you pay off this Contract early you will not huvo to pay B penalty
• H you pay oil this Contract early you may be entitled to B relund ol pan ol the Additional Rnance Charge
ct P r o v i s i o n s You can see the terms ol this Contract lor any additional information about nonpayment delault any required
ent before the scheduled date and prepayment refunds and penalties
I N S U R A N C E Credit life credit disability (accident and
and any other insurance coverage quotBd below Bre not
to obUun cred/t and we will not provtde them unless you sign
e to pay the addltora' pror-ium. II you want :>uch insurance
btaln rt lor you (if you quality lor coverage) Wo are quoting
V1Y the coveragos you hove chosen to purchase

lo D Joint
iaabllity

urnr

I/A

Prern 3 .

ITEMIZATION OF A M O W T R N A N C E D
Vehicle Pnce (mcl sales tax of $

, / f

Prem S

$_

Cash Down Payment

J_

~xrr
~mr

a Total Cash/Rebate Down
Trade-In Allowance

$

1 Z 2 W

—*rt

'

I22397Wr

1/A

Deferred Down Payment S _

T T

*

) $
* J

CsahFrlct
Manufadurer's Rebato

Insured.

|le D Joint

" M . M

Service Contract Paid to

N/A

%_

S

* ^

Less Amount owinq %

*

Paid to (includes I )
d Net Trade In (b mmus c)

S_

e Net CastVTradB In (a plus d ) 5 _
tatuip below nitons you v;nrtt (only) tl>o insurance coverage(s)
bo e II none dre qixited you have doclmed any coveragos we

f

""K7A

~trr

Amount to Finance line e (rt e is negative)

Down Payment (e

"*.••

disclose as 50 it negative)

Unpaid Balance ot Cash Price
d/o/b

Buyer

d/o/b

)PERTY I N S U R A N C E You niubl insure the Property securing
Udd You may purchase or provide the Insurance through any
e company reasonably acceptable to us Tlw cottision coverage
>le may not excoed $
tlirough us you will pay 5

"^*
_.

Paid to Public Oflictols

Filing Fees

Insurance Premiums
Additional Finance Charoe(s) Paid to Seller
ftocu—ntmarj
f*
"H7*A"

II you gel insuranco
lor

fl/A

-IMTWT

_ of covuragu

M7A

imiurn is calculated as follows
W\

DBdudlbte Collision Covorage S_

*/A

Deductible Comprehensive Cov S _

Thelt and Combtned Addilional Coverage $ _
S_

M/A
•/A
H/A
K/A

ty i n a u r a n c e c o v e r a g e for bodily Injury a n d motor
e d a m a g e c a u a o d to o t h e r * Is not I n c l u d e d in this
ct unless c h e c k e d a n d Indicated
IGLE INTEREST INSURANCE

Y D U must purchase

nlorest insurance as pari of this sale transaction You may
>B the coverage from a company ol your choteo reasonably
ible to us

II you buy the coverage Worn or through us you

5

lor
.

RVICE C O N T R A C T

of coverage

With your purchase of the Vehicle

oe to purchase a Service Contract lo cover
This Service Conlruct will be m

3NMENT

Total Othor Chargea/Amounla Pd lo O t h a n
Less PnapBld Finance Charge*
Amount Financed
We may retain or recotve a portion of this amount

NOTICE TO BUYER
(1) Do not sign this agreement before you read it or if
It contains any blank spaces (2) You are entitled to a
completely flllcd-ln copy of this agreement (3) Under
the law, you have the right to pay off in advance the
full amount due and undar certain conditions to
obtain a partial refund of the finance charge
BY SIGNING BELOW BUYER AGREES TO THE TERMS ON
FAGES 1 AND 1 OF THIS CONTRACT AND ACKNOWLEDGES
HECEIPT OF A COPY OF THIS CONTRACT
l*/§3/«3

This Contract and Secunty Agreement is assigned
Signature

the Assignee phone
This assignment is made D undor the \eimh
irwralr agroemtiol D undur tho torms ol Uw ASSIGNMCf/T

'

J

v

le/M/ea
Signature

Dale

Offender* 8481

USP # 17265

SUNIVILLE HARRY F

T - SAI T I A K F

Annollato M 20090398
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Ruling-3HARRY SUNIVILLE
Memorandum Decision -Request to Submit

01/05/2009

172 174

Answer & Memorandum and reply in support of motion to dismiss and opposing
response to pltfs motion for summary judgment HARRY SUNIVILLE

01/05/2009

175-193

Sep 4 2009
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE
JORDAN CREDIT UNION,

Appellate #:20090398

vs. S U N M L L E , HARRY

J7AH APPELL^Tcs COUhu
Entry Date

Page Number

03/04/2008

1-9

06/27/2008

10-12

Affidavit of Attorney Fees and Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements

07/10/2008

13-16

Military Service Affidavit and Order (no bond required)

07/11/2008

17-21

Default Certificate

07/11/2008

22

Information Statement of Judgment Creditor @J

07/25/2008

23-24

Default Judgment

07/25/2008

25-26

Court's Minute Entry re ex parte communications

08/01/2008

27-28

Notice of Entry of Default Judgment

08/01/2008

29-30

Notice of Judgment Lien

08/01/2008

31-32

Request for Copy; and Motion to Dismiss, or to Restart the Clock Sufficient for me
to Answer in Defense Against this Complaint; and Memorandum in Support HARRY SUNIVILLE

08/29/2008

33-36

Petition for Court Appointed Counsel, and Memorandum in Support - HARRY
SUNIVILLE

08/29/2008

37-39

Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants Motion to Dismiss and/or Motin for
Relief from Judgment

09/18/2008

40-51

Request to Submit for Decision (defs Motion to Dismiss . . . )

10/02/2008

52-54

Court's Minute Entry - defs Motion to Dismiss . . . . denied; judgment is set aside;
pi to mail complaint to def; def to file answer within 20 days; this ME will stand as
Court Order

10/09/2008

55-57

Memorandum and Reply to Plaintiffs Opposing Memorandum

10/14/2008

58-74

Certificate of Service of Complaint

10/17/2008

75-76

Motion to Dismiss and Defendant's Answer to Plaintiffs Complaint - HARRY
SUNIVILLE

11/10/2008

77-101

Motion for Summary Judgment - RICHARD C TERRY

11/21/2008

102-104

Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment and in Opposition to Deefndant's Renewed Motion to Dismiss

11/21/2008

105-117

Affidavit of Michelle Rogers

11/21/2008

118-132

Declaration of Ken Martinez

11/21/2008

133-137

Exhibit E (submitted in Addendum to Motion to Dismiss and Defendant's Answer
to Plaintiffs Complaint)

11/25/2008

138-142

Request to Submit for Decision (defs Motion to Dismiss)

12/02/2008

143-145

Reply and Objection

12/16/2008

146-150

Second Affidavit of Michelle Rogers

^nrntie^
r

^Jnmons & Complaint - Harry F Suniville

12/16/2008

151-157

Memorandum Decision (defs Motion to Dismiss denied)

12/19/2008

158-160

Notice to Submit for Decision (pi's Motion for Summary Judgment)

12/19/2008

161-163

Notice- Reply memorandum, filed by plaintiff on 12/16/08, was never received by
me

12/30/2008

164-168

Motion for Court Appointed Counsel, and Memorandum in Support - Request for
Ruling - HARRY SUNIVILLE

12/31/2008

169-171

Memorandum Decision -Request to Submit

01/05/2009

172-174

Answer & Memorandum and reply in support of motion to dismiss and opposing
response to pltfs motion for summary judgment- HARRY SUNIVILLE

01/05/2009

175-193

Sep 4, 2009
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE

v903840

Appellate #:20090398

JORDAN CREDIT UNION, vs. SUNIVILLE, HARRY

^ocurnentj^

Entry Date

Page Number

| 5 5 T l c i ^ F M O T I O N FOR SUMMARY JUDGMEN

01/05/2009

194-196

Defendant objects to plaintiff's objection

01/07/2009

197-203

Notice to Court and to Plaintiff, re Hearing 3/2/09

01/21/2009

204-206

Defendants questions to this court

02/04/2009

207-209

Affidavit of Ron Hinckley
Notice to Court and to Plaintiff, Regarding New Evidence

02/24/2009

210-213

02/24/2009

214-216

;opy of Notice to Court and to Plaintiff, Regarding New Evidence with attached
>ngmal docs, defs request to make copies, his payment on the way, copies
nade; sent copies to Richard C. Terry, holding defs copies here for hearing on
./2/0 '
jfidavit/declaration from Mirror Image Autobody and Paint

02/24/2009

217-224

02/25/2009
03/02/2009

225-229
230

ourt's Memorandum Decision and Order: the Court grants plaintiffs motion for
jmmary judgment.

04/06/2009

231-236

tter to the Court from defendant requesting copies; copies sent 4/17/09

04/17/2009

237-239

htary Service Affidavit

04/29/2009

240-243

fidavit of Attorney Fees and Memorandum of Costs and Dispursement

04/29/2009

244-251

>tice of Appeal and Memorandum in Support

05/07/2009

252-255

preme Court of Utah-Letter to Mr Suniville Jr. -Notice of Appeal has been filed;
ase reflect case number 20090398-SC on any future filings

05/14/2009

256-257

oreme Court of Utah-ORDER-Effective twenty days from May 14, 2009 this
tter will transfer to Utah Court of Appeals-20090398-SC

05/14/2009

258-259

tificate Regarding Inmate Account

05/15/2009

260-264

ion and Affidavit for Waiver of Court Fess (appeal from the 3rd District) RRY SUNIVILLE

05/20/2009

265-269

T FOUND IN FILE-Request for Transcript

05/20/2009

270

rt Order on Motion for Waiver of Court Fees Appeal from Third District Civil
rt (granted)

05/22/2009

271

" FOUND IN FILE-lnformation Statement of Judgment Creditor @J

05/26/2009

272

iment and order granting pltfs motion for summary judgment
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